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amended.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The Housing Authority disagrees with Snyder's statement of
the issues in this case. Accordingly, the Housing Authority
submits its own version of the issues presented on appeal,
accompanied with the pertinent standard of review.
1.

WHETHER SNYDER PROPERLY PRESERVED THE ISSUES
SURROUNDING THE SETTING OF A TRIAL DATE, AND IF SO,
WHETHER SNYDER WAS ENTITLED TO A CONTINUANCE OF THE
TRIAL DATE.

Standard of Review: As a general matter, appellate courts
will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal.
Snyder had an obligation to raise all of the issues that could
have been raised at the trial level.

Those issues not raised are

waived and cannot be considered on appeal. Condas v. Condas,
P.2d 491, 495 n. 8 (Utah 1980).

618

Even if Snyder had preserved

this issue at the trial court, whether the trial court acted
improperly in denying any request by Snyder for a continuance is
within the discretion of the trial court and a trial court's
decision in this regard can be reversed only if there is an abuse
of discretion. Christensen

v. Jewkes,

-1-

761 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1988).

2.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT
DETERMINED THAT SNYDER HAD COMMITTED AN ASSAULT.

Standard of Review: Whether Snyder engaged in criminal
behavior is a question of fact.

Thus, this issue is reviewed

under a "clearly erroneous" standard. State
932, 935 (Utah 1994).

v. Pena,

869 P.2d

To properly challenge the trial court!s

factual findings, the appellant must marshal the evidence in
support of the trial court's findings, then show that despite
this evidence, and despite the reasonable inferences from the
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as
to be inadequate. West Valley

City

v. Majestic

Investment

Co.,

818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
3.

WHETHER SNYDER WAS EVICTED UNDER A VALID LEASE
PROVISION.

Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of law.
Because the issue is one of law, this Court may review the trial
court's legal conclusions for correctness.
Inc.

v. Kurzet,

omitted).

Bailey-Allen

Co.,

876 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citation

However, this issue was not properly preserved at the

trial court.

Thus, this Court should not consider it as it is

being raised for the first time on appeal.

Condas v.

Condas,

618

P.2d 491, 495 n. 8 (Utah 1980).
4.

WHETHER SNYDER WAS ENTITLED TO A GRIEVANCE HEARING
BEFORE AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION COULD BE FILED.

Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of law
and is therefore subject to a review of the trial court's legal

-2-

Bailey-Allen

conclusion, if any, for correctness.
Kurzet,

Co.,

Inc.

v.

876 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citation

omitted).

However, once again, Snyder failed to adequately

preserve this issue at trial or elsewhere in the record, thus the
Condas v. Condas,

issue is not properly before this Court.

618

P.2d 491, 495 n. 8 (Utah 1980).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The interpretation of Utahfs Forcible
Statute,

UTAH CODE ANN.§§

78-36-1 et seq.

Entry

and

Detainer

(1953), as amended,

is

both determinative and of central importance to the underlying
appeal.

Because the sections of the Forcible

Statute,

in toto

Entry

and

Detainer

are lengthy, a complete copy is attached hereto

as part of the Appelleefs Addendum.

In addition, the Appellee

incorporates the relevant provisions of the Code of Federal
Regulations at attached to Appellant's Brief as Attachment D.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The Housing Authority of the County of Salt Lake (the
"Housing Authority" or "landlord") sued John Thomas Snyder (the
"tenant" or "Snyder") for the unlawful detainer of the premises
owned by it and known as 1966 South 200 East, #A506, Salt Lake
City, Utah.
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Course of Proceedings
On or about March 6, 2000, the Housing Authority filed a
complaint against Snyder for the unlawful detainer of premises
owned by it and which were subject to a lease agreement between
the parties. (R. 1-16).

The trial court issued a Three Day

Summons which was duly served on Snyder on March 9, 2000. (R. 2123). Snyder filed an answer to the Housing Authority's complaint
on or about March 13, 2000. (R. 17-20). On or about March 20,
2000, the Housing Authority filed a Certificate of Readiness for
Trial indicating that the matter was ready to be set for a
hearing or trial. (R. 29-30). That same day Snyder filed a Motion
to Dismiss (R. 24-26) and an Objection to Certificate of
Readiness for Trial (R. 27-28). On or about March 27, 2000, the
trial court denied Snyder's motion to dismiss on the basis that
it had not been properly submitted for decision and the trial
court also denied Snyder's objection to trial. (R. 31). The
Housing Authority filed a memorandum in opposition to Snyder's
motion to dismiss. (R. 32-86).

However, Snyder's motion to

dismiss was never submitted for decision to the trial court. On
or about April 6, 2000, the trial court set the matter for trial
on May 8, 2000. (R. 87-88). Snyder filed several motions, two of
which are relevant to the issues raised on appeal. On May 8,
2000, the day of trial, Snyder filed a motion for continuance of
the trial date. (R. 153-166).

The Housing Authority duly filed a

response to Snyder's motion for continuance on May 8, 2000. (R.
205-217). On or about May 9, 2000, Snyder filed a motion for
-4-

summary judgment.

(R. 229-248).

The Housing Authority also

filed a response to Snyderfs motion for summary judgment on or
about May 8, 2000. However, the Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment does not
appear in the record.1 A copy of Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is attached
hereto as part of the Appellee's Addendum/

None of these

motions were submitted for decision to the trial court pursuant
to the provisions of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
See Rule 4-501, UTAH CODE JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION.
On May 8, 2000 at 2:00 p.m., a bench trial was held whereby
both parties were represented by counsel.
opening and closing statements.

Both parties presented

The Court also heard the

testimony of six witnesses. On June 13, 2000, the trial court
entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law and an order
of judgment in favor of the Housing Authority. (R. 265-271 and R.
295-99 respectively).

Snyder filed his Notice of Appeal on or

about June 21, 2000.

This is also recognized and acknowledged by Snyder.
Brief of Appellant at page 11 n. 2.
2

See

While the Appellee argues herein that the issues raised
in Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment were not properly
preserved in the trial court and thus not issues proper for
consideration on appeal, the Housing Authority includes a copy
for the Court's consideration if the Court of Appeals should find
otherwise.
-5-

Disposition in the Court Below
At a bench trial on the merits of the underlying case, the
Honorable Michael K. Burton presiding, the Third District Court
found in favor of the Housing Authority and against Mr. Snyder.
At the conclusion of the trial in this matter, the Court found
that Snyder had violated the lease and that after being served
with an appropriate notice to quit the premises, Snyder failed to
surrender possession of the premises. Transcript at 100-103. A
complete copy of the transcript of the Trial in this matter is
attached hereto as part of the Appellee's addendum. The court
duly entered its "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" and
"Judgment(Unlawful Detainer)". (R. 265-71 and R. 295-99
respectively).
Statement of Relevant Facts
1.

On or about August 7, 1998, the Housing Authority and

Snyder entered into a residential lease agreement for the
premises known as 1966 South 200 East, #A506, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84115. A copy of the Lease Agreement is attached as Exhibit
A to the Complaint filed in this action (R. 4-11) and was
admitted at trial as Plaintifffs Exhibit 1.
2.

Transcript at 76.

Among other terms and conditions, the Lease Agreement

provides:
(a) That the tenant shall have certain obligations, to wit:
"Resident and household members, guests and visitors will act in
a manner so as not to disturb any neighbors peaceful enjoyment of
his/her accommodations and refrain from all illegal or criminal

-6-

activity on or near the Premises.

Such illegal activity

includes, but is not limited to, the use or sale of drugs by the
Resident, household members, guests or visitors.11 Trial Exhibit 1
at page 4, paragraph 11(1); (R. 8 ) .
(b)

That the lease may be terminated: "Housing Authority

will evict Resident for nonpayment of rent, nonpayment of other
financial obligations due under the terms of the lease, making
any false of misleading statements concerning information
required by Housing Authority; criminal activity that threatens
the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment by other
residents; drug related criminal activity at or near the
Premises; repeated failure to comply with any other Resident's
obligation under the lease; or for other good cause." Trial
Exhibit at page 5 paragraph 17; (R. 9 ) .
(c)

That

ff

[t]enancy shall not terminate until the time for

Resident to request a grievance hearing has expired, if Resident
is entitled to a grievance hearing.

If Resident is entitled to a

grievance hearing and requests such in a timely fashion, tenancy
shall not terminate until the grievance process is completed."
Trial Exhibit 1 at page 6; (R. 10).
3.

In addition to being bound by the terms and

conditions of the lease agreement, the parties are bound by the
policies of the Housing Authority as well as all applicable
governmental regulations.

Trial Exhibit 1 at page 4 at paragraph

11D; (R. 8 ) . Section XIII of the Housing Authorityfs policies
sets forth the Housing Authority's "Grievance Procedure."

-7-

The

Housing Authority's "Rental and Policy Statement" was admitted at
trial as Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 3. (R. 70). As noted therein,
at section 7, the provisions of the grievance procedure do not
apply to the termination of a tenancy based upon a "tenant's
creation or maintenance of the threat to the health or safety of
other tenants or HA [Housing Authority] employees."
Exhibit 3, Section XIII(7).

Trial

A copy of the Housing Authority's

Grievance Procedure is attached hereto in Appellee's Addendum for
the convenience of the Court.
4.

Sherrie Rico, an employee of the Housing Authority,

is the manager of the apartment complex in which Snyder resided.
Transcript at 11-12.
5.

The Housing Authority is both the owner and the

landlord of the premises which are the subject of the underlying
litigation.
6.

Transcript at 14.
On or about February 23, 2000, Ms. Rico went to work

at the subject premises.

Transcript at 14. Ms. Rico went to her

office and Julie Keyou, a volunteer worker, was already there.
Transcript at 16.

Ms. Keyou informed Ms. Rico that Snyder wanted

to talk to her. Transcript at 16. Ms. Keyou and Ms. Rico called
Snyder on the telephone to let him know that Ms. Rico was at the
building.

Transcript at 16-17.

In response to the telephone

call, Snyder stated that he would be right down. Transcript at
17.

Snyder did go to Ms. Rico's office. Transcript at 17.
7.

Upon his arrival in Ms. Ricofs office, Snyder "came

into the office and walked in and closed the door[.]ff Transcript
-8-

at 17:19-20. Ms. Keyou was still in the room.

Transcript at 17.

Snyder initially sat down at the desk across from Ms. Rico and
Ms. Keyou. Transcript at 17-18. Snyder threw a piece of paper on
the desk and indicated to Ms. Rico that he displeased with a
request made of him by the Housing Authority.
18:6-11.

Transcript at

Snyder then proceeded to call Ms. Rico names and swear

at her. According to Ms. Rico's testimony, Snyder stated
l!

[y]ou!re God-damn right, you bitch, I'll call you what I want to

call you" and then Snyder continued with name calling.
Transcript at 18:18-21.

Snyder then stated, "[y]ou know, you

better pull up your fucking pantyhose you fucking bitch because
I'm going to get you on this." Transcript at 18:19-21. Ms. Rico
then inquired as to why he was so upset.

Snyder then stood up

and came around the desk to where Ms. Rico was positioned.
Transcript at 18-19.

As Snyder came around the desk toward Ms.

Rico he was thrusting his finger in her face and he was calling
Ms. Rico names as he was moving toward her.

Transcript 18-20.

Ms. Rico was frightened so she turned on her two-way radio to
alert other Housing Authority employees of her situation.
Transcript at 19-20.

Snyder finally left the office. Transcript

at 20.
8.

Following the incident with Snyder, Ms. Rico filed a

police report with the Salt Lake City police department.
Transcript at 22.
9,

Shortly thereafter, the Housing Authority served

Snyder with a "3-Day Notice of Termination of Lease Agreement".
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The "3-Day Notice of Termination of Lease Agreement" was received
into evidence at trial as Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. Transcript at
54. A copy of the termination notice is also attached as Exhibit
B to the Plaintifffs complaint.
10.

(R. 12-16).

Snyder failed to vacate the premises as demanded in

the "3-Day Notice of Termination of Lease Agreement" and the
underlying unlawful detainer action was initiated.

Transcript at

26.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In large part, Snyder has failed to preserve the issues
raised in his appeal in the trial court below.

Initially, Snyder

contends that the trial court acted improperly when it scheduled
the trial in this matter.

However, Snyder did not request a

continuance of the trial date until May 8, 2000, the date of the
scheduled trial.

Moreover, Snyder's motion for a continuance of

the trial date was never submitted to the Court for decision
pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration,

In any event, at such a late juncture, the trial

court denied Snyder's oral motion to continue the trial date.

In

addition, Snyder now contends that he was not permitted to
conduct discovery in this case.

However, Snyder never submitted

a request for discovery. The trial court acted properly in
denying Snyder's oral motion to continue the trial given the fact
that Snyder waited until the day of trial to ask the trial court
for a continuance.

The trial court acted within its sound

discretion in setting the trial date in this case. Moreover,
-10-

Utah law does provide for an expedited proceeding in unlawful
detainer actions.
Snyder further claims that the evidence does not support a
finding that he engaged in criminal activity.

In short, Snyder

claims that the trial court's finding of Snyder's criminal
activity was not supported by the facts adduced at trial.
However, Snyder has failed to satisfy his marshaling burden.
Instead of marshaling the evidence in support of the trial
court's findings, Snyder simply cites to examples in the record
which support a conclusion opposite to that found by the trial
court. The record clearly supports the trial court's finding that
Snyder engaged in criminal activity on or near the leased
premises.

Snyder has not demonstrated that the trial court

abused its discretion in finding that the actions of Snyder
constituted assault.
In addition, the lease agreement between the parties
provides for the eviction of a tenant under the circumstances of
the instant case.

However, again, Snyder failed to adequately

preserve this issue at trial.

While Snyder did file a motion for

summary judgment which raised some of the issues set forth in the
Appellant's Brief, the motion was not submitted to the trial
court for consideration and decision pursuant to the mandates of
Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
Finally, Snyder's contention that he was entitled to a
grievance hearing was likewise not preserved before the trial
court. Snyder did attempt to address this issue in his motion for
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summary judgment, but again, the motion was never submitted for
decision to the trial court.

Even if Snyder had preserved the

issue for appeal, the trial court did have subject matter
jurisdiction.

Thus, this Court should deny appellant's requested

relief.
ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANT CANNOT CHALLENGE THE SETTING OF THE TRIAL
DATE WITHOUT A POSSESSION BOND AND WITHOUT ADDITIONAL
TIME FOR DISCOVERY GIVEN HIS FAILURE TO PRESERVE THESE
ISSUES FOR APPEAL.

In his Brief of Appellant, the Appellant contends that the
trial court committed error when it scheduled the trial date in
this matter on two specific grounds.

Initially, Snyder contends

that the trial court committed error by setting the trial date
without a possession bond being posted.

Second, Snyder argues

that the trial court committed error when it set this case for
trial without allowing him to conduct discovery.
In terms of Snyder's first argument, the issue was not
preserved at the trial court level.

Snyder did pose this

argument in a Petition for Extraordinary Writ filed with this
Court on or about April 19, 2000.3

However, the Petition for

Extraordinary Writ should not be considered as part of the record
in the matter before the trial court.4

Thus, this issue is not

3

This Court denied Snyder's Petition for Extraordinary
Writ on or about May 4, 2000.
4

Snyder's counsel did file a copy of Snyder's Petition
for Extraordinary Writ with the clerk of the trial court, see R.
93-137, however, simply because the document was filed with the
-12-

properly before this Court for review.

See Section III

infra.

Also, it should be noted that this is the issue addressed by
Amicus in its filing with this Court.

This issue was not

properly raised and preserved and should not be considered by
this Court.5
Even if Snyder had preserved the issue of the posting of a
possession bond, the trial court nevertheless acted appropriately
in this matter.

The trial court has discretion and control over

its trial calendar.

Because the underlying action is an unlawful

detainer action, the matter is entitled to an expedited trial
setting.

See UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 78-36-1 et seq.

"The district

courts shall provide by rule for the placing of actions upon the
trial calendar (1) without request of the parties or (2) upon
request of a party and notice to the other parties or (3) in such
other manner as the courts may deem expedient.

be given

to actions

entitled

thereto

by statute."

Precedence
UTAH

R.

shall
CIV.

P.

40(a) (emphasis added).
The mandate of Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides guidance to this Court:
Upon motion of a party, the court may in its discretion, and
clerk of the court does not mean that it is a part of the record
duly considered by the trial court. Snyderfs action seeking
mandamus against Judge Michael K. Burton was never raised at the
trial court level and should not be considered as part of the
record for purposes of appeal.
5

While a definitive ruling on this issue would be
helpful, the posture of this case does not provide the basis for
such a ruling. The issue was not preserved.
-13-

upon such terms as are just, including the payment of costs
occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or
proceeding upon good cause shown. If the motion is made
upon the ground of the absence of evidence, such motion
shall also set forth the materiality of the evidence
expected to be obtained and shall show that due diligence
has been used to procure it. The court may also require the
party seeking the continuance to state, upon affidavit or
under oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and if the
adverse party thereupon admits that such evidence would be
given, and that it may be considered as actually given on
the trial, or offered and excluded as improper, the trial
shall not be postponed upon that ground.
UTAH

R. CIV. P. 40(b).

Snyder did not, at trial or before, allege

any facts which satisfied the requirement of "good cause" for
granting a continuance. In making a determination whether to
grant a motion for continuance, the court is entitled to
considerable discretion.

Christensen

v. Jewkes,

761 P.2d 1375

(Utah 1988) .
In addition to the trial court's broad discretion to
schedule matters as it deems appropriate, the unlawful detainer
statute provides a basis for an expedited trial in this case.
The underlying action is an eviction proceeding under Utahfs
Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute.
seq.

UTAH CODE ANN.§§

78-36-1 et

As such, it is supposed to be summary in nature and

expeditious in terms of the trial calendar.

The unlawful

detainer "statute grants the landlord a summary court proceeding
to evict a tenant who has violated some express or implied
provision of the lease."

P.H. Investments

v.

Oliver,

818 P.2d

1018, 1020 (Utah 1991) . In addition, "the purpose of the law is
to provide a speedy resolution on the issue of possession."

-14-

Id.

See also

§ 78-36-8 (the tenant is required to appear

UTAH CODE ANN.

and defend the action in no less than 3 and no greater than 20
days following the service of the summons); Landlord-Tenant
A Perspective

on Reform

in

Utah,

Law:

1981 UTAH L. REV. 727, 744 (1981)

("In an unlawful detainer action, the court must set a date for
the summary proceeding for possession not less than three nor
more than twenty days from the date of service of summons on the
tenant."); and Paxton

v. Fisher,

45 P.2d 903, 906 (1935).

Thus,

there is a basis for an expedited trial setting in this case.
Snyder also relies an a memorandum from Mr. Brent Johnson of
the Administrative Office of the Courts regarding eviction trial
settings.

While Mr. Johnson has issued his opinion to the clerks

of the court, this does not mean that the opinion is absolute and
controlling authority for the trial court.

Moreover, the

statutory provision regarding the posting of a possession bond is
not mandatory.
bond."

The landlord "may execute and file a possession

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-36-8.5(1).

The Housing Authority

maintains that this provision provides for an even more expedited
basis for having a tenant removed from the premises. This
possession bond provision was not meant to undermine the
landlord1s ability to move an unlawful detainer matter forward on
an expedited basis and this provision should not be allowed to
undermine the other provisions of the Forcible Entry and Detainer
Statute as well as its underlying polices.

For example, the

Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute provides for "treble damages"

-15-

from the date the tenant wrongfully remains at the premises
following the expiration of the notice to vacate."

If Snyder and

Amicus are right in their respective positions on this issue,
damages would be accruing at a minimum of three times the daily
rent while the eviction slowly toiled along on the regular court
docket.

Such a proposition is not reasonable for either of the

parties in this case.7
Second, Snyder maintains that he was prevented from
discovery as a result of the trail courtfs setting of a trial
date in this matter.

However, Snyder never submitted a request

for discovery to the Housing Authority. Had he done so, it is
likely that the Housing Authority would have promptly replied.
In addition, it was not until the day of trial that Snyder stated
that he wanted to pursue discovery.
Moreover, any contention by Snyder that he did not have
adequate time to prepare a discovery request is incredulous at
best.

Snyder had ample time to file numerous motions, a petition

for extraordinary writ and a federal class action lawsuit. Based
upon the record before it, the trial court did not abuse its

6

On the other hand, tenants would then argue that it is
unreasonable for treble damages to accrue while the case is put
on the regular trial track and they would be justified in doing
so. Imagine a year or more of damages accruing at the minimum of
three times the daily rent amount. For instance, in this case
the tenant's monthly rent is $188.00 which means that his daily
treble damage amount is $18.80 per day. In one year alone, the
tenant's treble damages would amount to $6,862.00!
7

The Court must also consider the ramifications that such
a holding would have on all unlawful detainer actions.
-16-

discretion in denying Snyderfs request for a continuance.
II

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT SNYDER HAD ENGAGED
IN CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR.

The facts presented at trial support the trial court's
finding that Snyder had committed an assault under Utah law.
Because trial courts are charged with the primary responsibility
of making factual determinations, the reviewing court "must
decide that the factual findings made by the trial court are not
adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial courtfs
determination."

State

(citations omitted).

v. Pena,

869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994)

In order to demonstrate that the trial

court abused its discretion in this regard, it is necessary for
Snyder to marshal the relevant evidence.
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil!s
advocate. Counsel must extricate himself or herself from
the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's
position. In order to properly discharge the duty of
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very
findings the appellant resists. After constructing this
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger
must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence.
West Valley

City

v. Majestic

Inventory,

Co.,

818 P.2d 1311, 1315

(Utah Ct. App. 1991) . Here, Snyder cannot point to a fatal flaw
in the evidence.

Snyder can only complain that the trial court

found the Housing Authorityfs version of the relevant facts to be
more credible.
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The gist of Snyder's argument is that the Court gave more
weight to the version of facts presented by Ms. Rico and those
witnesses who heard the assault than it did to Snyder's version
of the facts.

Further, Snyder maintains that his action was not

criminal, but merely offensive.

These two arguments do not

demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in finding
that Snyder had engaged in criminal activity.

The standard for

overturning the trial court's factual finding
is highly deferential to the trial court because it is
before that court that the witnesses and parties appear and
the evidence is adduced. The judge of that court is
therefore considered to be in the best position to assess
the credibility of the witnesses and to derive a sense of
the proceedings as a whole, something an appellate court
cannot hope to garner from a cold record.
State

v.

Pena,

869 P.2d at 936 (citation omitted).

The facts adduced at trial showed that Snyder knowingly and
deliberately placed a Housing Authority employee in genuine and
reasonable fear of immediate violent harm through his overt
threats punctuated with foul language. Ms. Rico testified that
she was frightened by Snyder's actions. These facts support a
finding by the trial court that Snyder engaged in criminal
behavior,8

As stated by the Court:

8

Utah law defines an assault as follows:
Assault is:
(a)
an attempt, with unlawful force or violence,
to do bodily injury to another;
(b)
a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate
force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another; ...
II
Assault is a class B misdemeanor.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-5-102

( 1 9 5 3 ) , as
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amended.

I also find that he [Snyder] failed to abide by the terms of
this lease in that he engaged in criminal activity. I guess
for the purpose of this hearing I think there is other good
cause to have him removed. I think that it all revolves
around this event, but we have Ms. Ricofs testimony that
essentially he came into the room, he started pointing his
finger and coming around the desk and essentially, I guess,
the phrase that we use now days, "getting in her face." So
I think he made a clear threat. He was loud, he was upset,
he was angry, his choice of words was intimidating, it's
clear it did intimidate her because as I noted from the
demeanor of both witnesses today, its pretty clear to me Mr.
Snyder could, if he had done what was described, intimidated
and threatened in a manner that would, make a person believe
there is a show of immediate force to carry out some kind of
bodily injury.
Transcript at 101:2-17. The Court further found that
In response to just a couple of your arguments, Mr. Harris,
in that answer - I mean I think you're right, if he [Snyder]
were simply offensive there wouldn't be a problem, but I
think he committed a crime. I think that's assaultive
behavior to place his finger in the face of someone in the
manner he did, given the context in which it was done,
arising, moving around the table, getting closer to, made
physical proximity with the tone of voice, and the language
that he was using that day. And then you made another
argument, which I think is a fair argument, but it doesn't
apply to this case, what would happen if there were minor
criminal events. Well, that's an argument, but it's not
this case. This case is what I consider to be a serious
criminal offense, that of assault.
Transcript at 103:11-24. These findings as set forth by the
trial court are supported by the evidence adduced at trial. Ms.
Rico testified in detail about the assault.

Ms. Poulton and Mr.

Trowbridge, while neither actually saw the assault, both heard it
and both were frightened for the safety of Ms. Rico.

Transcript

at 29-32; 37-38.
The finding by the trial court that Snyder engaged in
criminal activity is supported by the facts.

Snyder has not

demonstrated that the Court abused its discretion or acted
-19-

unreasonably in so finding.

Therefore, the Housing Authority

requests that this Court deny Snyder's requested relief.
III.

THE LEASE AGREEMENT AND ITS SUBJECT PROVISIONS ARE
VALID, THUS SNYDER WAS PROPERLY EVICTED.

The issue of the validity of the certain provisions was
never fully raised and considered by the trial court.Q

It is a

well established principle of law that "a party must raise an
objection in an earlier proceeding or waive its right to litigate
the issue in subsequent proceedings."
Schwendiman,
Lopez

v.

790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

v. Schwendiman,

Condas,

Brinkerhoff

Accord

720 P.2d 778, 781 (Utah 1986); Condas v.

618 P.2d 491, 495 n. 8 (Utah 1980).

The fact-finding

tribunal is the "proper forum in which to commence thoughtful and
probing analysis" of issues.
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).

State

v. Bobo,

803 P.2d 1268, 1273

Indeed, failure to argue an issue and

present pertinent evidence in that forum "denies the trial court
"the opportunity to make any findings of fact or conclusions of
law1 pertinent to the claimed error."

9

State

v. Brown,

856 P.2d

In the Appellant's issue statement, he attempts to
point to various parts of the record and transcript which he
believes demonstrate that the issues surrounding the validity of
the lease provisions were raised and considered. However, the
citations do not support such a proposition. The Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment were never
submitted to the Court for decision. In fact, the trial court
specifically found that they were not timely. See Finding of Fact
#1. (R. 266) . The citations to the Transcript are citations to
argument by Snyder. However, there was no ruling per se on those
arguments.
-20-

358, 360 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting LeBaron
Enterprises,

& Assoc,

v.

Rebel

823 P.2d 479, 483 n. 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)).

The preservation principle has been examined at length by
Utah's appellate courts.
Condas,

Particularly instructive are Condas v.

618 P.2d 491 (Utah 1980) and Barney

Commerce,

v.

Utah Dept.

of

885 P.2d 809 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) . At issue in Condas,

was the testimony of certain witnesses that were deceased at the
time of trial.

On appeal, the party challenging the admission of

the statements contended that there was not proof offered that
the witnessed were unavailable at the trial. However, the party
had failed to object to the admission of the statements at trial,
and therefore had waived their right to challenge the issue on
appeal.

Id.

at 495.

In Barney,

the petitioner appealed the decision of the

Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing to revoke his
license to practice as a health facility administrator.

On

appeal, he argued that he was denied due process by various
defects and irregularities in the hearing.

In affirming the

Division1s decision, the Utah Court of Appeals held that
fl

[c]ounsel did not timely object to the specific defects

[petitioner] now raises on appeal. Moreover, counsel failed to
make a motion for relief, denying the administrative law judge
any opportunity to remedy the defects.

Therefore, [the court

was] unable to consider [petitioner's] due process claims."
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Id.

at 809.
With these principles and cases in mind, this Court should
not consider Snyderfs claims that the lease provisions under
which he was evicted were invalid.

Snyder's attempt to show that

the issue was preserved in the record below, falls short of
showing that the issue was raised, argued by both parties,
considered by the trial court, and ruled upon.

Furthermore,

Snyder fails to state grounds for the consideration of an issue
that has not been preserved.

See UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a) (5) (B) .

Even if the issue as to the validity of the subject lease
provisions had been preserved in the trial court, the provisions
nevertheless are valid under the law.

Snyder seems to assert

that regardless of the nature or severity of his assault upon Ms.
Rico, it does not form the basis of an eviction under § 11(1) of
the Lease Agreement, which prohibits "all illegal or criminal
activity on or near the premises".

In an attempt to support this

position, Snyder points to HUD regulations set out at 24 C.F.R.
§ 966.4 (f), and observes that, since that provision does not
absolutely mandate the inclusion of the lease provision relied
upon by the Housing Authority in this action, it therefore
somehow prohibits such a provision being included in the lease.
Thus, Snyder claims, this court may not enforce the terms of the
Lease Agreement as it is written.

Notably, Snyder cites not a

single case, statute, regulation, or other legal declaration in
support of this proposition.

This is because there is no legal

authority which supports such a proposition.
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The Housing Authority does function as a "public housing
agency" or "PHA" under the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42
U.S.C. § 1437 et

seq.

This means that, as a PHA, the Housing

Authority is charged with furnishing safe, sanitary, structurally
sound and affordable rental housing for low-income individuals
through the receipt and application of federal subsidy funding.
The Housing Act begins with the following policy declaration
in this regard:
It is the policy of the United States to promote the
general welfare of the Nation by employing its funds
and credit, as provided in this chapter, to assist the
several and their political subdivisions to remedy the
unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions and the acute
shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for
families of lower income and, consistent with the
objectives of this chapter, to vest in local
public

housing agencies the maximum amount of
in the administration
of their housing

responsibility
programs.

(Emphasis added).
42 U.S.C. § 1437.

This section further governs the creation of

leases between a public housing agency and tenants of federallysubsidized housing.

The law specifies certain provisions which

must be included in any such lease; it begins, however, with the
observation that a public housing agency shall "utilize leases

which ... do not contain
(emphasis added).

unreasonable

terms and conditions"

In addition to those provisions mandated

law, public housing agencies are also implicitly empowered

Id.
by
(in

carrying out the policy objective vesting the agency with "the
maximum amount of responsibility of the administration of

[its]

housing programs") to include additional terms and conditions in
-23-

their leases which are reasonable.

42 U.S.C. § 1437(d)(1).

The regulations promulgated by HUD under the Housing Act
expand upon and punctuate a public housing agency's discretion in
this regard. For example, 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 details specific
provisions which must be included in any lease between a PHA and
its tenants, "[a] lease shall be entered into between the PHA and
each tenant of a dwelling unit which shall
described

hereinafter."

Id.

contain

(Emphasis added).

the

provisions

Provisions which

may not be contained in a lease between a public housing agency
and its tenants are separately enumerated at 24 C.F.R. § 966.6:
Lease clauses of the nature described below shall not
be included in new leases between a PHA and a tenant
and shall be deleted from existing leases either by
amendment thereof or execution of a new lease ....
Id.

Again, by clear implication and consistent with the
Congressional policy statement granting public housing agencies
maximum authority in the administration of federally-subsidized
housing programs under the Act, a public housing agency,
including the Housing Authority, must be permitted to include, in
any lease agreement, both the provisions mandated by 24 C.F.R.
§ 966.4 and any other reasonable lease provisions necessary to
carry out the purposes of the Housing Act, so long as they do not
include any provisions prohibited by 24 C.F.R. § 966.6.
language of

The

Section 11 (I) of the Lease Agreement in this case

is not prohibited by 24 C.F.R. § 966.6.
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Cases interpreting the scope and breadth of a public housing
agency's authority in the administration of housing projects
under the Act (including terms of lease agreements) have
expressly upheld the agency's authority to include all reasonable
provisions in its leases and regulations so long as such
provisions are not expressly prohibited by law or regulation.
For example, in Rivera

v. Reading

Housing

Authority,

819 F.

Supp. 1323 (E. D. Penn. 1993), a public housing agency imposed a
policy requiring that minor applicants for housing obtain a
judicial decree of emancipation in order to be eligible to rent
publically-subsidized housing.

The plaintiff (a minor applicant)

challenged the enforceability of the policy in that it was not
specifically set forth by applicable HUD regulations.

The court

rejected the challenge and upheld the requirement, citing the
mandate of the Act that public housing agencies be vested with
"the maximum amount of power and responsibility ... in order to
promote efficient management of housing programs." Jd. at 329.
In reaching its conclusion, the Rivera

court stated the

following with regard to the appropriate standard of judicial
review of public housing agency practices under applicable HUD
regulations:
... [I]n assessing whether the [housing agency] has
violated the Housing Act or HUD regulations, we must
keep in mind that the Housing Act gives local housing
authorities discretion to select applicants and to
otherwise manage the day-to-day affairs of subsidized
housing projects. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437. We also
recognize that the administration of local housing
authorities is a difficult task, and the concern for
-25-

efficient management is particularly important, because
the number of applicants greatly exceeds the available
housing. [Citations omitted]. Consequently, the scope
of judicial review of a local Housing Authority's
policies and practices is limited, and we will not view
its actions as a violation of the Housing Act or HUD
regulations so long as the Housing Authority's
eligibility requirements are "consistent with [HUD]
regulations and in harmony with the overall policies"
of the Housing Act.
Id. at 1329-1330 (citing Vandermark

v. Housing

Authority

of

York,

663 F.2d 436 (3rd Cir. 1981)).
In another case of interest, Greenville
City

of Greenville,

Housing

Authority

v.

316 S.E.2d 718 (Ct. App. S. C. 1984), a

tenant in a housing complex subsidized under the Housing Act
challenged an eviction on the basis that the lease provisions
applied in his case were inconsistent with the Housing Act and
applicable regulations.

Specifically, the evicted tenant

challenged the propriety of a rent reduction provision in her
lease as not being reflective of the content of HUD regulations.
The court of appeals overturned a lower court finding against the
housing authority, agreeing that the housing authority "had
discretion to establish reasonable lease provisions" Id.
Similarly, in Allegheny
Morrissey,

County

Housing

Authority

at 720.

v.

651 A.2d 362 (Cmnwlth Ct- Penn.1994), the public

housing agency had a lease provision prohibiting ownership and
maintenance of pets on the premises.

A tenant challenged the

provision as not being reflective of the United States Housing
Act and applicable HUD regulations.
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The court rejected the

argument and observed:
42 U.S.C. § 1437(d)(1)(2) ... mandates that each public
housing agency shall utilize leases which obligate the
public housing agency to maintain the project in a
decent, safe and sanitary condition. Given that
mandate, the [housing authority] has the authority to
carry out that purpose by issuing lease agreements with
policies that meet that requirement unless they are
contrary to federal regulations.
Id.

at 634-635.
The Housing Authority in this action acknowledges that

Paragraph 11(1) prohibits more than the specific, narrow type of
criminal conduct specifically described at 24 C.F.R.
§ 966.4(f) (12).

The provision in question, however, is not

prohibited under 24 C.F.R. § 966.6.

Nor can it seriously be

argued that the provision is not rationally related to
maintenance of the housing project in a decent, safe and sanitary
condition, and otherwise furthering the purposes of the United
States Housing Act.

The Housing Authority would, in fact, be

remiss in its obligations under the Act were it not to proscribe
criminal activity by its tenants on or near the leased premises.
Thus, as in the cases discussed above, the Housing Authority in
this case is entitled to discretion in establishing its
reasonable lease provisions.

The Housing Authority is obligated

to carry out the mandates of the Housing Act and the policies
underlying the Housing Act.

The provisions challenged by Snyder

are reasonable and comport with the letter and spirit of the law.
Snyder argues that, if literally interpreted, Paragraph
11(1) of the Lease Agreement would make minor criminal
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infractions near the housing project grounds for eviction.
However, Snyder has no standing to raise such an objection -- the
conduct giving rise to his eviction was a criminal assault,
consisting of harsh and violent verbal threats of immediate
physical harm to Ms. Rico.

As such, Snyder1s criminal act falls

well within even the narrowest reading of the lease provision, as
well as the mandatory language of 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(f) (12) (I).
Moreover, Snyder cannot seriously argue that a Housing Authority
managing federally-subsidized, low-income housing has no
legitimate interest in prohibiting criminal activity, of whatever
nature or severity, on or around the housing complex, including
criminal activity relating to a Housing Authority employee.
Certainly, a public housing agency operating under the mandates
of the Housing Act has a vested interest in summarily ejecting
tenants who accost management employees with threats of imminent
physical harm.
On the other hand, even if the lease provision complained of
by Snyder were to be found to be invalid, Snyder's assault on Ms.
Rico, an employee of the Housing Authority, certainly constitutes
"good cause" for eviction.

See Lease Agreement paragraph 17.

Trial Exhibit 1 at 5; (R. 9).
IV.

SNYDER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A GRIEVANCE HEARING UNDER
THE LEASE AGREEMENT OF UNDER THE LAW.

Snyderfs last issue on appeal relates to his claim that he
was entitled to a grievance hearing under the terms and
conditions of the lease agreement between the parties. This issue
-28-

was not raised in the trial court below in any context other than
in motions filed by Snyder which were never submitted for
decision pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration.10
The gravamen of Snyderfs complaint in this regard is that
Snyder believes that

fI

[s]omeone other than the County Housing

Authority must determine that Mr. Snyder engaged in substantial
criminal or illegal conduct before plaintiff can deny his
mandated due process rights under his HUD approved contract."
Appellant!s Brief at 28-29.

This is, in fact, exactly what

happened in the proceedings below.

The trial court, not the

Housing Authority, made the determination that Snyder engaged in
the requisite criminal activity.

Moreover, contrary to the

argument of Snyder, the Housing Authority did not unilaterally
declare that Snyder was not entitled to a grievance hearing.

On

the contrary, governing federal law provides for the process that
was followed in this case.
The Housing Authority is required to have a grievance
procedure in place.

"Each PHA shall adopt a grievance procedure

affording each tenant an opportunity for a hearing on a grievance
as defined in §955.53 in accordance with the requirements,
standards, and criteria contained in this subpart."
§966.52 (1999).

24 C.F.R.

The requirement of grievance procedures in the

Also, Snyder did not ask the Court for an expedited
briefing or decision schedule with regard to the pending motions
as he was permitted to do under Rule 4-501(4) the Utah Rules of
Judicial Administration.
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administration of federally-subsidized housing also appears at 42
U.S.C. § 1437d (k). This section calls upon HUD to implement
regulations requiring public housing agencies receiving
assistance under the Act to establish and implement
administrative grievance procedures to be followed
eviction of tenants.

prior to the

If further expressly provides as follows:

For any grievance concerning an eviction or termination
of tenancy that involves any criminal activity that
threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful
enjoyment of the premises of other tenants or employees
of the public housing agency ... the agency may (A)
establish and expedite a grievance procedure as the
secretary shall provide by rule ..., or (B) exclude
from its grievance procedure any such grievance, in any
jurisdiction, which requires that prior to eviction, a
tenant be given a hearing in court which the secretary
determines provides the basic elements of due process
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k).

The Housing Authority herein has opted for

subsection (B) as it is allowed to do under the law and it does
have a grievance procedure in place which fully comports with
federal requirements.
grievance hearing.

In this case, Snyder was not entitled to a

The grievance procedure

(1) shall be applicable (except as provided in paragraph
(a)(2) of this section) to all individual grievances as
defined in §966.53 of this subpart between the tenant and
the PHA.
(2) the term due process
determination means a
determination by HUD that the law of the jurisdiction
requires that the tenant must be given the opportunity
for a hearing in court which provides the basic
elements of due process ... before eviction from the
dwelling unit. If HUD has issued a due process
determination, a PHA may exclude from the PHA
administrative grievance procedure under this subpart
any grievance concerning a termination of tenancy or
eviction that involves:
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(A) any criminal activity that threatens the health,
safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises
of other residents or employees of the PHA, or
(B) any drug related criminal activity on or near such
premises.
(iv) If HUD has issued the due process determination, the
PHA may evict the occupants of the dwelling unit
through the judicial eviction procedures which are the
subject of the determination. In this case, the PHA is
not required to provide an opportunity for a hearing
under the PHA ! s administrative grievance procedure.
24 C.F.R. § 966.50 (1999).
By notice dated December 3, 1991, HUD has expressly
determined that pre-eviction procedures available to tenants
under Utah law satisfy these due process requirements.

A copy

of the Department of Housing and Urban Developments Due Process
Determination for Utah appears in record as an attached Exhibit
to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss.
(R. 59-69).

A copy is likewise included in Appellee1s Addendum.

In this case, Snyder was evicted from criminal activity that
threatened the health and safety of an employee of the Housing
Authority.

In accordance with HUD f s due process determination

for the state of Utah, the Housing Authority has promulgated a
grievance procedure to be used in conjunction with tenant
evictions.

As set forth in the grievance procedure,

"the

provisions of this grievance procedure are not applicable to any
grievance concerning any eviction or termination tenancy based
upon a tenant's creation or maintenance of the threat to the
health or safety of other tenants or HA employees."

Trial

Exhibit 3 at Section XIII(7) attached as part of Appellee's
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Addendum.

Moreover, HUD has expressly found that Utah's unlawful

detainer statute provides for the required due process.

Thus, as

provided for by federal law and the lease agreement between the
parties, Snyder was not entitled to an administrative hearing
through the Housing Authorityfs grievance process.
The Housing Authority did comply with the requirements of
state and federal law in seeking to evict Snyder.

He was

properly served with a notice to quit the premises.

Trial

Exhibit 2; (R. 54). In addition, Snyder was given the
opportunity to dispute the charges in a trial court and under a
statutory scheme that meets HUD's requirements for due process.
Thus, the Housing Authority did comply with the requirements of
federal law.

In addition, there has been no argument, either at

the trial court or here on appeal, that the Housing Authority
failed to comply with the rigid requirements of Utahfs Forcible
Entry and Detainer Statute. Thus, the trial court did have
jurisdiction to hear the merits of this case and this Court
should deny Appellant's requested relief.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Housing Authority respectfully
requests that this Court affirm the decision of the trial court
in this matter in its entirety. The Appellant failed to properly
preserve the issues concerning the expedited trial without the
posting of a possession bond as well as the issues concerning the
validity of the provisions of the lease agreement. The trial
court acted within its sound discretion in finding that the
-32-

Appellant had engaged in criminal conduct in violation of the
lease agreement

Fi nally, Snyder was not entitled to a grie vance

hearing prior to the filing of an unlawful detainer action by the
Hoi 1 s irig A n thoi: :i ty
ADDENDUM
An a d d e n d u m of r\ppel 1 ef• i,; at t a ^ h e d

heret« ( nid ' G
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CHAPTER 36
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER
Section
78 36 6
78 36 10 5

Definitions — Notice to quit —
How served
Order of restitution — Service
— Enforcement — Disposi
tion of personal property —
Hearing

Section
78 36 12 6

Abandoned premises — Rctak
ing and rerentmg by owner —
Liability of tenant — Per
sonal property of tenant left
on premises

78-36-1. "Forcible entry" denned.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Landlord and tenant
—Contract rights
An amendment to a lease permitting a tenant
to attach signs to a monument on the property
did not convey a leasehold interest in real

78-36-3.

property and the forcible entry statue did not
apply to the tenants claim based on removal of
the signs without his consent Keller v
Southwood N Med Pavilion Inc 959 P2d 102
(Utah 1998)

Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than
life.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANAI YSIS

Detainer not found
Ejectment
Strict statutory compliance
— Required
Detainer not found
Because a lessee was under no duty to re
move a sign s foundation he was not guilty of an
unlawful detainer U P C Inc v R O A Gen
eral Inc 1999 UT App 303 990 P 2d 945
Ejectment
The unlawful detainer statute is not the
exclusive remedy in Utah to evict a tenant
since even if a landlord has failed to follow the
statutes requirements he may still maintain a

common law action in ejectment where the
lease includes a forfeiture provision to provide
the basis for the action Cache County v Beus
1999 UT App 134 978 P2d 1043
Strict statutory compliance
—Required
The unlawful detainer statute requires strict
compliance with its terms before landlords are
entitled to utilize its severe remedies and a
landlord who did not provide the tenant with
clear written notice that he or she had a chance
to either bring the rent current or quit the
property failed to meet the statutory require
ments Cache County v Beus 1999 UT App
134 978 P 2d 1043

78-36-6. Definitions — Notice to quit — How served.
(1) For purposes of this section
(a) "Commercial tenant" means any tenant who may be a body politic
and corporate, partnership, association, or company
(b) "Tenant" means any natural person and any individual other than a
commercial tenant
(2) The notices required by Title 78, Chapter 36, Forcible Entry and
Detainer, may be served
(a) by delivering a copy to the tenant personally or, if the tenant is a
commercial tenant, by delivering a copy to the commercial tenant's usual
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place of business by leaving a copy of the notice with a person of suitable
age and discretion
(b) by sending a copy through registered or certified mail addressed to
the tenant at his place of residence or, if the tenant is a commercial tenant,
by sending a copy through registered or certified mail addressed to the
commercial tenant's usual place of business,
(c) if he is absent from his place of residence or from his usual place of
business, by leaving a copy with a person of suitable age and discretion at
either place and mailing a copy to the tenant at the address of his place of
residence or place of business,
(d) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found at the place
of residence, then by affixing a copy m a conspicuous place on the leased
property, or
(e) if an order of abatement by eviction of the nuisance is issued by the
court as provided in Section 78 38-11, when issued, the parties present
shall be on notice that the abatement by eviction order is issued and
immediately effective or as to any absent party, notice shall be given as
provided in Subsections (2)(a) through (e)
(3) Service upon a subtenant may be made in the same manner as provided
in Subsection (2)
History L. 1951, ch 58, fc 1, C 1943,
Supp , 104 36 6, L 1981, ch 160, fc 3, 1986,
ch 137, & 2, 1987, ch 12), *} 1, 1992, ch 141
<& 3, 1997, ch 203, fc 1
Amendment Notes — The 1997 amend
ment effective May 5 1997 added Subsection

(1) renumbering the existing provisions and
miking related reference changes substituted
the eh iptei reference lor "the preceding sec
tiont." near the beginning of Subsection (2) and
added the provisions for commercial tenants in
Subsections (2)( i) ind (2Kb)

78-36-8. Allegations permitted in complaint — Time for
appearance — Service of summons.
NOTTS TO DI CISIONS
Insufficiency of process
In accord with first note under this heading

in bound volume See Keller v Southwood N
Med Pavilion Inc 959 P2d 102 (Utah 1998)

78-36-10.5. Order of restitution — Service — Enforcement
— Disposition of personal property — Hearing.
(1) Each order of restitution shall
(a) direct the defendant to vacate the premises remove his personal
property, and restore possession of the premises to the plaintiff, or be
forcibly removed by a sheriff or constable,
(b) advise the defendant of the time limit set by the court for the
defendant to vacate the premises, which shall be three business days
following service of the order, unless the court determines that a longer or
shorter period is appropriate under the circumstances, and
(c) advise the defendant of the defendant's right to a hearing to contest
the manner of its enforcement
(2) (a) A copy of the order of restitution and a form for the defendant to
request a hearing as listed on the form shall be served in accordance with
Section 78-36 6 by a person authorized to serve process pursuant to
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Section 78-27-58 If personal service is impossible or impracticable, service
may be made by
(l) mailing a copy of the order and the form to the defendant's
last-known address and posting a copy of the order and the form at a
conspicuous place on the premises, or
(n) mailing a copy of the order and the form to the commercial
tenant defendant's last-known place of business and posting a copy of
the order and the form at a conspicuous place on the business
premises
(b) A request for hearing by the defendant may not stay enforcement of
the restitution order unless
(I) the defendant furnishes a corporate bond, cash bond, certified
funds, or a property bond to the clerk of the court in an amount
approved by the court according to the formula set forth in Subsection
78-36-8 5(2)(b), and
(n) the court orders that the restitution order be stayed
(c) The date of service, the name, title, signature, and telephone
number of the person serving the order and the form shall be legibly
endorsed on the copy of the order and the form served on the defendant
(d) Within ten days of service, the person serving the order and the form
shall file proof of service in accordance with Rule 4(h), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure
(3) (a) If the defendant fails to comply with the order within the time
prescribed by the couit, a sheriff or constable at the plaintiff's duection
may enter the premises by force using the least destructive means possible
to remove the defendant
(b) Any personal property of the defendant may be removed from the
premises by the sheriff or constable and transported to a suitable location
for safe storage The sheriff or constable may delegate responsibility for
storage to the plaintiff, who shall store the personal property in a suitable
place and in a reasonable manner
(c) The personal property removed and stored shall be inventoried by
the sheriff or constable or the plaintiff who shall keep the original
inventory and personally deliver or mail the defendant a copy of the
inventory immediately after the personal property is removed
(4) (a) After demand made by the defendant within 30 days of removal of
personal property from the premises, the sheriff or constable or the
plaintiff shall promptly return all of the defendant's personal property
upon payment of the reasonable costs incurred for its removal and storage
(b) The person storing the personal property may sell the property
remaining in storage at a public sale if
d) the defendant does not request a hearing or demand return of
the personal property within 30 days of its removal from the premises,
or
(n) the defendant fails to pay the reasonable costs incurred for the
removal and storage of the personal property
(c) In advance of the sale, the person storing the personal property shall
mail to the defendant's last-known address a written notice of the time and
place of the sale
(d) If the defendant is present at the sale, he may specify the oider in
which the personal property shall be sold, and only so much personal
property shall be sold as to satisfy the costs of removal, storage, advertising, and conducting the sale The remainder of the personal property, if
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any, shall be released to the defendant If the defendant is not present at
the sale, the proceeds, after deduction of the costs of removal, storage,
advertising, and conducting the sale shall be paid to the plaintiff up to the
amount of any judgment the plaintiff obtained against the defendant Any
surplus shall be paid to the defendant, if the defendant's whereabouts are
known. If the defendant's whereabouts are not known, any surplus shall
be disposed of in accordance with Title 67, Chapter 4a, Unclaimed
Property Act
(e) The plaintiff may donate the property to chanty if
d) the defendant does not request a hearing or demand return of
the personal property within 30 days of its removal from the premises,
or
(11) the defendant fails to pay the reasonable costs incurred for the
removal and storage of the personal property, and
(in) donation is a commercially reasonable alternative
(f) If the property belonging to a person who is not a defendant is
removed and stored in accordance with this section, that person may claim
the property by delivering a written demand for its release to the sheriff or
constable or the plaintiff If the claimant provides pioper identification
and evidence of ownership, the sheriff or constable or the plaintiff shall
promptly release the property at no cost to the claimant
(5) In the event of a dispute concerning the manner of enforcement of the
restitution order, the defendant or any person claiming to own stored personal
property may file a icquest for a hearing The court shall set the matter foi
hearing within ten days from the filing of the request, or as soon thereafter as
practicable, and shall mail notice of the hearing to the parties
(6) The Judicial Council shall draft the forms necessary to implement this
section
History: C. 1953,78-36-10.5, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 225, $ 3,1995, ch. 68, fi 5; 1996, ch.
79, & 116; 1997, ch. 203, 5 2; 1997, ch. 352,
& 1, 1998, ch. 118, $ 1.
Amendment Notes — The 1997 amend
ment by ch 203, effective May 5, 1997, deleted
"the terms of the order of restitution or" after
"contest" in Subsection (lXc) and after "dispute
concerning" in Subsection (5), subdivided Subsection (2Xa) and added Subsection (2XaXu),
and made related changes
The 1997 amendment by ch 352, effective
May 5, 1997, deleted Subsection (lXc), relating
to the defendant's right to a hearing, in Subsection (2Xa) inserted "as listed on the form" and
substituted the present service provisions for a
requirement of personal service under U R C P
4 and a provision for substitute service, added
Subsection (2Xb) (redesignated as (2Xc) pursu-

ant to the acts coordination clause) making
related designation changes, deleted from Sub
section (3Kb) a rcqutrement that the plaintiff
consent to delegation, inserted "or the plaintiff
in Subsections (3Xc) and (4Xa) added Subset
tion (4Xe) making related designation changes
and deleted "the terms of order of restitution or
the" after "dispute concerning" in Subsection
(5)
The 1998 amendment, effective May 4 1998
added Subsection (lXc), making a related
change
Coordination clause. — Laws 1997, ch
203 and ch 352 each amended this section,
both acts included coordination clauses (ch
203, § 3, and ch 352 § 3) reconciling the
amendments by the two acts and directing that
the Subsection (2Xb) added by ch 3r>2 be added
as Subsection (2Xc)

78-36-12.6. Abandoned premises — Retaking
and
rerenting by owner — Liability of tenant —
Personal property of tenant left on premises.
(1) In the event of abandonment, the owner may retake the premises and
attempt to rent them at a fair rental value and the tenant who abandoned the
premises shall be liable
(a) for the entire rent due for the remainder of the term, or
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(b) for rent accrued during the period necessary to rerent the premises
at a fair rental value, plus the difference between the fair rental value and
the rent agreed to in the prior rental agreement, plus a reasonable
commission for the renting of the premises and the costs, if any, necessary
to restore the rental unit to its condition when rented by the tenant less
normal wear and tear. This subsection applies, if less than Subsection (a),
notwithstanding that the owner did not rerent the premises.
(2) (a) If the tenant has abandoned the premises and has left personal
property on the premises, the owner is entitled to remove the property
from the dwelling, store it for the tenant, and recover actual moving and
storage costs from the tenant.
(b) (i) The owner shall make reasonable efforts to notify the tenant of
the location of the personal property.
(ii) If the property has been in storage for over 30 days and the
tenant has made no reasonable effort to recover it, the owner may:
(A) sell the property and apply the proceeds toward any
amount the tenant owes; or
(B) donate the property to charity if the donation is a commercially reasonable alternative.
(c) Any money left over from the sale of the property shall be handled as
specified in Title 67, Chapter 4a, Part 2, Standards for Determining When
Property is Abandoned or Unclaimed.
(d) Nothing contained in this act shall be in derogation of or alter the
owner's rights under Title 38, Chapter 3, Lessors' Liens.
History: C. 1953,78-36-12.6, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 160, ft 8; 1986, ch. 194, ft 20; 199S,
ch. 198, 5 48; 1997, ch. 352, ft 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-

ment, effective May 5,1997, subdivided Subsection (2), added Subsection (2)(b)(iiXB), and
made stylistic changes.

CHAPTER 37
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
78-37-1. Form of action — Judgment — Special execution.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Applicability of section.
Exhaustion of security.
Cited.
Applicability of section.
The one-action rule applied to the co-maker
of a secured promissory note who provided none
of the security on the note; therefore, because
the creditor could not proceed against the comaker personally until property securing the
note was foreclosed or lost, the statute of limitations did not run on the creditor's claim. APS
v. Briggs, 927 P.2d 670 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
This section did not apply to bar a creditor's

action under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act before a deficiency judgment was entered
against the debtor. National Loan Investors,
L.P. v. Givens, 952 P.2d 1067 (Utah 1998).
Exhaustion of security.
After property was sold and the proceeds
applied to reduce the amount owed to a lending
bank, the bank's security interest that arose
under the note and trust deed was exhausted.
Rushton v. State Bank, 164 F.3d 1338 (10th Cir.
1999).
Cited in State Bank v. Rushton, 207 Bankr.
721 (D. Utah 1997), aff'd, 164 F.3d 1338 (10th
Cir. 1999).
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78-37-2. Deficiency judgment — Execution.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State Bunk v. Rushton, 207 Bankr.
721 (D. Utah 1997), aff'd, 164 F.3d 1338 (10th
Cir. 1999).

CHAPTER 38
NUISANCE, WASTE, AND OTHER
DAMAGE
Section
78-38-.5.
78-38-1.
78-38-4.6.
78-38-9.

Legislative intent.
Nuisance defined — Right of
action for — Judgment.
Enforcement.
Nuisance — Right of action to

abate nuisances — Wrug
houses and drug dealing —
Gambling — Group criminal
activity — Prostitution —
Weapons.

78-38-.5. Legislative intent.
(1) The Legislature finds:
(a) the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has determined
that environmental tobacco smoke is a Group A carcinogen, in the same
category as other cancer-causing chemicals such as asbestos;
(b) the EPA has determined that there is no acceptable level of exposure
to Class A carcinogens; and
(c) the EPA has determined that exposure to environmental tobacco
smoke also causes an increase in respiratory diseases and disorders
among exposed persons.
(2) The Legislature finds that environmental tobacco smoke generated in a
rental or condominium unit may drift into other units, exposing the occupants
of those units to tobacco smoke, and that standard construction practices are
not effective in preventing this drift of tobacco smoke.
(3) The Legislature further finds that persons who desire to not be exposed
to drifting environmental tobacco smoke should be able to determine in
advance of entering into a rental, lease, or purchase agreement whether the
subject unit may be exposed to environmental tobacco smoke.
History: C. 1953, 78-38-.S, enacted by L.
1997, ch. 230, 8 3.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 230

became effective on May 5, 1997, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-38-1. Nuisance defined — Right of action for — Judgment.
( D A nuisance is anything which is injurious to health, indecent, offensive to
the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with
the comfortable enjoyment of life or property. A nuisance may be the subject of
an action.
(2) A nuisance may include the following:
(a) drug houses and drug dealing as provided in Section 78-38-9;
(b) gambling as provided in Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 11;
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NOTES TO DECISIONS

ANALYSIS
A I' hl'tv
ConsSulionality of former section.
J

Applicability.
Petitions for writs of certiorari and mandamus were not subject to the statute of limitations that was intended to govern petitions for
writs of habeas corpus. Renn v. Utah Stote Bd.
of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677 (Utah 1995) (decided
under former section).

78-35a-108.

Constitutionality of former section.
^ n e t n r e e - m o n t f t limitation period formerly
fontei,ned i n f j * ^ o " was an unreasonable
limitation on the constitutional right to petition
for a habeas corpus writ; it violated petitioners'
rights under Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 11 to seek
a civil remedy in state courts. Currier v.
Holden, 862 P.2d 1367 (Utah Ct. App. 1993),
cert, denied, 870 P.2d 967 (Utah 1994) (decided
under former section),

History: C. 1953, 78-35a-109, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 235,ft9.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 235

78-36-1

became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-35a-110. Appeal — Jurisdiction.
Any party may appeal from the trial court's final judgment on a petition for
post-conviction relief to the appellate court having jurisdiction pursuant to
Section 78-2-2 or 78-2a-3.
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-110, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 235,ft10.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 235

became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Effect of granting relief — Notice.

(1) If the court grants the petitioner's request for relief, it shall either:
(a) modify the original conviction or sentence; or
(b) vacate the original conviction or sentence and order a new trial or
sentencing proceeding as appropriate.
(2) (a) If the petitioner is serving a felony sentence, the order shall be
stayed for five days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give
written notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will
pursue a new trial or sentencing proceedings, appeal the order, or take no
action.
(b) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice at any time
during the stay period that it intends to take no action, the court shall lift
the stay and deliver the order to the custodian of the petitioner.
(c) If the respondent gives notice that it intends to retry or resentence
the petitioner, the trial court may order any supplementary orders as to
arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters
that may be necessary.
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-108, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 235, ft 8.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 235

became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-35a-109. Appointment of counsel.
(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may,
upon the request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis.
Counsel who represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal may not
be appointed to represent the petitioner under this section.
(2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court shall consider the
following factors:
(a) whether the petition contains factual allegations that will require
an evidentiary hearing; and
(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that
require the assistance of counsel for proper adjudication.
(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section was ineffective
cannot be the basis for relief in any subsequent post-conviction petition.
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CHAPTER 36
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER
Section
78-36-1.
78-36-2
78-36-3.
78-36-4.
78-36-5.
78-36-6.
78-36-7.
78-36-8.
78-36-8.5.
78-36-9.
78-36-10.

"Forcible entry" denned.
"Forcible detainer" denned.
Unlawful detainer by tenant for
t«rm IPHH than life.
78-36-10.5
Right of tenant of agricultural
lands to hold over.
Remedies available to tenunt
against undertenant.
78-36-11.
Notice to quit — How served.
78-36-12.
Necessary parties defendant.
Allegations permitted in complaint — Time for appearance
— Service of summons.
78-36-12.3.
Possession bond of plaintiff 78-36-12.6.
Alternative remedies.
Proof required of plaintiff - Defense.
Judgment for restitution, dam-

ages, and rent — Immediate
enforcement — Treble damages.
Order of restitution - Service
— Enforcement — Disposition of personal property —
Hearing
Time for appeal.
Exclusion of tenant without judicial process prohibited —
Abandoned
premises excepted.
Definitions.
Abandoned premises - Retaking and rerenting by owner —
Liability of tenant — Personal property of tenant left
on premises.

78-36-1. "Forcible entry" defined.
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, who either:
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or other parts of a house, or by
fraud, intimidation or stealth, or by any kind of violence or circumstances
of terror, enters upon or into any real property; or,
(2) after entering peaceably upon real property, turns out by force,
threats or menacing conduct the party in actual possession.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58. ft 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-1.
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landlord nght to remove employee of tenants
from office and change locks on all doors Free
way Park Bldg, Inc v Western States Whsle
Supply, 22 Utah 2d 266, 451 P2d 778 (1969)

on the refusal of the tenant to surrender the
premises, resort to the remedy given by law to
secure it A violation of that duty set by the
statute gives rise to an action for damages not
in an action under the forcible entry and de
tamer statute but as a separate tort King v
Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419, 285 P2d 1114 (1955)

— Motel operator and occupant.

What constitutes forcible entry.

Unlawful eviction.
Where evidence disclosed that relationship
between operators of a motel and the occupants
of an apartment therein was one of landlord
and tenant, and not one of innkeeper and guest,
the occupants could only be dispossessed of the
apartment by resort to the statutory remedy of
unlawful detainer When the owner of the motel
locked out the occupants for unpaid rent, there
was an unlawful eviction Lambert v Sine, 123
Utah 145, 256 P2d 241 (1953)

— Removal of doors.
Where defendant landlord entered upon the

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Damages
— Mental anguish
— Nominal
Forcible detainer distinguished
Landlord and tenant
— Contract rights
— Motel operator and occupant
Unlawful eviction
Policy of section
— Abolishment of common law
Purpose of provisions
— Preventing disturbances of peace
— Summary remedy
Rent
Separate tort action
What constitutes forcible entry
— Removal of doors

Policy of section.

Damages,
— Mental anguish.
Tenant who is wrongfully evicted can collect
damages for mental anguish and humiliation
Mental pain and suffering in connection with a
wrong which apart from such pain and suffering constitutes a cause of action is a proper
element of damages where it is a natural and
proximate consequence of the wrong Lambert
v Sine, 123 Utah 145, 256 P2d 241 (1953)
— Nominal.
The statute places a duty upon any person,
whether entitled to possession or not, not to use
force or stealth or fraud in gaming possession of
realty Correspondingly, it creates a right in the
person in actual peaceable possession not to
have his possession disturbed other than by
legal process Therefore, regardless of his lack
of entitlement to the property, the tenant has a
cause of action for the invasion of that right
Where no actual damages are proved he should
be awarded nominal damages to preserve the
right King v Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419, 285 P2d
1114 (1955)
Forcible detainer distinguished.
Forcible entry and forcible detainer, while
often spoken of together, are in fact separate
and distinct wrongs Buchanan v Cntes, 106
Utah 428,150 P 2d 100, 154 AX R 167 (1944)
Landlord and tenant.
— Contract rights.
Anyone committing acts specifically prohibited under this section would be guilty of forcible entry including a party who may by contract be authorized to enter or an owner who as
a matter of law may have a right to possession,
contract purporting to establish right of reentry for default of rent payments did not give

— Abolishment of common-law.
The forcible entry statute expressed a policy
that no person should enter by force, stealth,
fraud or intimidation, premises of which an
other had peaceable possession This had the
effect of taking away the common-law right of a
landlord to possess his own property by no more
force than was necessary and left the one
against whom force was used to pursue his
common-law action Buchanan v Cntes, 106
Utah 428, 150 P2d 100, 154 A L R 167 (1944)
Purpose of provisions.
— Preventing disturbances of peace
The forcible entry and detainer statute was
enacted for the primary purpose of preventing
disturbances of the peace brought about
through self-help in the matter of disposses
sion King v Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419,285 P2d 1114
(1955)
— Summary remedy.
Purpose of this statute is to provide a speedy
remedy, summary in character, to obtain pos
session of real property Paxton v Fisher, 86
Utah 408, 45 P2d 903 (1935)
Rent.
This chapter provides a summary remedy for
the recovery of real property in case of forcible
entry or the forcible or unlawful detainer
thereof That is the purpose of the chapter, and
not to deal with the subject of remedies for rent
The question of rent is drawn into the statute,
not for the purpose of providing a remedy for its
recovery, but to complete a case of unlawful
detainer, which is the gist of the action Voyles
v Straka, 77 Utah 171, 292 P 913 (1930)
Separate tort action.
A landlord who is entitled to possession must,
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premises in plaintiff's absence by unlocking the
doors and removing the doors from their hinges
and carrying them away, the weather being at
the time freezing, these facts were held to
sufficiently show a forcible entry Buchanan v
Cntes, 106 Utah 428,150 P2d 100, 154 A L R
167 (1944)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am Jur 2d Forcible
Entry and Detainer I 1
C.J.S. — 36A C J S Forcible Entry and De
tamer §5 1. 2
Key Numbers. - Forcible Entry and De
tamer *" 4

Utah Law Review. — Landlord Tenant
Law A Perspective on Reform in Utah, 1981
Utah L Rev 727, 738
Brigham Young Law Review. - Necessity
or Overkill? Regulating Residential LandlordTenant Relations through the Utah Consumer
Sales Practices Act, 1990 B Y U L Rev 1063

78-36-2. "Forcible detainer* defined.
Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who either
(1) by force, or by menaces and threats of violence, unlawfully holds and
keeps the possession of any real property, whether the same was acquired
peaceably or otherwise, or,
(2) in the nighttime, or during the absence of the occupants of any real
property, unlawfully enters thereon, and, after demand made for the
surrender thereof, refuses for the period of three days to surrender the
same to such former occupant The occupant of real property within the
meaning of this subdivision is one who within five days preceding such
unlawful entry was in the peaceable and undisturbed possession of such
lands
Cross-References. — Burglary and criminal trespass. §§ 76-6-201 to 76 6 206

History: L. 1951, ch. 58, ft 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-2

NOTES TO DECISIONS
by plaintiff in defendant's possession escrow
agreement and quitclaim deed executed by
plaintiff were held to be properly admitted in
evidence Seeley v Houston 105 Utah 202 141
P2d 880 (1943)

ANALYSIS

Consent to entry
- Evidence
-Failure of action
-Immediate right of possession
Liability
-Lessor
-Purchaser
Occupancy "within five days *
-Allegation
"Unlawfully enters *

- Failure of action.
As one of the elements of this action is the
unlawful entry, the action must fail if it is found
that defendant entered with consent of plaintiff Seeley v Houston, 105 Utah 202, 141 P2d
880 (1943)

Consent to entry

— Immediate right of possession
In action of forcible entry and detainer, the
only question involved is the immediate nght to

Issues.

-Evidence.
To show intention of parties and acquiescence

605

78-36-3

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER

JUDICIAL CODE

possession. Seeley v. Houston, 105 Utah 202,
141 P.2d 880 (1943).

Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100,154 A.L.R.
167 (1944).
Fact that one of defendants in forcible detainer action by lessee of state land had signed
purchase contract covering such land would
» £ * » J ^ L T M tfih S S T S f t M^IS
raxton v. Fisher, oo Utah 408, 45 r.zd 903
(1935) Buchanan v Crite, 106 U u h 4 2 8 160
^
^ 154 A L R w
{ i u i )

Liability,
\jOUBOr
""Where, without serving the three days' notice
^^..i^^ k« A TO QC it i v«\ . i A .. A * ~JI~~*A »h.
required by* 78-36-3( lXc), a lessor entered the
premises of hi. tenant, whose rent was two
months in arrears, changed the locks on the
doors and refused to allow the tenant to enter to Occupancy "within five days."
remove equipment and perishable goods, lessor
_ Allegation.
was guilty of forcible detainer and conversion of
Allegation of -more" than five days includes
the personal property on the premises. period of-within" five days. Woodbury v. BunPeterson v. Piatt, 16 Utah 2d 330,400 P.2d 507 J ^ 9 8 Utah 216,98 P.2d 948 (1940); American
(1965).
Mut. Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Jones, 102 Utah 318,
117 R 2 d 2 9 3
_PnM.li..*,.
< 1M1 >. rehearing denied, 102
W ^ e ^ k a s e r of state land took poMes- U t e h 3 2 8 ' l 3 3 P M 3 3 2 <1943>sion of land while lessee from state was away "Unlawfully enters.*
and refused to quit premises upon demand, he
"Unlawfully enters* in Subsection (2) means
was liable for forcible entry and detainer, since unlawfully as relating to an occupant who was
such purchaser should have made proper de- there within five days. Woodbury v. Bunker, 98
mand, and if it was refused, should have settled Utah 216, 98 P.2d 948 (1940); Buchanan v.
question of possession by law. Paxton v. Fisher, Crites, 106 Utah 428,160 P.2d 100,154 A.L.R.
86 Utah 408, 45 P.2d 903 (1935); Buchanan v. 167 (1944).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible
Entry and Detainer § 1.
C.J.S. - 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and Detainer H 1, 2.

Key Numbers. — Forcible Entry and Detainer *=» 5.
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premises, has remained uncomplied with for a period of three days after
service, which notice may be served at any time after the rent becomes
due;
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased premises contrary to the
covenants of the lease, or commits or permits waste on the premises, or
when he sets up or carries on any unlawful business on or in the premises,
or when he suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the premises any
nuisance, including nuisance as defined in Section 78-38-9, and remains in
possession after service upon him of a three days' notice to quit; or
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after a
neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or
agreement under which the property is held, other than those previously
mentioned, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the
performance of the conditions or covenant or the surrender of the property,
served upon him and upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the
premises remains uncomplied with for three days after service. Within
three days after the service of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in
actual occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of the term, or other
person interested in its continuance may perform the condition or covenant and thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except that if the
covenants and conditions of the lease violated by the lessee cannot
afterwards be performed, then no notice need be given.
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a mobile home is determined
under Title 57, Chapter 16, Mobile Home Park Residency Act.
(3) The notice provisions for nuisance in Subsection 78-36-3(1 Xd) are not
applicable to nuisance actions provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16
only.

78-36-3. Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than
life.

Hiatory: L. 1951, ch. 58, ft 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-3; L. 1981, ch. 160, ft 1; 1986,
ch. 137, ft 1; 1989, ch. 101, ft 1; 1992, ch. 141,

(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful
detainer:
(a) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the
property or any part of it, after the expiration of the specified term or
period for which it is let to him, which specified term or period, whether
established by express or implied contract, or whether written or parol,
shall be terminated without notice at the expiration of the specified term
or period;
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with
monthly or other periodic rent reserved:
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after
the end of any month or period, in cases where the owner, his
designated agent, or any successor in estate of the owner, 15 days or
more prior to the end of that month or period, has served notice
requiring him to quit the premises at the expiration of that month or
period; or
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in possession of
the premises after the expiration of a notice of not less than five days;
(c) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after
default in the payment of any rent and after a notice in writing requiring
in the alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the detained
606

Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,1992, inserted "includ-

12.

ing nuisance as defined in Section 78-38-9," in
Subsection (lXd) and added Subsection (3).
Cross-References. — Nuisances, Title 47.
Right to recover treble damages from tenants
committing waste, S 78-38-2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Cause of action.
— Default in rent.
— Prerequisites.
— Presumptions.
— When determined.
— When exists.
Federal regulations.
— Modification of state rei
In general.
Notice to quit.
-Administrative claim.
— Liability of tenant.
— Prerequisites.
— Sufficiency.
— Tenancy at will.
Persons liable.

Pleadings.
— Tenancy at will.
Right of re-entry.
— Contractual provisions.
Strict performance.
— Waiver.
Strict statutory compliance.
— Not required.
— Required.
Substantial compliance.
Termination of lease.
Treble damages.
— Contract of sale.
— Intervenor.
— Lease.
Cause of action.
— Default in rent.
No cause of action for unlawful
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based on default in payment of rent survived
where tenant tendered rent due within three
days after service of unlawful detainer action,
regardless of defects in such notice Dang v Cox
Corp , 655 P2d 658 (Utah 1982)

default in payment of rent, the judgment will
also mandate forfeiture of the lease P H Inv v
Oliver, 818 P2d 1018 (Utah 1991)

— Prerequisites.
Notice to quit is necessary to give rise to
cause of action Carstensen v Hansen, 107
Utah 234, 152 P2d 954 (1944)
Service of the statutory notice and the tenant's noncompliance are prerequisites to the
tenant's being in unlawful detainer Olympus
Hills Shopping Ctr, Ltd v Landes, 821 P2d
451 (Utah 1991)

— Administrative claim.
Notice to quit or pay rent served on government as required by this section was not an
administrative claim sufficient to satisfy 28
U S C § 2675(a), and federal court therefore
had no jurisdiction over forcible entry and detainer action brought under Federal Tort
Claims Act Three-M Enters, Inc v United
States, 548 F2d 293 (10th Cir 1977)

— Presumptions.
Action of unlawful detainer presupposes absence of fraud and force, as well as existence of
relation of landlord and tenant Holladay Coal
Co v Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57 P 882 (1899)

— Liability of tenant.
Action by lessor, after end of fixed term of
lease, to terminate lease and require lessee to
vacate premises did not terminate provision
obliging tenant to pay attorney fees, where
parties entered stipulation, while matter was
pending, that lessee considered lease in effect
and held under it after end of fixed term
Milliner v Farmer, 24 Utah 2d 326, 471 P2d
151 (1970)

— When determined.
Whether a cause of action exists under this
section is to be determined at the time the
uclion 18 commenced Van Zyverden v Farrar,
15 Utah 2d 367, 39J P2d 4b8 (1964)
— When exists.
Upon expiration of tenant's lease, the tenant
18 subject to ou8tei by an unlawful detainer
action (not forcible detainer) under and pursuant to this section Woodbury v Bunker 98
Utah 216, 98 P2d 94H (1940), American Mut
Bldg & Loan Co v Jones. 102 Utah 318, 117
P2d 293 (1941), rehearing denied, 102 Utah
328, 133 P2d 332 (1943)
Unless tenant has retained the right to
refuse inspection by prospective purchasers of
premises, unreasonable refusal to permit entry
of premises for that purpose constitutes unlawful detainer Glenn v Keyes, 107 Utah 415, 154
P2d 642 (1944)
Federal regulations.
— Modification of state remedies.
OPA rental and housing regulations, under
Federal Price Contro' Act, were binding upon
Utah courts and modified any state remedy to
extent that such remedy was in conflict with
that act Callisterv Spencer, 113 Utah 497,196
P2d 714 (1948)
In general.
This chapter takes away the landlord's common law right to use self help to remove a
tenant, grants the landlord a summary court
proceeding to evict a tenant who has violated
some express or implied provision of the lease,
and provides five instances in which the tenant
is in unlawful detainer The remedy for a successful landlord is restitution of the premises,
treble damages, and recovery (or waste or rent
due If the unlawful detainer action is based on

Notice to quit.

— Prerequisites.
Notice in accordance with Subsection (lXe)
should precede notice to quit, and must be
uncomplicd with for five days after the service
before a notice to quit is in order Fireman's Ins
Co v Brown, 529 P2d 419 (Utah 1974)
— Sufficiency.
A notice to quit is sufficient under Subsection
(1Kb) in the case of a tenancy at will, as
provided in contract of sale in case of default,
where it merely declares a forfeiture, and is not
insufficient under Subsection (lXe) because not
giving purchasers alternative of performing
conditions of the agreement Forrester v Cook,
77 Utah 137, 292 P 206 (1930), American
Holding Co v Hanson, 23 Utah 2d 432, 464
P2d 592 (1970)
Notice to quit which notified tenant that he
was violating substantial obligations of tenancy
by conducting certain businesses on premises,
and which plainly informed tenant that he
must desist from such objectionable practices
by certain date and that, if on or before that
date he failed to desist therefrom and had not
surrendered premises, action would be commenced for restitution of premises, was not
defective because notice was not expressed in
the alternative as required by Subsection (lXe)
of former § 104-60-3, i e , that violation must
cease or tenancy be vacated, since such was
plain intent of notice without use of word "or "
Calhster v Spencer, 113 Utah 497,196 P2d 714
(1948)
Notice by landlord stating that tenants had
failed to make paymentr nf rent due under
lease, had failed to pay utility bills, and further
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providing that tenants were to quit premises Utah 2d 250, 381 P2d 735 (1963)
Notice to purchaser who had become tenant
and deliver up possession to landlord within
fifteen days did not comply with statutory re- at will for failure to make payment was suffiquirements under this section, in absence of cient under Subsection (lXe) even though sevcompliance, landlord was not entitled to main- eral months had elapsed between first and final
tain action for restitution of premises Ameri- notice Beneficial Life Ins Co v Dennett, 24
can Holding Co v Hanson, 23 Utah 2d 432,464 Utah 2d 310, 470 P2d 406 (1970)
P2d 592 (1970)
Notice of forfeiture, while sufficient to termi- Persons liable.
No one but tenant of real property for term
nate a lease for breach of covenant, is not
sufficient to put lessee in unlawful detainer, the less than life can be guilty of unlawful detainer
notice to quit must be in the alternative, i e , Holladay Coal Co v Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57 P
either perform or quit, before lessee becomes 882(1899)
subject to the provisions of this chapter
Pleadings.
Pingree v Continental Group of Utah, Inc , 558
P2d 1317 (Utah 1976)
— Tenancy at will.
Lessee was not in unlawful detainer and
Since on month-to-month tenancy owner
lessor was not entitled to maintain an action could recover property on fifteen-day notice,
under this section where lessor's notice to va- allegation in complaint that such tenant had
cate premises was defective in that it did not violated substantial obligations of rental agreestate that lessee had the alternative of paying ment was not necessary in unlawful detainer
the delinquent rent or surrendering the pre- action Calhster v Spencer, 113 Utah 497, 196
mises Sovtrtcn v Meadows 595 P2d 852 P2d 714(1948)
(Utah 1979)
A notice lo .i month to month tenant to quit Right of re-entry.
the pi i nnscs need not contain Lhc ultci native of
— Contractual provisions.
paying rent Utc Cal Land Dev v Inter mounUnder contract for sale and exchange of real
tain Stock Exch , 628 P2d 1278 (Utah 1981)
The cntn. il distinction between a notice of estate, providing that seller at his option could
•
e-enter
premises and be released from his
unlawltil dttainti and a notui ol foifcilme IH
that th< notice ol lotUiluiL simply dictates a obligations upon default of buyer, seller was
bound
to
give buyer notice of hiK intention to
termination ol the It UM without giving the
lessee the alternative of making up the defi- take advantage of forfeiture provision of contract,
since
such provision was not self-executciency Dang v Cox Corp , 655 P2d 658 (Utah
ing Leone v Zuniga, 84 Utah 417, 34 P2d 699,
1982)
94
ALR
1232(1934)
Letter stating that It In the event that lies
seel docs not immediately rc-open and eontinu
Strict performance.
ouBly conduct noimal business opeiations in
the premises, I lessor) will terminate the Lease — Waiver.
as well as seek damages and all other
Acceptance by vendor of purchaser s past-due
available legal relief for the breach" met the payments under uniform real estate contract,
requirements of Subsection (lXe) Olympus and other conduct leading latter to believe that
Hills Shopping Ctr, Ltd v Smith's Food & strict performance would not be required by
Drug Ctrs , Inc, 889 P2d 445 (Utah Ct App
vendor, imposes duty on vendor to give pur1994), cert denied. 899 P2d 1231 (Utah 1995)
chaser reasonable notice before vendor may
insist on strict performance by purchaser Pa— Tenancy at will.
At common law a tenant at will was not cific Dev Co v Stewart, 113 Utah 403,195 P2d
748(1948)
entitled to notice to quit possession Buchanan
v Cntes, 106 Utah 428, 150 P2d 100, 154 Strict statutory compliance.
ALR 167(1944)
— Not required.
It is only after buyer is in the status of a
There is no reason for the strict rule that
tenant at will that he is amenable to the notice
provided by this section, which requires him to landlord must demand the precise or enact
vacate within five days or be guilty of an amount of rent due or lose his right to recover
unlawful detainer Van Zyverden v Farrar, 15 possession of the premises A tenant is guilty of
unlawful detainer when he continues in possesUtah 2d 367, 393 P2d 468 (1964)
Where lease was terminated by failure of sion after default m payment of any rent, and
tenant to pay rent and taxes, the tenant be- after notice in writing requiring in the alternacame a tenant at will and landlord properly tive the payment of the rent or the surrender of
proceeded to regain possession by the proce- the premises, etc Commercial Block Realty Co
dure set forth in Subsection (1Mb) by giving v Merchants' Protective Ass'n, 71 Utah 505,
notiee to vacate Shoemaker v Pioncci Invs , 14 267 P 1009(1928)
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— Required.
This section, which provides a severe remedy,
must be strictly complied with before the cause
of action thereon may be maintained. Van
Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 Utah 2d 367, 393 P.2d
468 (1964).
Substantial compliance.
The substantial compliance doctrine applies
in some residential lease situations to defeat a
landlord's attempt to forfeit a lease because of a
tenant's minor breach. Housing Auth. v.
Delgado, 914 P.2d 1163 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
The substantial compliance doctrine furthers
the courts' general policy disfavoring forfeitures by allowing equity to intervene and rescue a lessee from forfeiture of a lease when the
lessee has substantially complied with the
lease in good faith. Housing Auth. v. Delgado,
914 P.2d 1163 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Trial court correctly determined that the equitable doctrine of substantial compliance applies to residential leases in Utah, and its
findings that defendant had substantially complied with lease at <ssue was supported by
adequate evidence. Housing Auth. v. Delgado,
914 P.2d 1163 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Termination of lease.
A lease may be terminated pursuant to an
unlawful detainer action. Hackford v. Snow,
657 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1982).

sale of real estate, where the vendors gave
notice of forfeiture of the contract only and did
not give the purchaser an alternative to pay up
or quit, as is required under this section, the
vendors were not entitled to treble damages for
unlawful detainer. Erisman v. Overman, 11
Utah 2d 258, 358 P.2d 85 (1961).

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER

History: L. 1951, ch. 58, ft 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-4; L. 1981, ch. 160, ft 2.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

— Intervenor.
A person not actually occupying the premises
who intervenes in an action to obtain possession and for damages for unlawful detainer,
and who asserts ownership and the right to
possession by the occupier as his tenant, may
be guilty of unlawful detainer and liable for
treble damages where the court finds this intervener's claim invalid. Tanner v. Lawler, 6
Utah 2d 84, 305 P.2d 882, modified on another
point, 6 Utah 2d 268, 311 P.2d 791 (1957).
— Lease.
Under a lease contract for a period of years,
in which the lessee defaulted, notice by the
lessor for the lessees to quit the premises was
not sufficient for treble damages. Under such a
lease the statutes require an alternative notice
that the tenant either perform or quit before he
becomes an unlawful detainer and subject to
treble damages. Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d
59, 278 P.2d 294 (1954).

Am. Jur. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and
Tenant ft 1193.
CJ.S. — 51C CJ.S. Landlord and Tenant
i 136(3).

A.L.R. — What constitutes tenant's holding
over of leased premises, 13 A.L.R.Sth 169.
Key Numbers. — Landlord and Tenant *=»
114(3).

78-36-5. Remedies available to tenant against undertenant.
A tenant may take proceedings similar to those prescribed in this chapter to
obtain possession of the premises let to an undertenant in case of his unlawful
detention of the premises underlet to him.
History: L. 1961, ch. 58, ft 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-5.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Treble damages.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and
Tenant § 1179.
CJ.S. - 51C CJ.S. Landlord and Tenant
( 48(1) et seq.

— Contract of sale.
In a suit for amounts due under a contract of

78-36-6. Notice to quit — How served.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and
Tenant ft 352 et seq.; 50 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord
and Tenant § 264 et seq.
C.J.S. - 52A CJ.S. Landlord and Tenant

ft 758.
A.L.R. — Right of landlord legally entitled to
possession to dispossess tenant without legal
process, 6 A.L.R.3d 177.
Grazing or pasturage agreement as violation
of covenant in lease or provision of statute

78-36-6

over for the 60-day period shall be taken and construed as a consent on the part
of the tenant to hold for another year.

against assigning or subletting without lessor's
consent, 71 AL.R.3d 780.
Express or implied restriction on lessee's use
of residential property for business purposes,
46 A.L.R.4th 496.
Landlord's permitting third party to occupy
premises rent-free as acceptance of tenant's
surrender of premises, 18 A.L.R.Sth 437.
Key Numbers. — Landlord and Tenant *»
290.

78-36-4. Right of tenant of agricultural lands to hold over.
In all cases of tenancy upon agricultural lands, where the tenant has held
over and retained possession for more than 60 days after the expiration of his
term without any demand of possession or notice to quit by the owner, his
designated agent, or his successor in estate, he shall be deemed to be held by
permission of the owner, his designated agent, or his successor in estate, and
shall be entitled to hold under the terms of the lease for another full year, and
shall not be guilty of an unlawful detainer during that year; and the holding
610

Key Numbers. — Landlord and tenant • »
80(3).

The notices required by the preceding sections may be served:
(1) by delivering a copy to the tenant personally;
(2) by sending a copy through registered or certified mail addressed to
the tenant at his place of residence;
(3) if he is absent from his place of residence or from his usual place of
business, by leaving a copy with a person of suitable age and discretion at
either place and mailing a copy to the tenant at the address of his place of
residence or place of business;
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found at the place
of residence, then by affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the leased
property; or
(5) if an order of abatement by eviction of the nuisance is issued by the
court as provided in Section 78-38-11, when issued, the parties present
shall be on notice that the abatement by eviction order is issued and
immediately effective or as to any absent party, notice shall be given as
provided in Subsections (1) through (4).
(6) Service upon a subtenant may be made in the same manner.
History: L. 1951, ch. 68, ft 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104 36-6; L. 1981, ch. 160, ft 3; 1986,
ch. 137, ft 2; 1987, ch. 123, ft 1) 1992, ch. 141,
| 3.

Amendment Notes. - The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsection (5) and designated the former second sentence of Subsection (4) as Subsection (6).
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Cross-References.
Rules 4 . 5 . U R C P

Service of process,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
maintained against a tenant to whom no copy
of the notice required by the statute was
mailed, although a copy was left with his wife
Perkins v Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P 2d 446
(1962)

ANALYSIS

Death of landlord
— Substitution of parties
Delay in bringing action
Improper service
— Failure to mail
Leaving copy with spouse
— Failure to serve personally
--Mail
Rules of Civil Procedure
-Effect
Strict statutory compliance

— Failure to serve personally.

Death of landlord.
— Substitution of parties.
Notice served by agent of landlord during his
lifetime did not lose its force upon landlord's
death in view of C L 1917, $ 6513 permitting
substitution of personal representative for deceased, nor was executor under recessity of
serving another demand for possession before
bringing action, for he was entitled to carry on
the litigation from point where original party
left it Boland v Nihlros, 77 Utah 205, 293 P 7
(1930)
Delay in bringing action.
Mere lapse of time does not operate as an
abandonment of all claim and demand under
the notice, nor does mere delay in bringing suit,
where explained, render demand for possession
of the premises of no force or effect Boland v
Nihlros, 77 Utah 205, 293 P 7 (1930), an action
in which six years elapsed between demand for
possession on commencement of action and in
which there were delays in bringing suit to
trial
Improper service.
— Failure to mail.
Leaving copy with spouse.
An action for unlawful detainer cannot be

--Mali
Assuming that compliance with this section
can be waived by defendant tenant, entering
general appearance cannot have that effect It
was not a compliance with statute for landlord,
after failing in a few attempts to find tenants at
home and serve them personally with notice, to
mail a copy of notice to quit, addressed to them
at their place of residence Carstensen v
Hansen, 107 Utah 234, 162 P2d 954 (1944)
(decided under prior law)

78-36-7

shall be made a party defendant in the proceeding, except as provided in
Section 78-38-13, nor shall any proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be
nonsuited, for the nonjoinder of any person who might have been made a party
defendant, but when it appears that any of the parties served with process or
appearing in the proceedings are guilty, judgment shall be rendered against
those parties
(2) If a person has become subtenant of the premises in controversy after the
service of any notice as provided in this chapter, the fact that such notice was
not served on the subtenant is not a defense to the action All persons who
enter under the tenant after the commencement of the action shall be bound by
the judgment the same as if they had been made parties to the action
(3) A landlord, owner, or designated agent is a necessary party defendant
only m an abatement by eviction action for an unlawful drug house as provided
in Section 78-38-13
History. L 1951, ch. 58, ft 1; C 1943,
Supp , 104-36-7, 1992, ch. 141,ft 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective Apnl 27, 1992, added the subsection designations, substituted "shall" for
*need" near the beginning of Subsection (1) and
inserted "except as provided in Section 78 38

13," near the middle of that subsection, added
Subsection (3), and made stylistic changes
throughout the section
Cross-References. — Necessary joinder of
parties, Rule 19, U R C P
Nonsuit, dismissal of actions Rule 41,
URCP

Rules of Civil Procedure.
-Effect.
The general provisions of Rule 4, U R C P,
relating to service do not modify the provisions
of this section, which specifically applies to
service in unlawful detainer actions Ute-Cal
Land Dev v Intermountain Stock Exch, 628
P2d 1278 (Utah 1981)
Strict statutory compliance.
To hold that any method of service other than
that prescribed in the statute is sufficient to
comply with it would be to nullify the intention
of the legislature Carstensen v Hansen, 107
Utah 234, 162 P2d 964 (1944)
Unlawful detainer being a summary procedure, the statute must be strictly complied with
in order to enforce the obligations imposed by
it Perkins v Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P2d
446 (1954)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 50 Am Jur 2d Landlord and
Tenant f 274. 275
C.J.S. — 62A C J S Landlord and Tenant
i 769(1) etseq
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point, 66 Utah 2d 268, 311 P2d 791 (1957)

Liability of parties
— Intervenor
Necessary parties
— Agent of landlord
— Assignor of sales contract

Necessary parties.

Liability of parties.

— Agent of landlord.
Agent of landlord is not a necessary or proper
party in forcible detainer proceeding Dunbar v
Hansen, 68 Utah 398, 250 P 982 (1926)

— Intervenor
A person not actually occupying the premises
who intervenes in an action to obtain posses
sion and for damages for unlawful detainer,
and who asserts ownership and the right to
possession by the occupier as his tenant, may
be guilty of unlawful detainer and liable for
treble damages where the court finds this intervener's claim invalid Tanner v Lawler 6
Utah 84, 305 P2d 882, modified on another

— Assignor of sales contract
It was not necessary for assignee of seller's
interest in real estate sale contract to notify
original purchaser of the forfeiture for default
or make him a defendant in the unlawful de
tainer action since an action for unlawful de
tamer is primarily against the person in possession and it is not necessary for everyone
having an interest to be made a party Pearce v
Shurtz, 2 UUh 2d 124, 270 P2d 442 (1954)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. 60 Am Jur 2d Landlord and
Tenant^ 1019
C.J S. — 52A C J S Landlord and Tenant
I 764

Key Numbers. — Landlord and Tenant «=»
291(6)

78-36-7. Necessary parties defendant.
(1) No person other than the tenant of the premises, and subtenant if there
is one in the actual occupation of the premises when the action is commenced,
612
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78-36-8. Allegations p e r m i t t e d in complaint — Time for
a p p e a r a n c e — Service of summons.
The plaintiff in his complaint, in addition to setting forth the facts on which
he seeks to recover, may set forth any circumstances of fraud, force, or violence
which may have accompanied the alleged forcible entry, or forcible or unlawful
detainer, and claim damages therefor or compensation for the occupation of the
premises, or both. If the unlawful detainer charged is after default in the
payment of rent, the complaint shall state the amount of rent due. The court
shall indorse on the summons the number of days within which the defendant
is required to appear and defend the action, which shall not be less than three
or more than 20 days from the date of service. The court may authorize service
by publication or mail for cause shown. Service by publication is complete one
week after publication. Service by mail is complete three days after mailing.
The summons shall be changed in form to conform to the time of service as
ordered, and shall be served as in other cases.
History: L. 1951, ch. 68, ft 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-8; 1987, ch. 123 ft 2.
Cross-References. — General rules of
pleadings, Rule 8, U.R.C.P.

Service of summons, Rules 4, 5, U.R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Insufficiency of process.
Defendant, by answering plaintiffs' complaint without raising the defense of insufficiency of process for failure to comply with the
indorsement provision of this section and by
proceeding through trial and the verdict before
raising that defense, waived it under U.R.C.P.
12(h). Fowler v. Seiter, 838 P.2d 675 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).

ANALYSIS

Action to recover rent.
Damages.
— Right to demand.
Dismissal.
— Joint motion.
Insufficiency of process.
Necessary allegations and proof.
— Date of notice to surrender.
Action to recover rent.
Plaintiff may bring action to recover rent
due, and a separate action in unlawful detainer
for recovery of possession and for damages.
Judgment in one action will not bar action in
the other proceeding, the issues in the two
actions not being the same, and, therefore, not
being adjudicated. Voyles v. Straka, 77 Utah
171. 292 P. 913 (1930).
Damages.
— Right to demand.
The plaintiff in his complaint may not only
ask for possession of the premises, but also for
damages accruing to trial. Forrester v. Cook, 77
Utah 137, 292 P. 206 (1930).
Dismissal.
— Joint motion.
Where complaint in forcible entry and detainer action stated cause of action against one
defendant, joint demurrer (now motion to dismiss) by two defendants was properly overruled. Paxton v. Fisher, 86 Utah 408, 45 P. 2d
903 (1935).

Necessary allegations and proof.
Plaintiff must allege and prove, not only that
he has right to property's possession, but also
that property is being unlawfully detained from
him, after notice to quit, served as provided by
law. Barnes v. Cox, 12 Utah 47,41 P. 657 (1895).
As a rule, all that is required to be alleged by
plaintiff, in action of forcible entry and detainer, is facts and circumstances constituting
entry or detainer complained of, and either that
he was peaceably in actual possession of premises at time of forcible entry, or, in some cases,
that he was entitled to possession of premises
at time of forcible detainer. Holladay Coal Co. v.
Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57 P. 882 (1899).
Plaintiff, in action of forcible entry and detainer, need not allege his estate in or title to
premises, nor, with few exceptions, is he required to allege his right of possession.
Holladay Coal Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57 P.
882 (1899).
— Date of notice to surrender.
In action of forcible entry and detainer, held
that exact date on which notice to surrender
premises was given was wholly immaterial,
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and that plaintiff was only required to aver and
prove specific fact that, subsequent to time of
unlawful entry, while defendants were in possession and prior to commencement of action,

78-36-8.5

sufficient notice was given and that surrender
of premises by defendants was refused for period of three days thereafter. Holladay Coal Co.
v. Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57 P. 882 (1899).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible
Entry and Detainer ( 38 et seq.
C.J.S. - 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and Detainer §§ 39,42,44.

Key Numbers. — Forcible Entry and Detainer *» 24.

78-36-8.5. Possession bond of plaintiff — Alternative remedies.
(1) At any time between the filing of his complaint and the entry of final
judgment, the plaintiff may execute and file a possession bond. The bond may
be in the form of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds, or a property
bond executed by two persons who own real property in the state and who are
not parties to the action. The court shall approve the bond in an amount that
is the probable amount of costs of suit and damages which may result to the
defendant if the suit has been improperly instituted. The bond shall be payable
to the clerk of the court for the benefit of the defendant for all costs and
damages actually adjudged against the plaintiff. The plaintiff shall notify the
defendant that he has filed a possession bond. This notice shall be served in the
same manner as service of summons and shall inform the defendant of all of
the alternative remedies and procedures under Subsection (2).
(2) The following are alternative remedies and procedures applicable to an
action if the plaintiff files a possession bond under Subsection (1):
(a) With respect to an unlawful detainer action based solely upon
nonpayment of rent or utilities, the existing contract shall remain in force
and the complaint shall be dismissed if the defendant, within three days
of the service of the notice of the possession bond, pays accrued rent, utility
charges, any late fee, and other costs, including attorney's fees, as
provided in the rental agreement.
(b) The defendant may remain in possession if he executes and files a
counter bond in the form of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds,
or a property bond executed by two persons who own real property in the
state and who are not parties to the action. The form of the bond is at the
defendant's option. The bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court. The
defendant shall file the bond prior to the expiration of three days from the
date he is served with notice of the filing of plaintiff's possession bond. The
court shall approve the bond in an amount that is the probable amount of
costs of suit and actual damages that may result to the plaintiff if the
defendant has improperly withheld possession. The court shall consider
prepaid rent to the owner as a portion of the defendant's total bond.
(c) The defendant, upon demand, shall be granted a hearing to be held
prior to the expiration of three days from the date the defendant is served
with notice of the filing of plaintiffs possession bond.
(3) If the defendant does not elect and comply with a remedy under
Subsection (2) within the required time, the plaintiff, upon ex parte motion,
shall be granted an order of restitution. The constable of the precinct or the
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sheriff of the county where the property is situated shall r e t u r n possession of
the property to t h e plaintiff promptly.
(4) If t h e defendant demands a hearing under Subsection (2)(c), and if the
court rules after t h e hearing t h a t t h e plaintiff is entitled to possession of the
property, the constable or sheriff shall promptly r e t u r n possession of the
property to the plaintiff. If at the hearing t h e court allows t h e defendant to
remain in possession and further issues remain to be adjudicated between t h e
parties, t h e court shall require t h e defendant to post a bond a s required in
Subsection (2Kb). If a t t h e hearing the court rules t h a t all issues between the
parties can be adjudicated without further court proceedings, t h e court shall,
upon adjudicating those issues, enter judgment on the merits.
History: C. 1953, 78-86-8.5, enacted by L.
1981, c h . 160, ft 4; 1983, ch. 209, ft 1; 1987,
ch. 123,ft3.
Cross-References. — Contracts of suretyship, 5 31A-22-101 et seq.

County sheriff, Title 17, Chapter 22.
Service of summons, Rules 4, 5, U.R.C.R

— Tender of rent.
A tender by tenant of rent, if insufficient in
amount, is no tender at all, and the fact that
subsequent tenders were, in the aggregate,
equivalent to the rent due, will not make the
tender sufficient and valid. Commercial Block
Realty Co. v. Merchants' Protective Ass'n, 71
Utah 505, 267 P. 1009 (1928).
— Constructive.

Cited in P. H. lnv. v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018
(Utah 1991).

P r o o f r e q u i r e d o f plaintiff — D e f e n s e .

On the trial of any proceeding for any forcible entry or forcible detainer the
plaintiff shall only be required to show, in addition to the forcible entry or
forcible detainer complained of, t h a t he was peaceably in the actual possession
at the time of t h e forcible entry, or was entitled to the possession a t t h e time
of the forcible detainer. The defendant may show in his defense t h a t he or his
ancestors, or those whose interest in such premises he claims, had been in the
quiet possession thereof for the space of one whole year continuously next
before the commencement of the proceedings, and t h a t his interest therein is
not then ended or determined; and such showing is a b a r to t h e proceedings.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, ft 1; C. 1943,
Cross-References. - Limitation of actions,
Supp., 104-36-9.
real property, ft 78-12-2 et seq.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

termination. Dunbar v. Hansen, 68 Utah 398,
250 P. 982 (1926) (decided under prior law).
Under Rule 13, U.R.C.P., counterclaim alleging misrepresentation and fraud concerning
the contract of purchase of the involved property could be asserted by defendants in an
unlawful detainer action. White v. District
Court, 232 P.2d 785 (Utah 1951).

Possession.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
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— Deed.

Defenses and counterclaims.

Fraud and duress.
_ Tax title.

~- -Counterclaim.
— Tender of rent.
Possession.
- Constructive
n-T. r *
- - R j g h t of entry.
file
- Public land.
Security interest in personal property.
— Partial possession of premises.
Title adjudication.
- Color of title.
Suite louse.

Defense, and counterclaim..
_ Tenant.
_
. .
Counterclaim.
Defendant in forcible detainer action cannot
c o u n t e r c l a i m , a n d i g i i m i t e d to defenses
predicated on nonexistence of relationship of
landlord and tenant between parties, nonexiste n c e 0 f valid lease or contract to pay rent, or
that no rent is due; but he may bring suit in
court of equity to determine right* and enjoin
forcible detainer proceeding pending Much de616

Right of entry.
Under an allegation of possession plaintiff
can show constructive possession, in that it is
an association of qualified persons in possession of coal mines upon which sufficient money
has been expended to give a preference right of
entry to 640 acres of surrounding land under
the law. Holladay Coal Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah
192,57 P. 882(1899)
- P u b l i c land.
Possession of public land is pinna facie evidence of right to possession as against a mere
intruder or trespasser. Wilson v. Triumph
Consol. Mining Co., 19 Utah 66, 56 P. 300, 75
Am. St. R. 718(1899).
Security interest in personal property.
— Partial possession of premises.
Plaintiff's security interest in bar equipment
did not constitute partial possession of premises, and plaintiff could not maintain action
for forcible entry or for wrongful eviction.

78-36-10

Wangagard v. Fitzpatrick, 542 P2d 194 (Utah
1975).
Title adjudication.
In action for possession and damages for
unlawful detention of farm lands, trial court
erred in rendering judgment and decree in
defendants favor quieting title to premises,
since question of title is not ordinarily involved
in such actions. Welling v. Abbott, 52 Utah 240,
173 P. 245 (1918).
It is not proper to quiet title to real estate in
action of forcible entry or in action for unlawful
detainer. Thomson v. Reynolds, 53 Utah 437,
174 P. 164 (1918).
- Color of title.
S t a t e lease.
In suit for forcible entry, it was proper to
introduce lease from State Land Board (now
Board of State Lands) to plaintiffs to show that
they held under color of title and that it was
necessary for defendants to resort to statute to
obtain possession. Paxton v. Deardon, 94 Utah
149, 76P.2d561 (1938).
- Deed.
- — F r a u d a n d duress.
It is not intention of forcible entry and detainer proceedings to try title or equities between parties, so that, in such an action, defendant was not permitted to show that deed
executed by him to plaintiff was obtained from
him by means of fraud and duress since such
defense would constitute an attempt to dispute
landlord's title. Williams v Nelson, 65 Utah
304, 237 P. 217 (1925).
- T a x title.
Affirmative defense and counterclaim setting
up tax title and seeking to have property in
question quieted in defendant, held not to lie i I
forcible detainer action. Woodbury v. Bunker,
98 Utah 216, 98 P.2d 948 (1940).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible
Entry and Detainer ftft 42 to 44
C.J.S. - 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and Detainer § 53 et seq.

Key Numbers. — Forcible Entry and Detainer «=» 29.

78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent —
Immediate enforcement — Treble damages.
(1) A j u d g m e n t may be entered upon t h e merits or upon default. A j u d g m e n t
entered in favor of t h e plaintiff shall include a n order for t h e restitution of t h e
premises as provided in Section 78-36-10.5. If the proceeding is for unlawful
detainer after neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of t h e
lease or agreement under which t h e property is held, or after default in t h e
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payment of rent, the judgment shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease or
agreement
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon the
defendant's default, shall also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff
from any of the following.
(a) forcible entry,
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is
alleged in the complaint and proved at trial;
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after
default in the payment of rent; and
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction as provided in Sections
78-38-9 through 78-38-16
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for
three times the amount of the damages assessed under Subsections (2Xa)
through (2)(c), and for reasonable attorneys' fees, if they are provided for in the
lease or agreement
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default in the payment of
the rent, execution upon the judgment shall be issued immediately after the
entry of the judgment In all cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced
immediately
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, ft 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-10, L. 1981, ch. 160, ft 5; 1987,
ch. 123,ft4; 1992, ch. 141,ft5; 1994, ch. 225,

first sentence of Subsection (4)
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994,
added "as provided in Section 78-36-10 5" to the
second sentence in Subsection (1)
Cross-References. — Fees of constable,
ft 21-3-3
Fees of sheriff, ft 21 2 4

ft 2.

Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective Apnl 27, 1992, added Subsection (2Xe) and added the clause beginning "execution upon the judgment" to the end of the

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

plaintiff, is "damage" suffered Forrester v
Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 P 206 (1930)

Damages
— Loss of value
— Nominal damages
— Rent and profits
— Treble damages
Effect of judgment
Execution upon judgment
— Failure to pay rent
Grace period
— Attempt to use
Real estate sale contracts
— Liquidated damages
Separate action for rent
Statutory remedy
— Tort liability for noncompliance
Cited

— Nominal damages.
Where husband and wife occupy the premises, and the notice required by statute is
served only on the wife so that an action for
unlawful detainer can be maintained merely
against her, the successful plaintiff is entitled
to nominal damages only, since, even if the wife
had moved, the plaintiff would have had no
nght to possession of the premises as against
the husband, and he thus suffered no actual
damage by reason of the fact that the wife
remained there Perkins v Spencer, 121 Utah
468, 243 P2d 446 (1952)

Damages.
— Loss of value.
The loss of the value of the use and occupation of the premises, during the period when
the premises were unlawfully withheld from

— Rent and profits.
Damages recoverable must be the natural
and proximate consequences of the unlawful
detainer and nothing more Rents and profits,
or rental value of the premises, during detention are included in damages Rental value or
reasonable value of the use and occupation of
the premises becomes an element of damages
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for retaining possession This is not rent, it is
damages Forrester v Cook, 77 Utah 137,292 P
206(1930)
This section was not designed to provide a
summary remedy for the recovery of rent The
language thereof that "judgment shall be rendered
for the rent," etc, is applicable only
when rent is claimed in the complaint for it
would be improper in any case to award a
judgment for what is not so claimed Voyles v
Straka, 77 Utah 171, 292 P 913 (1930)
— Treble damages.

78-36-10
Effect of judgment.
This section recognizes that the contractual
obligations of a lease survive the service of a
statutory notice It is the judgment that decrees
the forfeiture of a lease and not the service of
the statutory notice Olympus Hills Shopping
Ctr, Ltd v Landes, 821 P2d 451 (Utah 1991)
Execution upon judgment.
— Failure to pay rent.

When landlord prevails in unlawful detainer
action because of tenants failure to pay rent
under a lease which has not expired, he cannot
have any judgment unless he shows that there
is rent due and the amount thereof, when that
is done, the tenant has five days in which to pay
Where tenant merely remains over upon terthe judgment and costs, and then he will be
mination of lease and increase in rent, but does
restored to the premises under his lease The
not contest landlords right to terminate lease
landlord
cannot prevent the tenant from paying
or his right to possession, tenant is conclusively
the judgment and regaining his rights under
presumed to have acquiesced in increased
the
unexpired
lease by the device of failing to
rental and landlord is not entitled to treble
have the amount of rent due included in the
damages Belnap v Fox, 69 Utah 15, 251 P
1073 (1926)
judgment In such a case unless the judgment
determines the amount of rent due, it is defecThe provision for treble damages is highly
tive, and the restitution part cannot be lawfully
penal, and, therefore, subject to strict construcenforced
Monter v Kratzers Specialty Bread
tion It will be observed that only damages are
Co, 29 Utah 2d 18, 504 P2d 40 (1972)
to be trebled, not rents and waste But the
language is mandatory making it compulsory
Grace period.
upon the court to render and enter judgment
— Attempt to use.
for three times the amount of the damages
Where evicted lessees asserted that they
assessed, after a finding of damages by the jury
were not afforded the five-day post-judgment
And rents which may not be trebled are such as
accrue before termination of the tenancy
grace period to pay the delinquency and preForrester v Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 P 206
serve the lease, the issue was moot since the
(1930)
defendants did not make an attempt to take
A person not actually occupying the premises advantage of the grace period All red v Smith,
674 P2d 99 (Utah 1983) (decided under facts
who intervenes in an action to obtain possession and for damages for unlawful detainer,
existing prior to 1981 amendment)
and who asserts ownership and the right to Real estate sale contracts
possession by the occupier as his tenant, may
— Liquidated damages.
be guilty of unlawful detainer and liable for
By common practice in Utah, an action in
treble damages where the court finds this inunlawful
detainer may be brought against a
terveners claim invalid Tanner v Lawler, 6
Utah 2d 84 305 P2d 882, modified on another
vendee of realty whose payments are far in
point, 66 Utah 2d 268, 311 P2d 791 (1957)
arrears, after sufficient demands for payment
Plaintiffs failure to comply with the provi- have been made and subsequent notice to quit
has been given by vendor; where a vendor does
sions of ft 78-36-8 converted his action for unlawful detainer into one at common law for cancel the contract for sale and bring such an
action, vendee may be required, if the contract
ejectment and defeated his nght under this
so provides, to forfeit as liquidated damages all
section to treble damages Pingree v Continental Group of Utah, Inc, 558 P2d 1317 (Utah
money theretofore paid to the vendor along
1976)
with all improvements placed on the land by
the vendee, unless such forfeiture would be
After the termination of the tenancy by nounconscionable Weyher v Peterson 16 Utah
tice to quit, the person in unlawful possession is
not owing rent under contract, but must re2d 278, 399 P2d 438 (1965)
spond in damages This is not rent, but "damSeparate action for rent.
ages," and, therefore, may be trebled Forrester
Judgment in unlawful detainer for rcstitu
v Cook, 77 Utuh 137, 292 P 206 (1930), Monroe,
tion of the premises and for treble damages
Inc v Sidwull, 770 P2d 1022 (Utah Ct App
does not bar action to recover rent due, rent not
19S9)
being claimed or adjudged in the possessory
action, because the right to recover possession
Where all issues were decided in plaintiffs
favor, trial court's refusal to treble damages,
awarded plaintiff by jury, was error Eccles v
Union Pac Coal Co, 15 Utah 14, 48 P 148
(1897)
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Statutory remedy.

premises, resort to the remedy given by law to
secure it. A violation of that duty set by the
statute gives rise to an action for damages, not
in an action under the forcible entry and detainer statute but as a separate tort. King v.
Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419, 285 P.2d 1114 (1955).

— Tort liability for noncompliance.
A landlord who is entitled to possession must,
on the refusal of the tenant to surrender the

Cited in Fowler v. Seiter, 838 P.2d 675 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992).

by summary remedy, and the claim for rent, do
nut constitute one entire and indivisible cause
oC action. Voylcs v. Straka, 77 Utah 171, 292 P.
913(1930).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Forfeiture Under
Installment Land Contracts in Utah, 1981
Utah L. Rev. 803, 807.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible
Entry and Detainer $ 53.
C.J.S. - 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and Detainer $ 68 et seq.
A.L.R. — Landlord and tenant: respective

rights in excess rent when landlord relets at
higher rent during lessee's term, 50 A.L.R.4th
403.
Air-conditioning appliance, equipment, or apparatus as fixture, 69 A.L.R.4th 359.
Key Numbers. — Forcible Entry and Detainer «=» 38.

78-36-10.5. Order of restitution — Service — Enforcement
— Disposition of personal property — Hearing.
(1) Each order of restitution shall:
(a) direct the defendant to vacate the premises, remove his personal
property, and restore possession of the premises to the plaintiff, or be
forcibly removed by a sheriff or constable;
(b) advise the defendant of the time limit set by the court for the
defendant to vacate the premises, which shall be three business days
following service of the order, unless the court determines t h a t a longer or
shorter period is appropriate under the circumstances; and
(c) advise the defendant of his right to a hearing to contest the terms of
the order of restitution or the manner of its enforcement.
(2) (a) A copy of the order of restitution and a form for the defendant to
request a hearing shall be served personally upon the defendant in
accordance with Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, by a person
authorized to serve process pursuant to Section 78-27-58. If personal
service is impossible or impracticable, service may be made by mailing a
copy of the order and the form to the defendant's last-known address and
posting a copy of the order and the form at a conspicuous place on the
premises.
(b) The date of service, the name, title, signature, and telephone
number of the person serving the order and the form shall be legibly
endorsed on the copy of the order and the form served on the defendant.
(c) Within ten days of service, the person serving the order and the form
shall file proof of service in accordance with Rule 4(h), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
(3) (a) If the defendant fails to comply with the order within the time
prescribed by the court, a sheriff or constable at the plaintiffs direction
may enter the premises by force using the least destructive means possible
to remove the defendant.
(b) Any personal property of the defendant may be removed from the
premises by the sheriff or constable and transported to a suitable location
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for safe storage. The sheriff or constable, with the plaintiff's consent, may
delegate responsibility for storage to the plaintiff, who must store the
personal property in a suitable place and in a reasonable manner.
(c) The personal property removed and stored shall be inventoried by
the sheriff or constable who shall keep the original inventory and
personally deliver or mail the defendant a copy of the inventory immediately after the personal property is removed.
(4) (a) After demand made by the defendant within 30 days of removal of
personal property from the premises, the sheriff or constable shall
promptly return all of the defendant's personal property upon payment of
the reasonable costs incurred for its removal and storage.
(b) The person storing the personal property may sell the property
remaining in storage at a public sale if:
(i) the defendant does not request a hearing or demand return of
the personal property within 30 days of its removal from the premises;
or
(ii) the defendant fails to pay the reasonable costs incurred for the
removal and storage of the personal property.
(c) In advance of the sale, the person storing the personal property shall
mail to the defendant's last-known address a written notice of the time and
place of the sale.
(d) If the defendant is present at the sale, he may specify the order in
which the personal property shall be sold, and only so much personal
property shall be sold as to satisfy the costs of removal, storage, advertising, and conducting the sale. The remainder of the personal property, if
any, shall be released to the defendant. If the defendant is not present at
the sale, the proceeds, after deduction of the costs of removal, storage,
advertising, and conducting the sale shall be paid to the plaintiff up to the
amount of any judgment the plaintiff obtained against the defendant. Any
surplus shall be paid to the defendant, if the defendant's whereabouts are
known. If the defendant's whereabouts are not known, any surplus shall
be disposed of in accordance with Title 67, Chapter 4a, Unclaimed
Property Act.
(e) If the property belonging to a person who is not a defendant is
removed and stored in accordance with this section, that person may claim
the property by delivering a written demand for its release to the sheriff or
constable. If the claimant provides proper identification and evidence of
ownership, the sheriff or constable shall promptly release the property at
no cost to the claimant.
(5) In the event of a dispute concerning the terms of the order of restitution
or the manner of its enforcement, the defendant or any person claiming to own
stored personal property may file a request for a hearing. The court shall set
the matter for hearing within ten days from the filing of the request, or as soon
thereafter as practicable, and shall mail notice of the hearing to the parties.
(6) The Judicial Council shall draft the forms necessary to implement this
section.
History: C. 1953,78-36-10.5, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 225, & 3; 1995, ch. 68, 5 5; 1996, ch.
79, ft 116.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1,1995, added "by a person

authorized to serve process pursuant to Section
78-27-58" to the first sentence in Subsection
(2Xa).
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29,
1996, substituted "Title 67, Chapter 4a, Un-
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claimed Property Act" for "Title 78, Chapter 44,
Uniform Unclaimed Property Act" in Subsection (4Xd)

Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch 225
became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Lessor's lien.
Although this section envisions the return of
personal property to the tenant, it does not
preclude the creation and enforcement of a

lessors hen under ft 38-3-1 or one created by
contract Butters v Jackson, 917 P2d 87 (Utah
Ct App 1996)

78-36-12 3

day limit of this section being applicable only to Failure to comply.
judgments in forcible detainer Dunbar v
Hansen, 68 Utah 398, 250 P 982 (1926)
- Loss of jurisdiction.
Ten day period for appeal provided in forcible
Where judgment was entered against appelentry and detainer cases was inapplicable to lants on July 1 and they did not file notice of
appeal from money judgment entered for land- appeal until July 15, appeal was not timely
lord after recovery of possession, six-month filed and Supreme Court was without junsdic
period of general statute being applicable
tion to hear it Coombs v Johnson, 26 Utah 2d
Belnap v Fox, 69 Utah 15, 251 P 1073 (1926)
8, 484 P2d 155 (1971)
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

78-36-11. Time for appeal.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), either party may, within ten days,
appeal from the judgment rendered.
(2) In a nuisance action under Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16, any party
may appeal from the judgment rendered within three days
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, ft 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-11; 1992, ch. 141, ft 6,
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, rewrote the
section, which formerly read "Either party

may, within ten days appeal from the judgment rendered "
Cross-References. — Stay of execution
pending appeal, Rule 62, U R C P

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability ot section.

Madsen v Chournos, 102 Utah 247, 129 P2d
986(1942)
A party had ten duys, as provided by this
section, and not one month, as provided by
former Rule 73(a), U R C P, in which to appeal
from a judgment for unlawful detainer Ute-Cal
Land Dev v Intermountain Stock Exch , 628
P2d 1278 (Utah 1981)

— Held applicable.
Time for taking appeal in forcible entry and
detainer suit was governed by this section,
which is valid, and general provision providing
for appeals was not applicable Hunsaker v
Hams, 37 Utah 226, 109 P 1 (1910)
Fact that judgment rested on construction of
whether lease was terminated upon sale of
property did not change action from one in
unlawful detainer, so that it was necessary to
take appeal within ten days as provided by this
section Brandley v Lewis, 97 Utah 217,92 P2d
338 (1939)
Fact that demurrer to complaint required
trial court to construe written instrument to
determine whether plaintiff was entitled to any
relief did not change action from one of unlawful detainer, so that it was necessary to take
appeal within ten days as provided by this
section Madsen v Chournos, 102 Utah 247,
129 P 2d 986(1942)
Appeal from dismissal of unlawful detainer
action for failure to amend complaint within
time allowed was governed by this section

— Held inapplicable.
Where, in first count, plaintiff sought to recover possession of real estate, and in second
count sought to quiet title to certain land adjoining property involved in first cause of action, and it appeared that case was tried as
action in equity, plaintiff could not defeat appeal by contending that action was one of
forcible detainer Ottenheimer v Mountain
States Supply Co, 56 Utah 190, 188 P 1117
(1920)
Where a complaint contained two causes of
action asking for treble damages for forcible
entry and detainer, one cause of action for a
temporary restraining order and temporary injunction, and a fourth cause of action for damages for breach of a lease, the hybnd nature of
the plaintiffs action prevented this statute
from controlling the time limitation for filing an
appeal Fashions Four v Fashion Place Assocs,
681 P 2d 830 (Utah 1984)
Where plaintiff in forcible detainer action
was held liable on counterclaim, time for appeal
was not governed by ten-day limitation of thia
section, but by general six-month statute, ten-

Applicability of section
— Held applicable
— Held inapplicable
Failure to comply
— Loss of jurisdiction

Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am Jur 2d Forcible
Entry and Detainer ft 55
C.J.S. - 36A C J S Forcible Entry and Detainer § 90

Key Numbers. — Forcible Entry and Detamer *=» 43

78-36-12. Exclusion of tenant without judicial process
prohibited — Abandoned premises excepted.
It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a tenant from the tenant's
premises in any manner except by judicial process, provided, an owner or his
agent shall not be prevented from removing the contents of the leased premises
under Subsection 78-36-12 6(2) and retaking the premises and attempting to
rent them at a fair rental value when the tenant has abandoned the premises
History: C. 1953, 78-36-12, enacted by L.
1981, ch 160,ft6.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Condemnation of leasehold premises.
A landlord's actions in having a house effectively condemned for the purpose of evicting a
tenant rather than repairing a leaking sewer
system violated state policy disfavoring self-

help evictions and abused the building inspection process and were unconscionable under
the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act Wade
v Jobe, 818 P2d 1006 (Utah 1991)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Landlord and tenant respective
rights in excess rent when landlord relets at

78-36-12.3.

higher rent during lessee s term 50 A L R 4th
403

Definitions.

(1) "Willful exclusion" means preventing the tenant from entering into the
premises with intent to deprive the tenant of such entry.
(2) "Owner" means the actual owner of the premises and shall also have the
same meaning as landlord under common law and the statutes of this state
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of the following situations
(a) The tenant has not notified the owner that he or she will be absent
from the premises, and the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days after the
due date, and there is no reasonable evidence other than the presence of
the tenant's personal property that the tenant is occupying the premises,
or
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78-36-12 6

JUDICIAL CODE

(b) The tenant has not notified the owner that he or she will be absent
from the premises, and the tenant fails to pay rent when due and the
tenant's personal property has been removed from the dwelling unit and
there is no reasonable evidence that the tenant is occupying the premises

MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
COLLATERAL R E F E R E N C E S
A L U - Landlord and t e n a n t respective
rights in excess rent when landlord relets a t
hitfhe i K nt Hut mu U use < s term r>0 A I R 4th
403

History* C 1 9 5 3 , 7 8 - 3 6 12 3 , e n a c t e d b y L
1981, c h 160, ft 7

CHAPTER 37
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE

NOTES TO DECISIONS
C i t e d in Fashion Place Assocs v Glad Rags
I in 754 P 2 d 940 ( U t a h 1988)

Section
78 i7 I

78-36-12.6. Abandoned
premises
— Retaking
and
rerenting by owner — Liability of tenant —
Personal property of tenant left on premises.
(1) In the event of abandonment, the owner may retake the premises and
attempt to rent them at a fair rental value and the tenant who abandoned the
premises shall be liable
(a) for the entire rent due for the remainder of the term, or
(b) for rent accrued during the period necessary to rerent the premises
at a fair rental value, plus the difference between the fair rental value and
the rent agreed to in the prior rental agreement, plus a reasonable
commission for the renting of the premises and the costs, if any, necessary
to restore the rental unit to its condition when rented by the tenant less
normal wear and tear This subsection applies, if less than Subsection (a)
notwithstanding that the owner did not rerent the premises
(2) If the tenant has abandoned the premises and has left personal property
on the premises, the owner is entitled to remove the property from the
dwelling, store it for the tenant, and recover actual moving and storage costs
from the tenant The owner shah make reasonable efforts to notify the tenant
of the location of the personal property, however, if the property has been in
storage for over 30 days and the tenant has made no reasonable effort to
recover it, the owner may sell the property and apply the proceeds toward any
amount the tenant owes Any money left over from the sale of the property
shall be handled as specified in Title 67, Chapter 4a, Part 2, Standards for
Determining When Property is Abandoned or Unclaimed Nothing contained in
this act shall be in derogation of or alter the owner s rights under Title 38,
Chapter 3
H i s t o r y C 1953, 78*36-12 6, e n a c t e d b y L
1981, c h 160, ft 8, 1986, c h 194, ft 20, 1995,
c h 198, ft 4 8
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s - The 1995 amend
ment effective May 1 1995 substituted the
language beginning with "Title 67" and ending
with "Unclaimed" in the next to-last sentence
in Subsection (2) for "Section 78 44 18 "

M e a n i n g of " t h i s a c t * - The term "this
a c t " in Subsection (2) m e a n s Laws 1981,
Chapter 160 which a p p e a r s a s $4 78 36 3
78 36 4 78 36 6 78 36 8 fi 78 36 10 78 36 12
and 78 36 12 3
C r o s s R e f e r e n c e s - Residential r e n t e r s
deposits Title 57 C h a p t e r 17

624

Air conditioning appliance equipment o r a p
p a r a t u s as fixture 60 A L R 4th 359

78 37 1 5
78 37 2
78 37 3
78 37 4

78-37-1.

Form of action — J u d g m e n t —
Special execution
Environmental impairment to
real property security interest
— Remedies of lender
Deficiency j u d g m e n t — Execu
tion
Necessary parties — Unre
corded rights barred
Sales — Disposition of surplus
moneys

Section
78 37 5
78 37 6

78 37 7
78 37 8
78 37 9

Sales — When debt dui in in
stallment*
Right of redemption — Sales b>
parcels — Of land and w it< i
stock
Repeuled
Restraining possessoi fiom in
j u r i n g property
Attorney fees

Form of action — J u d g m e n t — Special execution.

There can be but one action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement
of any right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate which action must be
in accordance with the provisions of this chapter Judgment shall be given
adjudging the amount due, with costs and disbursements, and the sale of
mortgaged property, or some part thereof, to satisfy said amount and accruing
costs and dnecting the sheriff to proceed and sell the same according to the
provisions of law relating to sales on execution, and a special execution or order
of sale shall be issued for that purpose
H i s t o r y L 1951, c h 58, ft 1, C 1943,
S u p p , 104 37 1, L 1965, c h 172, ft 1
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s — Execution and pro

ceedings supplemental thereto
URCP
Trust deeds § 57 1 19 et seq

Rule

N O T E S TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Action for deficiency
Additional security
Applicability of section
Defenses
Exclusive remedy
Exhaustion of security
Federal action
Good faith reliance on appraisal
Legislative intent
Limitation to single suit
Nature of action
Plonding
Prior lien
Sales
Servicr of proce ss
( ib tl

A c t i o n for d e f i c i e n c y
Former s t a t u t e held not bar to action at law
for deficiency remaining after sale u n d e r power
in t r u s t deed failed to realize full a m o u n t of
note secured by such deed Mnlloiy v Kcsslei
18 U t a h 11 54 P 892 72 Am St R 765 (1398)
Additional security
When a creditor t a k e s more t h a n o m item of
security upon an obligation secured by a t i u s t
deed the creditor is not preclude d fiotn in ikuiK
use of t h a t additional security merely lice u w
the creditor h a s not sought a doncic ncv IIICIL,
inc nt within thric months of a non|ii<li< i il s i|<
of om ol the items eovciitl Ity the IMI»I d < <l
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Kimberly D. Washburn (USB #6681)
Attorney for Housing Authority of the County of Salt Lake
1926 East 3900 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Telephone: (801)278-6080

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, MURRAY DEPARTMENT

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE COUNTY
OF SALT LAKE,
Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
JOHN THOMAS SNYDER,

Civil No. 000201956
Judge Michael K. Burton

Defendant.

Plaintiff Housing Authority of the County of Salt Lake ("Housing Authority"), by counsel
and pursuant Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration, submits the following memorandum of law in opposition to Defendant
John Thomas Snyder's Motion for Summary Judgment in the above-entitled proceeding.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Snyder is being evicted from his apartment at 1966 South 200 East, #A-506,
Salt Lake City, Utah, for violating the terms of his Lease Agreement with the Housing Authority.
The Defendant's violation of the lease consists of a verbal assault and threats of physical assault,
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on Sherrie Rico, a Housing Authority employee and the apartment building manager. Under the
express terms of the Lease Agreement which defendant Snyder read and signed, such criminal
activity is grounds for immediate termination of the lease and eviction from the leased premises,
without prior benefit of administrative grievance procedures.
Upon being served with process in this action the Defendant filed an answer to the
complaint. Shortly thereafter, Defendant Snyder - while apparently not denying his tirade against
Ms. Rico - moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that, inter alia, the Housing Authority
did not comply with the terms of the lease in the manner in which it was attempting to terminate
Defendant's tenancy, and that the procedure followed denied him due process of law.
Defendant's motion was summarily denied, and the matter set for trial on May 8, 2000 in
accordance with summary procedures specified under Utah's Unlawful Detainer Act, Utah Code
Annotated, § 78-36-1, etseq.1
Upon receiving the court's ruling, Defendant (now acting through counsel rather than pro
se) petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus, asking
(in effect) that the appellate court order this Court to grant Defendant a continuance in order to
conduct discovery and engage in "settlement negotiations." The Defendant has petitioned the

1

The denial of the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was not on the merits of the motion.
Rather, the Defendant failed to submit the motion as required under the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration. The Housing Authority has filed a memorandum in opposition to the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss and the time for filing a reply by the Defendant has long since lapsed.
Nevertheless, the Defendant has not submitted the motion for the decision of the Court. See
court file herein.
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Utah Supreme Court for this relief despite the fact that the Defendant has never asked this Court
for a continuance of the trial date. Moreover, the Defendant has never contacted the Housing
Authority to inquire if it would agree to a continuance of the trial date. The Housing Authority
has duly responded to Defendant's petition for extraordinary relief, which is still pending before
the Utah Supreme Court.
In addition, the Defendant has also named himself class representative in a federal class
action filed before the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division,
styled: John Thomas Snyder, personally and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated,
plaintiff vs. Housing Authority of the County of Salt Lake, a government entity, defendant\ Civil
No. 2:00CV-0336C. Therein, Defendant argues that his Lease Agreement, and all similar leases
entered into between the Housing Authority and its tenants, are invalid and unenforceable on their
face because they contain terms not specified in HUD regulations applicable to leases governed by
the United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437, etseq.
Defendant now comes to this court with a motion for summary judgment, claiming that, as
a matter of law: (1) that the provision of the Lease Agreement relied upon by the Housing
Authority in evicting him is invalid and unenforceable because it is broader than provisions
mandated by Housing and Urban Development in regulations applicable to federally-subsidized
low-income housing (this is the same argument which forms the basis of Defendant's pending
federal class action); (2) that the Defendant's assault on Housing Authority employee Sherrie
Rico failed, as a matter of law, to constitute conduct proscribed by the mandatory lease provisions
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outlined in HUD regulations; and (3) that any other basis for evicting Defendant required a prelitigation "grievance procedure" under applicable HUD regulations and Housing Authority
policies and procedures.
Without exception, Defendant's arguments fail on their face. As a designated public
housing administrator ("PHA") under the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437,
et seq., the Housing Authority is charged with the obligation of preserving the peace, health and
welfare of its residents and employees. HUD regulations specify provisions which must be
included in any Lease Agreement governed by the terms of the Housing Act; HUD regulations do
not res/rid a lease's terms to only those mandated provisions. Evidence to be adduced at trial
will establish that Defendant's conduct was of the sort clearly proscribed by the terms and
conditions of the lease voluntarily executed by the Defendant. The Defendant's conduct which is
the basis for seeking the termination of his tenancy constitutes criminal assault under Utah Code
Annotated § 76-5-102. Moreover, this criminal assault directed toward a Housing Authority
employee. As such, the Housing Authority is justified and expressly authorized, by federal law
and regulation and by the terms of Defendant's Lease Agreement complete with the policies and
procedures incorporated therein, to initiate a summary eviction procedure against the Defendant
without a providing a access to the Housing Authority's administrative grievance procedure.
RESPONSE TO "STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS"
The Housing Authority disputes the following factual statements contained in the
statement of "Undisputed Facts" set out at pages 1-7 of Defendant's memorandum:
-4446201vl

^

1.

The Housing Authority does not dispute paragraphs 1 through 4 of the

Defendant's statement if undisputed facts. However, the Housing Authority was not served with
an affidavit of any sort from the Defendant as referred to in paragraph 1. In addition, the
Defendant makes reference to an "Exhibit A." The motion and memorandum served upon the
Housing Authority did not contain any attachments or exhibits. Thus, the Housing Authority
cannot agree that any such exhibit not provided to them is an accurate copy of the lease
agreement between the parties.
2.

Paragraphs 5-8 purport to characterize the regulatory structure governing the

Lease Agreement between the Housing Authority and the Defendant. The Housing Authority
acknowledges that it is the recipient of federal funding in connection with the operation of lowincome housing facilities (including that located at 1966 South 200 East in Salt Lake City, Utah,
in which Defendant is currently a resident). The application of federal law and regulations to the
Housing Authority's activities in that regard, however, is a conclusion of law, and the provisions
in question speak for themselves.
3.

Paragraph 9 correctly quotes § 11(1) of the parties' Lease Agreement. Paragraph

10, however, attempts to characterize the Lease Agreement as deficient under applicable HUD
regulations by observing that "absent from § 11(1) of Plaintiffs lease is any prohibition against
criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the PHA's
public housing premises by employees of the PHA". This statement ignores that fact that such
activities are implicitly proscribed by § 11(1) in its prohibition of "all illegal or criminal activity on
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or near the premises". Moreover, if any such deficiency exists, it is a question of law and not an
undisputed fact.
4.

Paragraphs 11-13 set forth no facts at all. Instead, these paragraphs are an attempt

at a premature legal argument to the effect that, because the parties' Lease Agreement contains
provisions not mandated by HUD in applicable regulations, they are somehow prohibited. For
reasons set out at Point I of the argument below, this assumption is simply not true.
5.

Paragraphs 14-16 attempt to characterize and interpret the language of the Lease

Agreement. The Lease Agreement speaks for itself A copy of the Lease Agreement is attached
hereto as Exhibit 1.
6.

Paragraph 17-19 attempt to characterize the language of the 3-Day Notice of

Termination of Lease Agreement served on Defendant in this matter. The 3-Day Notice speaks
for itself A copy of the 3-Day Notice served upon the Defendant is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
7.

Paragraphs 20-25 completely mischaracterize the nature of the Housing

Authority's grounds for evicting Defendant from the leased premises. The Defendant committed
a criminal assault upon Housing Authority employee, Sherrie Rico. The circumstances of that
assault are detailed in the 3-Day Termination Notice. See Exhibit 2. In addition, the
circumstances are set forth as well as in the police report filed by Ms. Rico with the Salt Lake City
Police Department. A copy of the police report is attached hereto Exhibit 3.
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The incident is described as follows in the Termination Notice:
On or about February 23, 2000, during a meeting with the apartment manager,
Sherrie Rico, and the assistant manager, Julie Cayou, you threatened the safety and
well-being of Ms Rico. Your threats and intimidation began as you started
verbally assaulting Ms. Rico. You repeatedly called Ms. Rico "honey" and a
"fucking bitch." When Ms. Rico requested that you stop your verbal assault, you
stood up from your chair and moved toward her in a threatening manner. You
were yelling insults as Ms. Rico an pointing your finger at her as you moved
toward her. Your demeanor was belligerent and hostile. When you reached Ms.
Rico you moved so close to her that she had to pull backward to get away from
the finger that you were thrusting in her face. You continued to call Ms. Rico a
"fucking bitch" and told her that she had "better pull up her fucking pantyhose
because you were going to go the rounds." Ms. Rico continued to ask you to
desist from your threats, but you refused. You threatened Ms. Rico again telling
her that you "were going to get her" because she cost you $120.00. At this point
in time, Ms. Rico was nearly falling backward over her chair. You finally stepped
backward, opened the door and again threatened Ms. Rico when you stated, "I
don't have time for you right now, I have a doctor's appointment. You fucking
bitch, you'd better pull up your fucking panty hose because I'm not done with you
yet."
Exhibit 2. The 3-Day Notice sets forth the grounds for the eviction of the Defendant. These are
the sole grounds asserted for seeking the termination of the Defendant's tenancy.
1.

In Paragraph 26, defendant alleges that he has never been arrested or charged with

criminal conduct in connection with his assault on Sherry Rico. A government's entity's decision
whether or not to prosecute a criminal charge does not define the parameters of criminal conduct
2.

Paragraph 27 is not a statement of fact, but an astounding legal argument: that the

Constitutions of the United States and the State of Utah protected his right to subject Housing
Authority employee Sherry Rico to criminal assault simply because his conduct was verbal rather
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than physical. For reasons which are self-evident, this argument is not made a basis for summary
judgment.
8.

Paragraph 28 claims (without any evidence whatsoever) that Defendant was

evicted for complaining about conditions at the leased premises. The Housing Authority's
reasons for evicting Defendant are set out in the Notice of Termination and in the Housing
Authority's complaint herein. Exhibit 2.
9.

In response to Paragraph 29, the Housing Authority does not dispute that

Defendant's conduct forming the basis of this eviction action was not directed at other tenants. It
was directed at Housing Authority employee Sherrie Rico. It was, nonetheless, (1) illegal and
criminal conduct engaged in by Defendant on or near the leased premises, and (2) criminal
conduct which threatened the health or safety of a Housing Authority employee. Both of these
facts were clearly set out in the Notice of Termination. Exhibit 2. Moreover, the dispute of this
fact alone precludes the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant.
10.

Paragraph 30 is, again, not an assertion of fact but a legal argument concerning the

right to a pre-eviction grievance procedure. For those reasons set out at Point III, below, no such
right exists in this case.
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ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT IS NOT BEING EVICTED ON THE
STRENGTH OF AN INVALID LEASE PROVISION.

Defendant's first claims that, regardless of the nature or severity of his assault upon
Sherrie Rico, it may not form the basis of an eviction under § 11(1) of the parties' Lease
Agreement, which prohibits "all illegal or criminal activity on or near the premises". In an attempt
to support this position, the Defendant points to HUD regulations set out at 24 CFR § 966.4 (f),
and observes that, since that provision does not mandate the inclusion of the lease provision relied
upon by the Housing Authority in this action, it therefore somehow prohibits such a provision
being included in the lease. Thus, the Defendant claims, this court may not enforce the Lease
Agreement as written. It should be noted, that the Defendant cites not a single case, statute,
regulation, or other legal declaration in support of this proposition. This is because there is no
legal authority which supports such a proposition.
The Housing Authority does function as a "public housing agency" or PHA under the
United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 et seq. and regulations promulgated by the
thereunder by the Department of Housing and Urban Development with respect to its
management of the leased premises herein. This means that, as a PHA, the Housing Authority is
charged with furnishing safe, sanitary, structurally-sound and affordable rental housing for lowincome individuals through the receipt and application of federal subsidy funding.
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The Housing Act begins with the following policy declaration in this regard:
It is the policy of the United States to promote the general welfare of the Nation
by employing its funds and credit, as provided in this chapter, to assist the several
and their political subdivisions to remedy the unsafe and unsanitary housing
conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for
families of lower income and, consistent with the objectives of this chapter, to vest
in local public housing agencies the maximum amount of responsibility in the
administration of their housing programs. (Emphasis added).
42 U.S.C. § 1437. This section further governs the creation of leases between a public housing
agency and tenants of federally-subsidized housing. The law specifies certain provisions which
must be included in any such lease; it begins, however, with the observation that a public housing
agency shall "utilize leases which ... do not contain unreasonable terms and conditions"
(emphasis added). In addition to those provisions mandated by law, therefore, public housing
agency is implicitly empowered (in carrying out the policy objective vesting the agency with "the
maximum amount of responsibility of the administration of [its] housing programs") to include
additional terms and condition which are reasonable. 42 U.S.C. § 1437(d)(1).
Regulations promulgated by HUD under the Housing Act expand upon and punctuate a
public housing agency's discretion in this regard. 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 details provisions which must
be included in any lease between a PHA and its tenants, "[a] lease shall be entered into between
the PHA and each tenant of a dwelling unit which shall contain the provisions described
hereinafter." Id. (Emphasis added). Provisions which may not be contained in a lease between a
public housing agency and its tenants are separately enumerated at 24 C.F.R. § 966.6:
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Lease clauses of the nature described below shall not be included in new leases
between a PHA and a tenant and shall be deleted from existing leases either by
amendment thereof or execution of a new lease ....
Again, by clear implication, and consistent with Congressional policy statement granting
public housing agencies maximum authority in the administration of federally-subsidized housing
programs under the Act, a public housing agency must be permitted to include, in any lease
agreement, both the provisions mandated by 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 and any other reasonable lease
provisions necessary to carry out the purposes of the Housing Act, so long as they do not include
any provisions prohibited by 24 C.F.R. § 966.6. The language of Section 11 (I) of the Lease
Agreement in this case is nowhere prohibited by 24 C.F.R. § 966.6.
Cases interpreting the scope and breadth of a public housing agency's authority in the
administration of housing projects under the Act (including terms of lease agreements) have
expressly upheld the agency's authority to include all reasonable provisions in its leases,
regulations, etc., so long as such provisions are not expressly prohibited by law or regulation.
For example, in Rivera v. Reading Housing Authority, 819 F. Supp. 1323 (E. D. Perm.
1993), a public housing agency imposed a policy requiring that minor applicants for housing
obtain a judicial decree of emancipation in order to be eligible to rent publically-subsidized
housing. The plaintiff (a minor applicant) challenged the enforceability of the policy in that it was
not specified by applicable HUD regulations. The court rejected the challenge and upheld the
requirement, citing the mandate of the Act that public housing agencies be vested with "the
maximum amount of power and responsibility ... in order to promote efficient management of
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housing programs." Id. at 329. In reaching its conclusion, the Rivera court stated the following
with regard to the appropriate standard of judicial review of public housing agency practices
under applicable HUD regulations:
... [I]n assessing whether the [housing agency] has violated the Housing Act or
HUD regulations, we must keep in mind that the Housing Act gives local housing
authorities discretion to select applicants and to otherwise manage the day-to-day
affairs of subsidized housing projects. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437. We also recognize
that the administration of local housing authorities is a difficult task, and the
concern for efficient management is particularly important, because the number of
applicants greatly exceeds the available housing. [Citations omitted].
Consequently, the scope of judicial review of a local Housing Authority's policies
and practices is limited, and we will not view its actions as a violation of the
Housing Act or HUD regulations so long as the Housing Authority's eligibility
requirements are "consistent with [HUD] regulations and is in harmony with the
overall policies" of the Housing Act.
Id. at 1329-1330, citing Vandermark v. Housing Authority of York, 663 F.2d 436 (3rd Cir. 1981).
In the case of Greenville Housing Authority v. City of Greenville, 281 S.C. 604, 316 S.E.
2d 718 (Ct. App. S. C. 1984), a tenant in a housing complex subsidized under the Housing Act
challenged an eviction on the basis that the lease provisions applied in the case were inconsistent
with the Housing Act and applicable regulations. Specifically, the evicted tenant challenged the
propriety of a rent reduction provision in her lease as not being reflective of the content of HUD
regulations. The court of appeals overturned a lower court finding against the housing authority,
agreeing that the authority "had discretion to establish reasonable lease provisions" Id, at 720.
Similarly, in Allegheny County Housing Authority v. Morrissey, etal, 651 A.2d 362
(Cmnwith Ct. Penn. 1994), the public housing agency had a lease provision prohibiting ownership
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and maintenance of pets on the premises. A tenant challenged the provision as not being
reflective of provisions required by the United States Housing Act and applicable HUD
regulations. The court rejected the argument and observed:
42 U.S.C. § 1437(d)(l)(2)... mandates that each public housing agency shall utilize
leases which obligate the public housing agency to maintain the project in a decent,
safe and sanitary condition. Given that mandate, the [housing authority] has the
authority to carry out that purpose by issuing lease agreements with policies that
meet that requirement unless they are contrary to federal regulations.
Id. at 634-635.
The Housing Authority in this action acknowledges that Paragraph 11 (I) prohibits more
than the specific, narrow type of criminal conduct specifically described in at 24 C.F.R.
§ 966.4(f)(12). The provision in question, however, is not prohibited under 24 C.F.R. § 966.6.
Nor can it seriously be argued that the provision is not rationally related to maintenance of the
housing project in a decent, safe and sanitary condition, and otherwise furthering the purposes of
the United States Housing Act. The Plaintiff Housing Authority would, in fact, be remiss in its
obligations under the Act were it not to proscribe criminal activity by its tenants on or near the
leased premises. Thus, as in the cases discussed above, the Housing Authority in this case is
entitled to discretion in establishing its reasonable lease provisions. The Housing Authority is
obligated to carry out the mandates of the Housing Act and the policies underlying the Housing
Act. The provisions challenged by the Defendant are reasonable and comport with the letter and
spirit of the law.
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The Defendant argues that, if literally interpreted, Paragraph 11(1) of the Lease Agreement
would make minor criminal infractions near the housing project grounds for eviction. The
Defendant himself, however, has no standing to raise such an objection — the conduct giving rise
to his eviction was a criminal assault, consisting of harsh and violent verbal threats of immediate
physical harm to Sherrie Rico. The Defendant's criminal act falls well within even the narrowest
reading of the lease provision, as well as the mandatory language of 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(f)(12)(I).
Moreover, it cannot seriously be argued that a Housing Authority managing federally-subsidized,
low-income housing has no legitimate interest in prohibiting criminal activity, of whatever nature
or severity, on or around the housing complex. Certainly, a public housing agency operating
under the mandates of the Housing Act has a vested interest in summarily ejecting tenants who
accost management employees with threats of imminent physical harm. The Defendant has not
demonstrated that as a matter of law, he is entitled to judgment on this basis. Thus, the
Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be denied.
BL

DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT CONSTITUTED CRIMINAL
ACTIVITY JUSTIFYING EVICTION UNDER THE
PROVISIONS OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT.

Defendant Snyder next argues that, as a matter of law, his conduct toward Sherrie Rico
did not rise to the level of criminal activity justifying eviction under the terms of the Lease
Agreement because she is an employee of the Housing Authority. Such a claim is preposterous
and is simply not justified under the law.
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The court is again referred to the events of February 23, 2000 giving rise to this action as
set forth in the 3-Day Notice of Termination See Exhibit 2 and Housing Authority's Response to
Statement of Facts, above.
The Utah Legislature has defined Assault as follows:
"Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat accompanied by a show immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another."
UTAH CODE ANN.. § 76-5-102. If the court accepts as true Ms. Rico's account of Defendant's
assault on her (which it must, under the standard governing summary judgment — See Winegar v.
Froerer Corporation, 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991)), the Defendant's conduct fell squarely within
the elements of assault as defined by Utah law. The Defendant knowingly and deliberately placed
a Housing Authority employee in genuine and reasonable fear of immediate violent harm through
overt threats punctuated with foul language. To argue that such conduct does not constitute
"criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the PHA's
public housing premises by ... employees of the PHA" simply flies in the face of reason. See 24
C.F.R. § 966.4(f)(12).
Defendant argues that other cases involving evictions from public housing units
administered under the Housing Act have involved "serious criminal conduct and intervention by
law enforcement" (Defendant's Memorandum at 12). Housing employee Sherrie Rico takes
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significant issue with the cavalier way in which Defendant dismisses the nature and severity of his
assault upon her. Moreover, the fact that the police department has yet to pursue criminal
charges against Defendant for his conduct does not render it non-criminal. The decision whether
or not to pursue conviction for a criminal offense rests with the discretion of the prosecutorial
government entity. The determination whether Defendant's conduct constituted the established
elements of a criminal offense, and therefore grounds for eviction int his case, lies with this Court
based upon the evidence to be produced at trial. Thus, the Defendant's motion for summary
judgment should be denied.
III.

DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A PRE-LITIGATION
GRIEVANCE HEARING.

In an attempt to confuse the gravity of his own conduct with lesser criminal offenses
which "might" fall within the language of Paragraph 11(1) of the Lease Agreement, Defendant
argues that before this action was filed, he was entitled to an administrative grievance procedure
under policies and procedures promulgated by the Housing Authority pursuant to federal
regulation. Again, Defendant argues a position which he does not have standing to assert.
The requirement of grievance procedures in the administration of federally-subsidized
housing appears at 42 U.S.C. § 1437d (k). This section calls upon HUD to implement regulations
requiring public housing agencies receiving assistance under the Act to establish and implement
administrative grievance procedures to be followed prior to the eviction of tenants. If further
expressly provides as follows:
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For any grievance concerning an eviction or termination of tenancy that involves
any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful
enjoyment of the premises of other tenants or employees of the public housing
agency ... the agency may (A) establish and expedite a grievance procedure as the
secretary shall provide by rule ..., or (B) exclude from its grievance procedure any
such grievance, in any jurisdiction, which requires that prior to eviction, a tenant
be given a hearing in court which the secretary determines provides the basic
elements of due process ....
Id
HUD regulations implementing the foregoing provision are found at 24 C.F.R. § 966.50
et seq. Thereunder, HUD has provided as follows:
The term due process determination means a determination by HUD that the law
of the jurisdiction requires that the tenant must be given the opportunity for a
hearing in court which provides the basic elements of due process ... before
eviction from the dwelling unit. If HUD has issued a due process determination, a
PHA may exclude from the PHA administrative grievance procedure under this
subpart any grievance concerning a termination of tenancy or eviction that involves
... any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful
enjoyment of the premises of other residents or employees of the PHA ... if HUD
has issued the due process determination, the PHA may evict the occupants of the
dwelling unit through the judicial eviction procedures which are the subject of the
determination. In this case, the PHA is not required to provide an opportunity for
a hearing under the PHA's administrative grievance procedure.
24 C.F.R. § 966.50.
By notice dated December 3, 1991, HUD has expressly determined that pre-eviction
procedures available to tenants under Utah law satisfy these due process requirements and that
grievance procedures may therefore be modified in accordance with the above-cited regulations.
A copy of the Department of Housing and urban Developments Due Process Determination for
Utah is attached hereto as Exhibit 4.
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In accordance with HUD's due process determination for the state of Utah, the Housing
Authority promulgated grievance procedures in to be used in conjunction with tenant evictions
As set forth in the grievance procedure, "the provisions of this grievance procedure are not
applicable to any grievance concerning any eviction or termination of tenancy based upon a
tenant's creation or maintenance of the threat to the health or safety of other tenants or HA
employees." A copy of the Grievance Procedure is attached hereto as Exhibit 5.
Again, Defendant's conduct toward Sherrie Rico was, on its face, criminal activity
threatening the safety and well-being of a Housing Authority employee. It fell within the larger
scope of prohibition outlined by paragraph 11(1) of the Lease Agreement; it likewise falls within
the narrower definition of conduct for which no administrative grievance procedure is required
under the Housing Act and the applicable HUD regulations by reason of the due process
determination for the State of Utah.
IV.

PLAINTIFF ASSERTS NO NEW GROUNDS FOR
EVICTION.

In pages 13-15 of his memorandum, the Defendant claims that the Housing Authority is
changing the grounds for eviction from those plead in his Complaint. This is simply not the case.
The grounds for seeking the termination of the Defendant's tenancy are those set forth in the 3Day Notice. Despite the Defendant's contentions to the contrary, the Housing Authority has not
asserted new grounds for the Defendant's eviction.
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By assaulting Sherrie Rico, the Defendant committed a criminal act in violation of Section
11(1) of the Lease Agreement. Because that criminal act entailed a threat of violence toward a
Housing Authority employee, no grievance procedure was warranted or allowed. Likewise,
because Defendant's criminal conduct involved a threat of injury to a Housing Authority
employee, a summary three-day eviction procedure was permitted. It was this conduct as
identified in the Housing Authority's 3-Day Notice of Termination and in the Housing Authority's
complaint for unlawful detainer which is the basis for the Defendant's eviction. There simply is
no other reason. Thus, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be denied.
CONCLUSION
As the court can see from the parties' memoranda, Defendant John Snyder's residency at
1965 South 200 East has been characterized by conflict with the Housing Authority. In February
of this year, however, the Defendant elected to push that conflict to the point of criminal assault
on a Housing Authority employee. The Housing Authority is not required, and cannot afford, to
countenance such behavior from its tenants. The eviction procedure was therefore initiated.
Defendant Snyder's myriad arguments over the scope of HUD regulations, the breadth of
the language of his Lease Agreement, the severity of his conduct, and the like, do not change the
simple facts. His assault on Sherrie Rico - which he apparently admits - clearly constitutes a
violation under the provisions set forth in Utah's Criminal Code. The Lease Agreement, which
Defendant Snyder voluntarily signed, makes such criminal conduct grounds for termination of the
Lease. The Housing Authority is at liberty to include such provisions in its Lease Agreement so
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long as they are rationally related to the underlying purposes of the Housing Act and are not
prohibited by HUD regulations. Since the conduct involved a threat of injury to a Housing
Authority employee, moreover, Defendant's conduct is exempted from pre-litigation
administrative grievance procedures by reason of HUD's due process determination for the state
of Utah and the consequent policies put in place by the Housing Authority. Therefore the Court
should deny the Defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Defendant should be compelled
to come to court for trial, answer for his conduct, and be evicted or not as the evidence and merits
may dictate.
Dated this 6 ^

day of May, 2000.

Kimberly D.AVkshburn (USB #6681)
Attorney for Housing Authority of
the County of Salt Lake
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _

day o f f e r W y , 2000, I caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be mailed, postage prepaid, to
the following:
Brian M. Bernard
James L. Harris, Jr.
Utah Legal Clinic
214 East Fifth South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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EXHIBIT 1

SALT LAKE C I T Y , UTAH
TOO
(801) 284 •14 0 0

8411b"
(801)

LEASE
1.
P A R T I E S AND P R E M I S E S .
The Housing A u t h o r i t y of the County of Salt
Lake ("Housing A u t h o r i t y " ) agrees to lease to SNYDER, JOHN THOMAS
( " R e s i d e n t " ) , and Resident agrees to lease from Housing Authority the
P r e m i s e s located at 1966 SO 200 E A 5 0 6 , S L C , UTAH .
Household
NAME
JOHN

T.

SNYDER

or

family members who will

reside

at

the Premises

8IRTHDATE

RELATIONSHIP

07/26/31

H

are:

2. T E N A N C Y .
This tenancy shall commence on AUGUST 7, 1998 , for a
period of six (6) months and then shall be renewed automatically on a
month to month b a s i s until terminated p u r s u a n t to the provisions of
p a r a g r a p h 17 h e r e u n d e r .
3.
P A Y M E N T S UNDER LEASE.
Rental amounts paid by Reside nt depend
The rent
upon f a m i l y income and the number of household m e m b e r s ,
under this lease at this time is $ 186.00 per month and is
due on or before the first day of each m o n t h .
The pro-r ated amount
due b e f o r e d e l i v e r y of the Premises key to the Resident is $ 136.00
The amount of m o n t h l y rent is subject to upward or downwa rd
a d j u s t m e n t s by Housing A u t h o r i t y .
These adjustments,, if any, are
based on c h a n g e s in family income, number of household m embers, o r
any o t h e r factor affecting Resident's continued eligibil i ty as
d e t e r m i n e d by Housing Authority and will occur at least annually,
and at any other time Housing Authority deems necessary,
Resident
m u s t , upon H o u s i n g Authority's request, but at least on an annual
b a s i s , fully and a c c u r a t e l y complete forms provided by H ousing
A u t h o r i t y regarding rent d e t e r m i n a t i o n .
H o u s i n g A u t h o r i t y will reimburse R e s i d e n t for any overpayment
r e c e i v e d , after applying the o v e r p a y m e n t to any payments due from
Resident.
If Housing Authority reevaluates rent amount or determines
that R e s i d e n t m u s t change P r e m i s e s , Resident^ may ask for an
e x p l a n a t i o n of such d e t e r m i n a t i o n ; if R e s i d e n t d i s a g r e e s , Resident
has the right to request a hearing under Housing Authority grievance
procedures.
R e s i d e n t w i l l be assessed a $10.00 late fee on the sixth day of
month if full rent has not been paid that m o n t h .
A second $10.00
late c h a r g e w i l l be assessed if the rent is not paid by the fifteenth
day of the m o n t h .
Housing Authority will charge Resident $10.00 on
each returned c h e c k .
Resident's checks will not be accepted if a
second check is returned; payment of rent will only be accepted by
m o n e y order or cashier check.
Payments will be accepted at Housing
A u t h o r i t y ' s main office or by m a i l .

1

duo

r e n t ; then (e) current rent.
N o n - P a y m e n t of rent and / or
month will result in c o m m e n c e m e n t
CACH WILL

any other c h a r g e s by the
ot eviction p r o c e e d i n g s .

HOT C £ ACCCPTEO

FOR

ANY

t" i f t h of

PAYMLNT

4.
SECURITY OCPOSIT.
A secur ity deposit in the amount ot $ 100.00
is required o f R e s i d e n t .
The deposit is to be used by Housing
A u t h o r i t y tor r e i m b u r s e m e n t 1" or any repairs n e c e s s a r y as a result of
a n y t h i n g othe r than normal wea r and use of the P r e m i s e s .
The deposit
ma y a l s o be u sed by Housing Au thority for any outstanding rent or
other o b l i g a t Ions owed by Resi dent at the time the Premises are
vacated.
The d e p o s i t will con stitute liquidated damages and may be
r e t a i n e d in f ull by Housing Au thority if R e s i d e n t occupies the
P r e m i s e s for less
than six mo nths or if R e s i d e n t fails to give at
least thirty days notice prior to terminating the a g r e e m e n t in
accord ance wi th Paragraph 17 h erein.
Housing Author* ity will return
d e p o s i t balan ce to Resident wi thin thirty days after Premises are
v a c a t e d , p rov ided that a fo rwa rding address is p r o v i d e d .

H o u s i n g A u t h o r i t y will notify Resident of any rent a d j u s t m e n t s .
All rent a d j u s t m e n t s which involve an increase will be effective
b e g i n n i n g the first of the second m o n t h .
All decreases in rent will
be e f f e c t i v e first of the next m o n t h .
If Resident fails to report
an i n c r e a s e , the rent increase shall become effective on the first day
of the first m o n t h following such increase in income.
T h o s e R e s i d e n t s who do not show up for their re-determination of
rent a f t e r being notified by Housing A u t h o r i t y will either pay the
P u b l i s h e d Fair M a r k e t Rent or 3 0 % of their adjusted gross income
w h i c h e v e r is g r e a t e r .
The Housing Authority may also evict the
R e s i d e n t as outlined in Section 5.
6.
UTItlTIES.
At no cost beyond the m o n t h l y rent Housing Authority
will p r o v i d e the following u t i l t i e s : w a t e r , sewer, other
A.
M a n a g e m e n t shall give written notice to Resident of any applicable
a l l o w a n c e for M a n a g e m e n t - f u r n i s h e d utilities or R e s i d e n t - f u r n i s h e d
utilities.
R e s i d e n t u n d e r s t a n d s and agrees that Management may revise
said a l l o w a n c e from time to time during the course of this lease and
that said r e v i s i o n s are binding upon R e s i d e n t .
B.
M a n a g e m e n t ' s a l l o w a n c e for M a n a g e m e n t - f u r n i s h e d utilities shall
be d e t e r m i n e d in a c c o r d a n c e with HU0 regulations and r e q u i r e m e n t s .

R e s i d e n t - p u r c h a s e d u t i l i t i e s shall
HUD r e g u l a t i o n s and r e q u i r e m e n t s .

C.
M a n a g e m e n t ' s allowance for
be determined in accordance with
2

t h e#

failure to pay utility b i l l ( s ) , said shut-off c o n s t i t u t e s u serious
v i o l a t i o n of this A g r e e m e n t and nuj y be grounds Tor termination of tht
A g r e e m e n t p u r s u a n t to paragraph 17 h e r e u n d e r .
/.
C H A N G E OP P R E M I S E S .
If Housing Authority d e t e r m i n e s , for any
r e a s o n , that the P r e m i s e s provided for in this lease are no longer
appropriate,
R e s i d e n t will be transferred to an appropriate
a l t e r n a t i v e location after receipt of reasonable n o t i c e .
3.
R E S I D E N T ' S RIGHT TO USE AND OCCUPY.
R e s i d e n t shall have
e x c l u s i v e use and o c c u p a n c y of the premises including the right to
care
for foster children and live-in care of member of Resident's
f a m i l y , provided a p p r o p r i a t e notice of such persons is given to
H o u s i n g A u t h o r i t y in a c c o r d a n c e with this lease.
Resident
and/or
h o u s e h o l d members may engage in legal profit making activities If
H o u s i n g Authority d e t e r m i n e s that such are incidental to the primary
use of the P r e m i s e s and do not violate any rule, law or
ordinance.
R e s i d e n t may also have guests whose stay may not exceed five (5) days
w i t h o u t Housing A u t h o r i t y ' s prior written a p p r o v a l .
Repeated or
e x t e n d e d a c c o m m o d a t i o n of guests is grounds for redetermination of the
rent or e v i c t i o n .
9.
DAMAGE AND R E P A I R .
Resident is responsible for payment of repair
c h a r g e s not due to reasonable wear and tear.
The Housing Authority
will m a k e repairs and bill Resident for those repairs due to nonr e a s o n a b l e wear and tear.
Such damage shall be presumed to be due to
the n e g l i g e n c e or i n t e n t i o n a l acts of R e s i d e n t , household members, or
other persons under the control of Resident.
This presumption is
rebuttable.
Payment for repairs will be due on the first day of the
second m o n t h .
A late fee of $10.00 will be assessed for charges that
are past d u e .
R e s i d e n t may be evicted for n o n p a y m e n t of repair
charges.
Charges for repairs will be based upon a schedule of repair
c h a r g e s posted in Housing Authority's office.
10.
HOUSING A U T H O R I T Y O B L I G A T I O N S .
Housing Authority shall maintain
the common areas in a d e c e n t , safe, and sanitary condition and will
comply with a p p l i c a b l e local building and housing codes and all HUD
r e g u l a t i o n s a f f e c t i n g safety and health.
Housing Authority will also
m a k e all n e c e s s a r y repairs and maintain e l e c t r i c a l , plumbing, sanitary
h e a t i n g , v e n t i l a t i n g and other facilities and a p p l i a n c e s , including
e l e v a t o r s , in good and safe working c o n d i t i o n .
Housing Authority will
supply and m a i n t a i n n e c e s s a r y waste receptacles for deposit of waste
removed from R e s i d e n t ' s p r e m i s e s , hot and cold running water, and
r e a s o n a b l e a m o u n t s of heat unless not required by law.
Housing
A u t h o r i t y will also make reasonable accommodation for disabled
persons.
Contact Roy H o u s e , Section 504 C o o r d i n a t o r , 3595 S.Main St.
SLC, UT 8 4 1 1 5 , telephone 2 8 4 - 4 4 3 0 , concerning any a c c o m o d a t i o n s .
11.
RESIDENT'S OBLIGATIONS.
A.
R e s i d e n t shall not assign or sublease the Premises nor provide
a c c o m o d a t i o n s for b o a r d e r s whether for compensation or not.
B.
The P r e m i s e s is for use as a private residence and may not be used
for any other p u r p o s e .
C.
R e s i d e n t will notify Housing Authority, in writing, of any
a b s e n c e from the p r e m i s e s of longer than one week (seven d a y s ) .
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appliLjole provision*-., of building and ho us m g coL'ib at lee ting health
Jnd ba » r« Ly .
E- Additionally, Resident will f.eep all ureas assigned for Resident'b
£n elusive use in a safe and sanitary condition and dispone of ail
i^a s 19 in a safe and sanitary manner.
F. Resident and all household member's and guests will use ail
utilities, appliances, plumbing, and facilities in a reasonable
ma nner and refrain from damaging or removing any p a rt of the Premises.
G. Resident will pay for all repair of damages caused by Resident,
household members, guests or visitors.
H. Resident will be held directly responsible for the actions of
Resident, household member's, guests and visitors.
I. Resident and household members, guests and visitors will act in a
manner so as not to disturb any neighbor's peaceful enjoyment of his/
her accomodations and refrain from all illegal or criminal activity on
or near the Premises. Such illegal activity includes, but is not
limited to, the use or sale of drugs by the Resident, household
members, guests or visitors.
J. Neither* Resident nor household members, guests or visitors shall
commit any fraud in connection with any housing assistance program, or
engage in any illegal or criminal activity.
Such activity shall be
cause for eviction.
12.
PETS.
Only residents of elderly or handicapped housing
developments are permitted to have pets. Violation of Management's
pet policy, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" by
Resident may be cause for removal of their pet on 2 4 hours written
notice to Resident and shall be cause for eviction.
13.
RESIDENT MAINTENANCE RESPONS IB11ITIES. Resident will maintain
the inside of the Premises in clean condition and repair any broken
windows, screens, or doors. Resident is also responsible for the
following :
Mow and edge the lawn at least once a week.
Water the lawn as often as necessary, at least two times weekly.
Shovel snow from sidewalks immediately after each snowfall.
Sweep sidewalks on regular basis.
Keep litter and trash off the Premises at all times.
Weed when required to keep property in good condition.
Other
.
If Resident fails to perform the duties marked above, Housing
Authority will perform them and charge Resident a reasonable fee.
Refusal to perform these duties is grounds for eviction. Charges will
be due the first day of the second month. Resident will be assessed a
$10.00 late fee if not paid when due. If Resident is determined by
Housing Authority to be unable to perform such duties, resident shall
not be required to do so.
14.
HAZARDOUS DEFECTS. If the Premises are damaged enough to be
hazardous to the life, health, or safety of an occupant* Resident
shall immediately notify Housing Authority of the damage.
A

r e a s o n J b 1 e t i m e . H oTf s i n g Authority shall a 11> o a"u a t e R e s i d e n L ' s r e n t
p r o p o r t i o n a t e to the ± o s s in value o f t he P r e in i s e s i t r c» p airs a r e no
made in a reasonable time and/or alternate a c c o m m o d a t i o n s are not
provided.
H o w e v e r , no abatement will occur 3i\d Resident will be
c h a r g e d for the repairs if R e s i d e n t , Resident's household m e m b e r s ,
g u e s t s , or v i s i t o r s cause the d a m a g e .
Nor will there be any a b a t e m e n t if R e s i d e n t rejects offered alternative a c c o m m o d a t i o n s .
15.
INSPECTIONS.
Housing Authority and Resident will inspect the
P r e m i s e s before Resident takes possession an6 furnish Resident with a
w r i t t e n s t a t e m e n t of the condition of the Premises and the appliances
p r o v i d e d with the P r e m i s e s .
The s t a t e m e n t will be signed by both
H o u s i n g A u t h o r i t y a\Mi Resident before Resident takes p o s s e s s i o n .
W h e n R e s i d e n t v a c a t e s the P r e m i s e s , Housing Authority will once
again i n s p e c t the Premises and a p p l i a n c e s and furnish a statement to
R e s i d e n t of any charges to be assessed to Resident for d a m a g e s .
R e s i d e n t may p a r t i c i p a t e in this final inspection unless Resident
vacates without notice.
H o u s i n g A u t h o r i t y will be allowed by Resident to enter the
P r e m i s e s to make regular i n s p e c t i o n s , do routine m a i n t e n a n c e , or to
show the P r e m i s e s for r e l e a s i n g .
Housing Authority may enter the
P r e m i s e s during reasonable hours with reasonable notice to Resident
or w i t h o u t notice if it is reasonable to believe an emergency e x i s t s .
H o u s i n g A u t h o r i t y will provide a written statement specifying the
p u r p o s e of entry at least 48 hours before entry.
If there are no
adults p r e s e n t when Housing Authority enters the P r e m i s e s , it will
leave a w r i t t e n s t a t e m e n t specifying the d a t e , time, and purpose of
entry.
16.
NOTICE PROCEDURES.
Except for notice prior to entering the
P r e m i s e s or n o t i c e prior to the sale of abandoned p r o p e r t y , any notice
given by Housing A u t h o r i t y shall be in writing and delivered to an
adult m e m b e r of R e s i d e n t ' s household or sent by prepaid first class
mail.
If R e s i d e n t is v i s u a l l y impaired, the notice shall be in an
accessible format.
Any
and hand
mail.

n o t i c e given by R e s i d e n t to Housing Authority m u s t be
d e l i v e r e d to its main office or sent by prepaid first

written
class

17.
LEASE T E R M I N A T I O N .
R e s i d e n t may terminate this lease upon
thirty days n o t i c e in c o m p l i a n c e with Paragraph 1 6 .
Resident will
leave the P r e m i s e s in a clean and safe condition and return all keys
to H o u s i n g A u t h o r i t y .
H o u s i n g A u t h o r i t y will evict Resident for n o n p a y m e n t of rent,
n o n p a y m e n t of other financial o b l i g a t i o n s due under the terms of the
l e a s e , m a k i n g any false or m i s l e a d i n g s t a t e m e n t s concerning
i n f o r m a t i o n required by Housing A u t h o r i t y ; criminal activity that
t h r e a t e n s the h e a l t h , s a f e t y , or right to peaceful enjoyment by other
r e s i d e n t s ; drug related criminal activity at or near
the P r e m i s e s ;
repeated failure to comply with any other R e s i d e n t ' s obligation under
the l e a s e ; or for other good c a u s e .
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a c t i v i t y described in the proceeding pciragraph;' *.'vurtc?n days notice
lor nonpayment o? . ent; and thirty day<> notice in all other C J : G ^ : .
The n o t i c e shall state the reasons for termination and inform
R e s i d e n t of the tight to a g r i e v a n c e h ^ <; t i n g in accordance with MUD
r e g u l a t i o n s if a p p l i c a b l e .
T e n a n c y shall not terminate until the time for Resident to
r e q u e c t a g r i e v a n c e hearing has e x p i r e d , if R e s i d e n t is entitled to a
grievance hearing.
If Resident is entitled to a grievance hearing
and r e q u e s t s such in a timely f d s h i o n , tenancy shall not terminate
until the g r i e v a n c e process is c o m p l e t e d .
If R e s i d e n t is evicted for criminal a c t i v i t y , Housing Authority
shall notify the Post Office to d i s c o n t i n u e delivery ot Resident's
mail to the P r e m i s e s .
18.
C O U R T COSTS AND ATTORNEY F E E S .
Should Housing Authority
incur c o u r t costs and/or attorney fees while attempting to resolve
n o n c o m p l i a n c e with any term of this lease by Resident, Resident will
be a s s e s s e d those costs and/or
fees if Housing Authority is
successful .
R e s i d e n t shall compensate Housing Authority in full and hold it
h a r m l e s s with respect to any claims made against Housing Authority
for d a m a g e s caused by intentional acts of Resident and/or any of
R e s i d e n t ' s family m e m b e r s , household m e m b e r s , guests or v i s i t o r s .
19.
A B A N D O N M E N T AND DISPOSAt OF ABANDONED P R O P E R T Y .
Abandonment
of the P r e m i s e s is presumed if R e s i d e n t has not notified Housing
A u t h o r i t y of an absence from the Premises of more than seven (7) days,
R e s i d e n t fails to pay rent within fifteen (15) days after rent is due,
and there is no reasonable e v i d e n c e , other than the presence of
R e s i d e n t ' s personal property, that Resident is occupying the P r e m i s e s .
A b a n d o n m e n t is also presumed if R e s i d e n t ' s personal property has been
removed from the p r e m i s e s , if R e s i d e n t has not notified Housing
A u t h o r i t y of an absence from the p r e m i s e s , Resident fails to pay rent
when d u e , and/or
other facts exist which indicate abandonment of the
P remis e s .
If Housing Authority d e t e r m i n e s that Premises are
abandoned
p u r s u a n t to the above c r i t e r i a , Housing Authority will post notice of
a b a n d o n m e n t on the Premises for a period of seven (7) days.
At the
same time Housing Authority will also mail a copy of the a b a n d o n m e n t
n o t i c e to R e s i d e n t , and a copy to the individual listed on Resident's
a p p l i c a t i o n as the person to contact in the event of an emergency.
At
the end of the seven (7) day period, if there has been no contact from
R e s i d e n t , Housing Authority will take possession of the p r e m i s e s .
U p o n entry of the Premises after repossession, if Housing
A u t h o r i t y d i s c o v e r s that personal property is left, Housing Authority
will remove the property and store it at Resident's expense for thirty
(30) d a y s .
Housing Authority will post notice of possession of the
p r o p e r t y and will mail a copy to Resident and a copy to the
i n d i v i d u a l listed on R e s i d e n t ' s a p p l i c a t i o n as the person to contact
in the event of an emergency.
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property.
I f R e s i d e . ' : ! d o s s n o t ^ : ' : e m p r to r e c o v l - . »:.ie p r op o :• •: y ., ii.
the e n d of the t h i r t y (30) day p e r i o d , H o u s i n g A u t h o r i t y will d i s p o s e
o i i t a s i t d e ••: in s p r o p e r .
All m o d i f i c a t i o n s . o f the
2 0.
LEASE
MODIFICATIONS
i c c o m p 1 i s h e d b y w r i t t e n r i d e r to
execu t
lC3-

lease must
b y b o 11

be

21.
C E R T I F I C A T I O N BY R E S I D E N T .
In e n t e r i n g i n t o t h i s a g r e e m e n t ,
R e s i d e n t c e r t i f i e s that neither Resident nor any household m e m b ers
have c o m m i t t e d fraud with any federal housing assistance programs,
u n l e s s t h a t f r a u d h a s b e e n f u l l y d i s c l o s e d to H o u s i n g
Authority.
R e s i d e n t a l s o c e r t i f i e s t h a t all i n f o r m a t i o n s u b m i t t e d by R e s i d e n t
o r h o u s e h o l d m e m b e r s i s t r u e and
complete.

IN W I T N E S S W H E R E O F , the
a g r e e m e n t on A U G U S T 7, 1 9 9 8 .

Co-Res ident

have
Lake

executed this
City, Utah.

lease

H O U S I N G A U T H O R I T Y OF
C O U N T Y OF S A L T L A K E

RESIDENT(S)

ResicK&ht

parties
at Salt

U

Authorized

THE

Signature

Title

A l l p e r s o n s w i l l b e t r e a t e d f a i r l y a n d e q u a l l y w i t h o u t regard
c o l o r , r e l i g i o n , s e x , f a m i l i a l s t a t u s , h a n d i c a p , or n a t i o n a l
in c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e F a i r H o u s i n g A c t .

to r a c e ,
origin

EXHIBIT 2

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

3 - DAY NOTICE OF
TERMINATION OF LEASE AGREEMENT
To:

John Thomas Snyder
1966 South 200 East #A506
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115

You must vacate the premises by midnight,
W E D N E S D A Y , March 1, 2000 . (3 Days)

This is notice to you to move out of your unit in 3 days, by midnight, Wednesday, March 1, 2000. You
have been served this notice because you have caused, or allowed to be caused by household occupants, guests or
visitors to make, serious violations of your Lease Agreement with Housing Authority, as follows:
On or about February 23, 2000, during a meeting with the apartment manager, Sherrie Rico, and the
assistant manager, Julie Cayou, you threatened the safety and well-being of Ms. Rico. Your threats and
intimidation began as you started verbally assaulting Ms. Rico. You repeatedly called Ms. Rico "honey and a
"fucking bitch." When Ms. Rico requested that you stop your verbal assault, you stood upfromyour chair an
moved toward her in a threatening manner. You were yelling insults at Ms. Rico and pointing your finger at her
as you moved toward her. Your demeanor was belligerent and hostile. When you reached Ms. Rico you moved so
close to her that she had to pull backward to get away from the finger that you were thrusting in her face. You
continued to call Ms. Rico a "fucking bitch" and told her that she had "better pull up her fucking pantyhose
because you were going to go the rounds." Ms. Rico continued to ask you to desistfromyour threats, but you
refused. You threatened Ms. Rico again telling her that you "were going to get her" because she cost you $120.00.
At this point in time, Ms. Rico was nearly falling backward over her chair. You finally stepped backward, opened
the door and again threatened Ms. Rico when you stated, "I don't have time for you right now, I have a doctor's
appointment. You fucking bitch, you'd better pull up your fucking panty hose because I'm not done with you yet."
These threats constitute criminal activity and Ms. Rico has filed a police report as a result of your assault,
case #2000-35594 with the Salt Lake City police department
'This assault is not the only time you have engaged in criminal activity in violation of your lease
agreement You have repeatedly threatened and intimidated Ms. Rico, employees, and other tenants. The Housing
Authority has previously asked you to stop such activity to no avail.
Based on these actions by you, you have violated your lease agreement as follows:
1.

2.

3.

Section 11 - Resident's Obligation
D. - Resident will comply with all terms of this lease, all rules and regulations posted by
Housing. Authority in its main office, and all applicable provisions of building and housing codes
affecting health and safety.
Section 11 - Resident's Obligation
R - Resident will be held directlyresponsiblefor the actions of Resident, household members,
guests and visitors.
Section 11 - Resident's Obligation
I. - Resident and household members, guests and visitors will act in a manner so as not to disturb
any neighbors peaceful enjoyment of his/her accommodation and refrain from all illegal or
Criminal activity on or near the Premises. Such illegal activity includes, but is not limited to, the
Use or sale of drugs by the Resident, household members, guests or visitors.

The provisions of this grievance procedure arc not applicable to any grievance concerning an eviction or
termination of tenancy based upon a tenant's creation or maintenance of the treat to the health or safety of other
tenants or HA employees. The HA may immediately commence an eviction action in accordance with State Law
based on any of the grounds stated in tliis section.
Utah law gives you 3 days to vacate the premises. U.C.A> S78-36-3(l) and 24 C.F.R. S966.4(I)(5). If you do not
vacate the premises, you will be breaking Utah law and a complaint to evict you will be filed with Third District
Court, U.S.A. S78-36-1, et.seq.
UTAH LAW
Utah state law says if you are found by the court to be guilty of unlawful detainer, the judge can order you
to pay Housing Authority for damages, which may include three times (1) the amount of rent for the time you
remain in the unit after this notice expires; (2) the cost of repairs of tenant-caused damage to the unit; and (3) any
damages caused by forcible entry, U.C.A. S78-36-10. If you do not win in court, your Lease Agreement with
Housing Authority gives the judge authority to order you to pay Housing Authority for attorney's fees and court
costs they have spent to evict you. Utah state law, U.C.A. S15-1-4, allows Housing Authority to charge you legal
interest at the rate the Federal Post Judgment Rate plus 2% on the judgement amount.
FEDERAL LAW
Federal Housing Authority regulations give you the following rights:
4.
5.

6.

You have the right to make any reply you wish to this notice, 24 C.F.R. S966.4(l);
You have the right to talk to and have an attorney represent you in any court proceeding, 24
C.F.R. S966.53(c). If you cannot afford an attorney, you may be able to get one with Utah Legal
Services, Inc. at 328-889 L
You have the right to ask your Housing Authority Representative to show you all documents in
your Housing Authority file wich relate to this eviction. If you ask, copies of these documents
can be made for you for a charge. 24 C.F.R. S966.4(ra).

Because you are being evicted for criminal and/or drug-related activity on or near the premises,
the following shall apply to you, 24 CFR S966.4(l)(4):
1.
2.

3.

4.

Dated:

You are not entitled to a grievance proceeding concerning the issues of this notice,
24 C.F.R. S966.4(l)(3)(v)(A).
Under Utah state law, if you do not vacate the premises as requested, a lawsuit will be filed
against you in Third District Court. You will have the opportunity for a hearing before the court.
24 C.F.R. S966.4(l)(3)(v)(B).
HUD has issued a determination which finds Utah judicial eviction proceedings meet the due
process guidelines as defined in HUD regulations. 24 C.F.R. S966.4(l)(3)(v)(B). A copy of this
determination may be obtained from counsel for Housing Authority upon request.
When Housing Authority gets an orderfromthe court to evict you, they will notify the post office
that you no longer live on the premises. (24 C.F.R. S966.4(5)(ii).

•a-3S--0O
Authorized representative of Housing Authority of
the County of Salt Lake

RETURN OF SERVICE

I certify that I caused to be served, pursuant to 24 CFR S966.4(k), 24 CFR
S247.4(b) and U.C.A. S78-36-5 (1987), the above Notice of Termination and Notice
to Vacate, by the method^ctiecked beltow. Notice was ^served on the J2L
day _

/^fi

X

, 2000, upon

U^Anf

T£O>T7/M

<Ty,^d&C

AT

3- 3 7 P."L

(1)

by sending a copy through registered or certified mail addressed to
the tenant at his place of residence; and

(2)

by delivering a copy to the tenant personally; or

(3)

if the tenant is absent from his place of residence or from his
usual place of business, by leaving a copy with a person of suitable
age and discretion at either place and mailing a copy to the tenant
at the address of his place of residence or place of business; or

(4)

if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found at the
place of residence, then by affixing a copy in a conspicuous place
on the leased property. Service upon a subtenant may be made in the
same manner.

DATED this

2S -

/

day of

AzT£

2000.

(OtAAJ^
Server's s ignature
STATE OF UTAH
:SS.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

i^^Hv.

ACKNOWLEDGED AND SWORN TO before me this
2000.

day of

Fe>b

Notary Public
Resides In:<^V?c
My Commission Expires:

"7-3=7 - r ^ .

NOTARY PUBLIC
H. K!M LADOO'JS
•••/

»••"•" ' • • , t , r

- • » ' " ->

J u M 7 ?Q<:?.

STATS OF UTAH
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SALT LAKH POLICE DEPARTMENT
GENERAL OFFENCE HARDCCPY

Fri, KCJU. 24 2000

GO SL 2000-35594

1399 - 0 A3LT-THREATS FREE TEX

frolafcod teyt paqo(g)
Document: INITIAL R/O PIELD
Author; 25V - 3impaon, Bill
Relauod da*-e/Liir«2: Feb-24-00 11^3

MRS RICO WORKS TOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY, AND IS TiY£
RESIHEMT MANAGER OF A ^OW INCOME HOUSING APARTMFNT A? 19 £6 SO 2CO E. MRS
RTCO CALLED TO REPORT THE THREATS MADE TO HER BY ONE OF THE RESIDENCE
PERSONS, THE SUSPECT IS A JOHN TOM SNYDER, 7-26-31, WHO LIVES IN APT A SCS
AT THE APARTMENT HOUSING.
MRS RICO SAID TilAT MR SNYDER CAME INTO H£R OFFICE YESTERDAY MORNING
AROUNN 10:30 AM, AND STARTED SWEARING AT HER CALLING HER A F — I H G BITCH,
WERE MRS RrCO WORDS, AND STATING FOR HER TO PULL UP HER PANTY HOSE BECAUS3
HK WASN'T THROUGH WI1H HER AND THAT HE WOULD GET HER AND CAUSE BODILY HARM.
MRS RICO STATES THAT THIS MAN HAS HARASSED THE OTHER RESIDENTS AND HAS
HEJSN A COMPLETE NUISANCE TO HER AND THE OTHER PEOPLE THAT RESIDE HERE.
MRS
RICO SAID THAT A MR FRANK NATION WHO LIVES AT THE APARTMENT HCSE HAS BEEN
HARASSED KVERY DAY BY MR SNYDER, MRS RICO WOULD LIKE SOMETHING DONE ABOUT
THIS PROBLEM, IF NEED BE SHE WOULD SIGH A COMFLAINT AGAINST HIM- MRS RICO
SAYS THAT THERE MIGHT BE A MENTAL PROBLEM WITH THIS MAN.

Continued .. .
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GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOFY
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Offence

1399

00
-
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0 A£LT-THREATS

2000-355<M
FREE TEX

Iinformation

Operational status : OPEN
Reported on Fob-24-2000 (Thu,) 1124
Oouwrr t-d on Fab-23-2000 (Wed.) 1030
Kuport submitted by 25V - Simpson, Bill
Or-j unit : Telephonic
Located at 1966 S 200 E
Municipality : Salt Lake City Proper
Oounty ; Cncl Diofc £
District : 1
Heat : 115
Grid : LIW
OffJ?JIQUJ2

(Cotopleted/Abt*nvpted) _

Offense- ;~ #1 1399 - 0 ASLT-THREATS FREE TEXT - COMPLETED
Location : Apartment
Weapon typo : Poreonal Weapons / Physical

ConQiral Offense Tnformafcion (cont'd)
Diaa : None {no hiao)
Varoily violence r NO
IER. Clearance status ; Not Applicable

£olafcad Porpon(jg)
Cava Specific i Victim - 01
RICO, SHERKIK WIK
CntiCAoian/Whi te FEMALE
Boxn on Aug-08-19$6
R*±Sidiu«J at 43 55 W LOSES DRIVE , WEST VALLEY 84120Phono Number G
Home » (HOI) 969-0175
Business : (601)284-4422
Reference Nastar Kama Index
Rl-CO, SHERRIE UNK
Caucasian/Whit*
FEMALE
Born on Aug-08-195G
Linkage factors
Resident status : Resident

Cone m u e d

CEASE AND DESIST
DATE

/

/

TOFROM...
S JOJECT: Cease and Desist Re

"""he Respondent o f this letter,

, is hereby given notice that
(Respondent]

as cr

_/

j

, respondent's couroo of conduct tcwarc
is causing

(Authors Name)

_ , tho Author of this
(Author's Namej

letter to suffor emotional distress.
If above named Respondert continues tc n\sir,tST, a visual or physical proximity, o r
conveys verbal or written communication to m
it will be
(Author's Name)
considered stalking and Is ir. violation of Salt Lake City Cede 11 05 C60(Crimes of
Staking).

CcmmjniCcition regarding: property, custody, or divece, deemed accessary between
tho parties must fas through respective attorney's Thers should be no otier
communications including third party

Signed,

Date:

AUTHOR

EXHIBIT 4

\?£Mll4^v
U'V Oi::>AMT^tNI (.» h'-X r-'\'G AND 'JfKiAN OfVHOPM*' NT
F>il .lUUJMC'
P'.-.-t—iljvr

3, 19 91

H o n o r a b l e Norman H. B a n g e r t e r
'*';oveinnx• oL U t a h
:;.iM, h a k e C i t y , Utah
el'llM
J.war fy<:ivonif>r B-.wigei: t o r i
I «"im happy to advice you of a new public housing "duo
pi .oe^n octermination" for the State of Utah.
Under i-'ederal law, if the Secretary of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) determines that law of the
•]{)i:ir,dicLion roquir.es a pie-eviction court hearing with i h'>
ba«io "olt^onts of due process - (42 U.S.C. 1437d(k), as a^ndod
in .ly9Q), a public housing agency (PUA) is not required to
];j.viVM.!f.j an administrative grievance hearing before ovi.ct.iaq a
piiV*.i>'; h«...isi rig tenant for:
*.

Any criminal activity that threatens tho health,
safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the promises;
of other tenants or employees of tho PHA; or

A.

r-.riy drug-related criminal activity on or near sucih
proiai i:\ca .

in accordance with the law, HUD has recently issued a
rtgr.latioA which revises HUD'a definition of due process
elements at 24 CPR 966.53(c) (5G Federal Register 5.1560,
October H , 1.991) .
I'un^.'irit to the revised regulation, HUD has determined that
tho Utah low governing eviction by an action for unlawful
detainer in tin* Utah district or circuit court requires that tho
tenant h.iv». the opportunity for a pre-eviction hearing in court
.ontainiiivi ho elements of due process or. defined in 24 CCK
!*£6. 53(c) "C the KUO regulations. The bAsie of thi«
determination >•' xplained in the legal analysis enclosed with
t h ) ?.: l e t t e r .
Jn a c c o r d a n c e w i t h Hu*)';\ d e t e r m i n a t i o n , a PHA. o p e r a t i n g
p u b l i c h o u s i n g i n t h e S t a t e of Utah may e x c l u d e from i t s
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e g r i e v a n c e procedure any g r i e v a n c e c o n c e r n i n g an
e v i c t i o n o r t o r n > i n a t i o n *.l tenancy which i n v o l v e s any c r i m i n a l
o o t i v l t y t h a t t h r e a t e n s the h e a l t h , s a f e t y , or r i g h t to peaceful
e n j o y n e n t of t h e premise*; of o t h » r t e n a n t s o r employees of t h o
PHA, o r a n y d r u g - r e l a t e d er.ij«ina> a c t i v i t y on o r n e a r such
proa* j r>eB •

2
When a PliA ovictfl *•;•• ?nant pursuant to a Utah unlawful
detainer action in tHv.h district oc circuit court for the
rsasone; aet forth above, t.he r.HA 5.LS not required to afford tho
tenant the opportunity for an nrtminJstrativc hearing on the
ovvcrtion under 24 CFR Part 966/ and may evict a public housing
Hunt pursuant to a decision in such judicial action.
Very sincerely yourA,

enclosure

1HJD OUR PROCESS DETEkMI NATION
for tho
S'lATE OF UTAH
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I » Jurisdiction
II. Elements of Due Process
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ANALYSIS
T.

Jurisdiction;

Utah

X1. RiomfintS_of Due Process
Section 6(k) of the United States Housing Act of 1937 (42
u»s.r, l437d(k), as amend* • I by section 503(a) of the National
Affordable Housing Act OL 1990, Pub. L. 101-025, approved
November 20, 1990), provider, Uiat:
For any grievance concerning an eviction or termination of
tenancy that involves any criminal activity that threatens
Uie health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the
premises of other tenants or employees of the public housing
agency or any drug-related criminal activity on or near such
promises, the agency way . « . exclude from its grievance
procedure any such grievance, in any jurisdiction which
requires that prior to eviction, a tenant be given a hearing
in court which the Secretary determines provides the basic
elements of due process . . • .
The statutory phrase "elements of due process** is defined by
l\)U at ?4 CFR S 966,53(c) is:
. • * an evict-ion action or a termination of tenancy in a
Sin to or local court in which the following procedural
safoguards are required:
(1)

Adequate notice to the tenant of th^ grounds
laminating the trnar.cy and for eviction*

(2)

Hii/ht of the tenant to be ref rented by counsel;

for

(3) Opportunity for the tenant to refute the evidence
presented by the PRA including the right to confront
and croGs-examine witnesses and to present any
affirmative legal or equitable defense whicn the tenant
may have; and
(4) A decision on the merits.
HUD's determination that a State's eviction pieced" res
batisly this regulatory definition is called a "due precoma
deter mi nation".
The present due process determination is based upon HUD's
analysis of the laws of the State of Utah to determine if
eviction procedures for unlawful detainer under those laws
require a hearing which comports with all of the regulatory
•elements of due process", as defined in § 9f>6.53(c).
HUD finds that the requirements of Utah law governing an
action for eviction in district or circuit court under Utah Code
Ann. § 70-36-1 to 12.6 (1989 and 1990 Supp.) include all of the
elements of basic due process, as defined in 24 CFR § 966.53(c).
This conclusion is based upon requirements contained in the Utrih
code, case law and court rules.1
ill-

Overview of Utah Evict ion Procedures

The eviction procedures for unlawful detainer in UUih are
stated at Utah Code Title 78, Chapter 36 (sections 78-36-3 to
70-36-12.6). An unlawful detainer action under this r.rtlfc may be
bjought in district court or circuit court.
Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-3-4; S 78-4^7 (1989 and 1990 Supp.).
Except as otherwise
provided in the unlawful detainer statute, such cases aro
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. U.R.C.P. 1(a);
U.R.C.P. 81(a).
A tenant is guilty of unlawful detainer in the circumstances
specified in Utah Code Ann. S 78-36-3 (1989), Unlawful detainer
lies where the tenant holds over after expiration of the term.

3

This due process deteraii nation does not apply where
plaintiff obtains possession by filing a possession bond pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8,5. HUD expresses no opinion as to
whether the Utah law requires a pre-eviction hearing which meets
thtt requirements of 24 CFR 966.53(c) if the plaintiff obtaino
possession by filing a possession bond.

2

Utah Duo Process DetoriAi nation

df.'iauittf in payment of rent, or commits a violation of the loase.
JiJAn action for unlawful detainer is al^o governed by the Utah
Constitution*
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution
M
provides!
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property/ without due process of law.* The Utah Supremo Court
haa hold that because this clause is substantially similar to the
tilth
and
Fourteenth
Amendments
to
the
United
States
Constitution, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
are highly persuasive as to its interpretation.
Vail
Convalescent and Care Institutifill v» Industrial Commission of.
Vl*hi 6*49" P.2d 33 (Utah 1982).
TV, Analysis of Utah Eviction Procedures for Each of the
Hegulatory Due Process Elements
The following discussion will consider separately each
element of the regulatory due process definition and demonstrate
that each
element is satisfied in the action for unlawful
detainer in Utah district and circuit court under Utah law.
A

-

Adequate notice to the tenant of tj;e_qrounds for
terminating the tenancy and for eviction (24 CPR
S 36~6.S3(cllU~~

The* plaintiff may ccrarence a civil action, including an
action for unlawful detainer, either by service of the summons on
the defendant or by filing the complaint with the court.
U.R.CP. 3(a).
Under Utah law, the suitimcns in a civil action for unlawful
detainer notifies the defendant of the plaintiff's lawsuit and
c3aim for possession and informs the defendant of the time by
which the defendant is required to answer the complaint,
U»R,C,P. 4(c) j Utah Code Ann. S 78-36-8 (1989), In an action for
unlawful detainer, procedures for service of the summons are
qencrally the same as "in othex [civil] cases," .Id. A summons
must be served on the defendant by personal service, publication
or mall. U*R*C,P. 4; Utah Code Ann, S 78-36-8 (1939),
The summons may be served together with the complaint.
Howeverr Utah does nor require that the ccmplaint be served with
the amumona.
U.R.C.P. 3(b); U.R«C.?. 4(c). If the summons is
served before the complaint or by publication, the summons must
state the relief demanded. Id. When service is by publication,
the summons must describe the subject matter involved in the
action.
U,H,C,P. 4(c). In an unlawful detainer action, the
3
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defendant muot appear and defend the action not less than three
dayi3 (dnd not more than twenty days) from service of the summons •
Utah Code Ann. 5 78-36-8 (1989).
Tho complaint gives notice of the facts which arc grounds
for termination and eviction. U.R.C.P. 8(a)(1); Utah Code Ann.
5 78-36-8 (1989).
Under tho general civil pleading rules, the
complaint must contain "(1) a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a
demand for judgment for the relief which [the plaintiff J deems
hiiusolf entitled,"
U.R.C.P. 8(a). Furthermore, tho unlawful
detainer statute provides that the complaint must set forth tho
"J act a on which [the plaintiff] seeks to recover." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-36-8 (1909).
Under Utah law, the defendant in an unlawful detainer action
wust bo given notice of the complaint (and therefore of the
qrounds for eviction stated in the complaint) either (i) by
soivlcc of the complaint on the defendant (with or subsequent to
tfervictf of tho summons), or (2) by opportunity to examine the
complaint, on file with the court. The Utah rules provide that
whon tho complaint is filed by the plaintiff, a copy is deposited
with the court "lor the benefit of the defendants not otherwise
carved with ouch copy At the timo of the service of the summons."
M.R.CtV 3(b), If the complaint has not been tiled with the court
or served on the defendant, the defendant may demand a copy of
the complaint from the plaintiff. The time for the defendant to
respond to the complaint (a minimum of three days in an unlawful.
detainer) runs ftoiu the date a copy of tho complaint is served on
the defendant- IKR.C.P. 3(b).
In addition to the summons and complaint., the notice to quit
also affords notice of the plaintiff's claim for repossession of
tho premises. Except for an unlawful detainer after expiration
of a • specified lease termr the plaintiff may not maintain the
unlawful detainer action unless the plaintiff has served a notice
to quit. Utah Code Ann. $ 78-36-3(1) (1989). Procedures for
service of the notice to quit are specified in the Code. Utah
Code Ann. § 78-36-6 (1989).
Tho Utah Supreme Court has also held that due process of law
i\s provided for in the Utah Constitution requires that a party be
served with process which is calculated to qive notice. Naisbitt
v. Uerrick, 76 Utah 575, 290 P. 950 (1930)/
From the foregoing, HUD has determined that Utah
requires adequate notice to the tenant of the grounds
eviction.
4

law
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B-

Right to be represented by counsel (24 CFR

While the right Lo be represented by nn attorney is nowhere
ntntod explicitly,, the existence of thio right icay bo inferred
frum references throughout the Utah Rules of Civil procedure,
i'or example, U.R.C.P* 5(b)(1) requires that whenever service is
jaade upon a party represented by an attorney, the service must be
iiiada upon the attorney unless the court orders otherwise.
The right to representation by counsel is also provided by
the due process clause of the Utah Constitution.
Utah Const.
ntl.
T, fr 7.
Thus, HUD concludes that Utah law gives a tenant in an
unlawful detainer action the right to be ropiesented by counsel,
C«

Opportunity for the tenant to refute the evidence
presented by the FHA including the_rioht to confront
fr.nd cross-examine witnesses (24. C?R_ $ 966.53(c) (.¥)?

In Utah courts " . . . [a]li evidence shall be admitted which
is admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence or otht^r rules
adopted by the [Utah] Supreme Court.* U.R.C-P. 43(A).
Kxcept in limited circumstances specified in the Utah rules
or statutes (such as the use of depositions and interrogatories
At trial pursuant to U.R.C.P. 32 and 33), the testimony of
witnesses must be taken orally in open court. U.R.C.P. 43(a), A
deposition may only be used at trial, and only in specified
narrow circumstances, against a person who bad opportunity to be
represented at taking of the deposition.
U.R.C.P. 32(a).
Provisions which allow the use of a deposition at txial in
"exceptional circumstancesM note "the importance of presenting
the testimony of witnesses orally in open court."
U.R.C.P,
32(a)(3)(H).
In general# a witness (other than an expert witness) must
have personal knowledge of the matter on which the witness is
called to testify. IKR.E. 602. Credibility of a witness may be
attacked by any party, U.R.E. 607. Credibility of the witmiss
may bo refuted by evidence concerning the witness's character or
conduct. U«R.3. 608; U.R.fc. b09. Bias, prejudice or any motive
to misrepresent mav » shown to impeach the witness, either by
exainlnation of th
*ess or by evidence otherwise adduced.
U.R.E, 600(c).
J
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A
party nay
interrogate witnesses, including crossexamination on matters affecting credibility cf the witness.
U.R.E. 611(b).
The evidence rules permit, a party to call a
hostile witness, an adverse party or a witness identified with an
adverse party, and interrogate the witness by leading questions.
U.K.E. 611(c). A party may eross-exanine an adverse party upon
ihe subject mattor of his examination in chief. U.R.E. 611(b),
The court's control over the mode and order for interrogation of
witnesses is Intended to "make the interrogation and presentation
effective for the ascertainment of the truth." U.R.E. 611(a)(1).
Thus the defendant in an unlawful detainer action, aa 3n or.hor
civil actions, has the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, subject to the normal judicial control over conduct of
the trial,
The Utah statutes and civil rules do not restrict tho right
of a defendant, including a defendant threatened with eviction in
on action for unlawful detainer, to impeach or contradict tho
plaintiff'HI evidence by argument, evidence or cross-examination,
A tenant has the right to present evidence and witnesses to
refute the case presented by the plaintiff, subject to reasonable
judicial control over the "mode and order* for presentation of
witnesses.
See U.R.E. 611(a).
Relevant evidence way only he
excluded if its probative value is outweighed on grounds r>f
prejudice, confusion or waste of time. U.K.K. 4C3- Tno tenant
may use a subpoena to obtain the attendance of witnesses or
production of documentary evidence at the trial- U.K.C.P. 45.
Tho right to confront and cress-examine witnesses is also
yuaranteed by the due process clause of the Utah Constitutjon,
Utah Const, art. I, S 7,
Thus, in Utah courts, tho tenant has the opportunity to
refute the evidence presented by the PHA including the right to
confront «nd cross-examine witnesses.
D»

Opportunity to present any affirmative J egal or
equitable defense which the tenant may hayg. (JM CPR

Li6j.53(c)(3))
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide for one form of
action, known as a •'civil action*"
U«K»C*P. 2.
The ruleo
abolish the distinction between acx-ions at law and suits at
equity. O'Neill v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R. Co. , 38 U. 475, 114
P. 127 (1911), Further, pursuant to U.R.C.P. 2, the defendant
raay raise both legal and equitable defenses >
Williamson v._
Wanle^r 545 P. 2d 1145 (1976)6

Utah Due Process Determination

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 8(b) and 8(c) require the
deforciant to state his defenses to each claim asserted*
In
adult .ion, when responding to the complaint/ the defendant must
set for/th all of his affinaative defenses, whether equitable or
logal in nature*
Utah law does not restrict the right of the
defendant to raise any available defense to the plaintiff's claim
to possession of the property, including any of the specific
"affit-matJve defenses" specified in tho rules.
From the above, HUD has concluded that Utah law provides the
tenant with the opportunity to present any legal or equitable
defense.
E-

A decision on tho merits (24 CFR,S 966.53{$11 111

Tho Utah unlawful detainer statute specifically provides
that except upon default a judgment must be entered "upon the
merits." Utah Code Ann. S 78-36-10(1) (1939)•
The structure and procedural incidents of a trial under the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Rules of Evidence arc
designed to the end that a trial shall lead to a decision on the
liierits, btUted on the evidence presented bearing on tho legal and
factual issues fraised by tho complaint and defenses presented. A
final judgment muut grant ''the relief to which t.he party in whose
favor it is rendered is entitled." U,R.C.P. 54(c)(1). The Utah
Civil RUIOB are construed "to secure the just . . . determination
ox every action.- U.R.C*P. 1(a). Similarly, the Utah Rules of
Evidence are construed "to the end that the truth may be
ascertained and proceedings justly determined*" U.R.E. 102.
The judgment is entered upon the verdict of the jury or
decision of the court. U.R.CP. 58A; See U.R.C*P. 47 to S2. In
a jury trial, the jurors are sworn to "try the matter in issue"
and to render a true verdict "according to the evidence and the
iiu> trueLiotiu of the court." U.R.C.P« 47(h). At the request of
any party, the court is required to instruct the juxy a& to the
applicable law* U.R.C.P. 51. In a bench trial, the court timet,
make findings of fact and conclusions of law. U.R.C.P. 52(a).
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, whether the
decision Is by the judge or the jury, the decision must be made
on the merjtu of the law and facte as presented to the court. A
decision on the merits is also guaranteed by the due process
clauso of the Utah Constitution. Utah Const, art. 1, § 7,

7
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V.

Determination

Con^luai.pn

Utah law governing the eviction procedures for unlawful
detainer in UK> district or circuit court requires that the
tenant have the opportunity for a pro-eviction hearing in court
vhich provides the basic oicments of due proceu3 AS defined in 24
CFR S 966.53(c) ot the mm regulations.
By virtue of this due process determination under section
6(k) of r.ho U.S. Housing Act of 1937, a PHA in lUah nay evict a
public housing tenant pursuant to a district or circuit court
decision in an eviction proceeding for any grievance involving
any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right
xo peaceful enjoyment of the premises of other tenants or
ejKpjoyeoc of the public housing agency or any drug-related
criminal activity on or near such premises, and is not required
to first afford the tenant the opportunity for an administrative
hearing on the eviction.

8

I

I

U
<*> H
CUf
<<K
M
P
r.CH
LW
H^A

, 8 G
^ S !;

1 i Lc;

A l b ; iqhl
\Ui\ )b
C)\tou
Heiold
X< - t i i n g
KPinp
Kuuibon
f
><hilf
iVn.don
Whipple
Legal F i l e s

10214
13166
81G6
10262
10214
J 0000
8162
4100
0165
4 206
9141

Opinion i ' i l e ft 166
Kcyional Counsel
K^'jional A d m i n i s t r a t o r

il:ih ah

(Wisrwljh

Subject:

11/8/91

Lxt.

708-OW

P u b l i c Housing: Lease and g r i e v a n c e :
Dun procDBi> cvt orxninatioiv. S t a ' e of Utah

i,<~jal O p i n i o n IIJIJCX 2.245

EXHIBIT 5

unauthorized changes or additions have been made.
U.

Waterbeds are permitted on ground floor bedrooms only.

V.

Residents shall not install or change
written permission of Management.

W.

Resident is responsible for the repair of all breakage of
window glass, doors and screens on the premises.

X.

Resident shall not drive or park on lawn or sidewalks for any
purpose.

Y.

No major repairs requiring that a vehicle remain in an
inoperable condition for longer than 24 hours shall be
permitted within the complex. The discharge of vehicle fluids
including hydraulic fluids or anti-freeze within the complex
shall be prohibited.

Z.

Maintenance should immediately be notified of inoperable smoke
detectors." Removal of batteries from smoke detectors is
grounds for termination of the lease.

locks without

SECTION XIII
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
1. DEFINITIONS

A.

"Grievance" shall mean any dispute which a tenant may
have with respect to the Housing Authority of the County
of Salt Lake (hereinafter referred to as the HA) action
or failure to act in accordance with the individual tenant's
lease of HA regulations which adversely affect the individual
tenant's rights, duties, welfare, or status.

B.

"Complainant" shall mean any tenant whose grievance is
presented to the HA or in accordance with this procedure.

C.

"Hearing Officer" shall mean a person appointed in accordance
with Section C (2) of this Procedure to hear grievances and
render a decision with respect thereto.

the

D.

"Tenant" shall mean any lessee or the remaining head of
the household of any tenant family residing in housing
accommodations covered by this Procedure.

DISCUSSION OF GRIEVANCE
A.

Any grievance shall be personally presented, either
orally or in writing, to the Area Manager or the Director
of Housing so that the grievance may be discussed
informally and settled without an informal hearing.

B.

The grievance must be presented by the complainant or his
representative within a reasonable time, not in excess
of
10 days of the HA action or failure to act which is the
basis of the grievance.

C.

The HA shall schedule the informal discussion as promptly
as possible; time and place reasonably convenient to the
complainant, and shall inform the complainant thereof.

D.

A summary of the discussion, dated and signed by the
Director Of Housing shall be prepared within a reasonable
time, not in excess of five working days of the informal
discussion. One copy shall be given to the tenant and one
retained in the HA's tenant file. The summary shall
specify the nature of the complaint and the specific
reasons therefore/ and shall specify the right of the
complainant to an informal hearing before the Executive
Director and the procedure by which such a hearing may be
obtained in such case as the complainant is not satisfied
with the disposition of the matter by the HA.

PROCEDURE TO OBTAIN A FORMAL HEARING
Request a Hearing
If the complainant is dissatisfied with the proposed
disposition of his complaint, as stated in the Director of
Housing or other HA official's statement, he may submit a
written request for a hearing to the HA within a reasonable
time, not in excess of 10 days of the date of the Director of
Housing's summary. The written request shall specify:

1.
2.
B.

The reasons for the grievance; and
The action of relief sought.

Hearing Officer
A hearing officer, as approved by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development shall be appointed to preside over the
formal hearing proceedings.

C.

Failure to Request a Formal Hearing
If the complainant does not request a formal hearing in
writing and within ten days of the Director of Housing's
summary, then the HA's disposition of grievance as summarized
by the Director of Housing shall become final. Failure to
request a hearing shall not constitute a waiver by the
complainant of his rights to contest the HA's action in an
appropriate judicial proceeding.

D.

Hearing Prerequisite
All grievances shall be personally presented either orally or
in writing pursuant tot he informal procedure prescribed in
section B as a condition precedent to a formal hearing.

E,

Escrow Deposit
Before a hearing or an informal discussion is scheduled in any
grievance involving the amount of rent which the HA claims is
due, the complainant shall pay to the HA an amount equal to
the amount of the rent due and payable as of the first of the
month preceding the month in which the act or failure to act
took place. The complainant shall thereafter deposit the same
amount of the monthly rent in an escrow account monthly until
the complaint is resolved by decision of the hearing officer.
These requirements may be waived by the HA in extenuating
circumstances. Unless so waived, the failure to make such
payments shall result in a termination of the grievance

procedure.
Scheduling of Hearings
A hearing shall be scheduled by the hearing officer or hearing
panel promptly for a time and place reasonably convenient to
both complainant and the HA. A written notification specifying
the time, place and the procedures governing the hearing shall
be delivered to the complainant and the appropriate HA
official.

PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE FORMAL HEARING
The hearing shall be held before a hearing officer.
The complainant shall be afforded a fair hearing providing the
basic safeguards of due process which shall include:
1.

The opportunity to examine before the hearing and,
at the expense of the complainant, to copy all
documents, records and regulations of the HA that
are relevant to the hearing. Any document not so
made available after request therefore by the
complainant may not be relied on the HA at the
hearing.

2.

The right to be represented by counsel or other
person chosen as his or her representative;

3.

The right to a private hearing unless the
complainant requests a public hearing, but this
shall not be construed to limit the attendance of
persons with a valid interest in the proceedings.

4.

The right to present evidence and arguments in
support of his or her complaint, or controvert
evidence relied on the PHA, and to confront and
cross-examine all witnesses on whose testimony or
information the PHA relies; and

5.

A decision based solely and exclusively upon the
facts presented at the hearing.

If the complainant or the HA fails to appear at scheduled

hearing, the hearing officer may make a determination that the
party has waived his right to a hearing. Both the complainant
and the PHA shall be notified of the determination by the
hearing officer or hearing panel.
D.

The hearing shall be conducted by the hearing officer and oral
or documentary evidence pertinent to the facts and issues
raised by the complaint may be received without regard to
admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable to
judicial proceedings. The hearing officer shall require the
HA# the complainant, counsel and other participants or
spectators to conduct themselves in an orderly fashion.
Failure to comply with the directions of the hearing officer
to obtain order may result in exclusion from the proceedings.

E.

The complainant or the PHA may arrange, in advance and at the
expense of the party making the arrangement, for a transcript
of the hearing. Any interested party may purchase a copy of
such transcript.

5.

DECISION OF THE HEARING OFFICER
A.

The decision of the hearing officer shall be based solely
and exclusively upon evidence presented at the hearing
and upon applicable HA and HUD regulations and State and
Federal Law.

B.

If both parties agree to prepare a proposed decision to
the hearing panel, each party shall submit same to the
hearing panel for its consideration.

C.

The hearing officer shall prepare a written decision,
together with the reasons therefore, within a reasonable
time after the hearing. A copy of the decision shall be
sent to the complainant and the HA. The HA shall retain
a copy of the decision in the tenant's folder. A copy of
such decision, with all names and identifying references
deleted, shall also be maintained on file by the HA and
made
available
for inspection
by
a
prospective
complainant, his representative, or hearing officer.

D.

The decision of the hearing officer shall be binding on
the Ha and the complainant. The HA shall take all actions
necessary to carry out the decision unless the HA Board
of Commissioners determines within a reasonable time (not

in excess of 3 0 days of the date of the hearing officer's
decision) and promptly notifies the complainant of its
determination that:

6.

1.

The grievance does not concern HA action or
failure to act in accordance with or involving
the complainant's lease on PHA regulations,
which adversely affect the complainant's
rights, duties, welfare or status; or

2.

The decision of the hearing officer is
contrary to applicable Federal, State, or
local law, HUD regulations or requirements of
the annual contributions contract between HUD
and the PHA.

PHA EVICTION ACTIONS

If a tenant has requested a formal hearing in accordance with
Section C on a complaint involving HA notice of termination of the
tenancy and the hearing officer upholds the HA's action to
terminate the tenancy, the HA shall not commence an eviction action
in a State or local court until it has served a notice to vacate on
the tenant, and in no event shall the notice to vacate be issued
prior to the decision of the hearing officer having been mailed or
delivered to the complainant. Such notice to vacate must be in
writing and specify that if the tenant fails to quit the premises
within the applicable statutory period, or on the termination date
stated in the notice of termination, whichever is later,
appropriate action will be brought against him and he may be
required to pay court costs and attorney fees.

7*

INAPPLICABILITY OF GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES

The provisions of this grievance procedure are not applicable to
any grievance concerning an eviction or termination of tenancy
based upon a tenant's creation or maintenance of the threat to the
health or safety of other tenants or HA employees. The HA may
immediately commence an eviction action in accordance with State
Law based on any of the grounds stated in this section.

SUCTION XIV
LOCALLY OWNED HOUSING PROGRAM
All preceeding policies, rules and regulations as stated in Section
I - XIV of the Admission and Continued Occupancy Schedule shall be
applicable to applicants and residents of locally owned housing
with the following exceptions:

TENANT RENT

Tenant Rent will be determined
Monthly Adjusted Income as defined
rent which will be established
Housing Authority to ensure the
program.

as the greater of
in Section I or the
from time to time
financial solvency

3 0% of
minimum
by the
of the

i
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and say, "Here's the problem and here's what we need to do"?

2

MR. HARRIS: Well, your Honor—

3

THE COURT:

I mean I'm a little confused why the

4

Supreme Court wants to look over ray shoulder on a scheduling of

5

an unlawful detainer.

6

great movements of the law as I should be.

7

Maybe I'm just not as sensitive to the

MR. HARRIS: No, I'm not suggesting that, your Honor.

8

Your Honor though, however, dismissed sua sponte a motion to

9

dismiss on behalf of my client.

10

THE COURT: Right.

11

MR. HARRIS: And prior to that being fully briefed and

12

prior to that being submitted to your Honor, and it was —

13

was clear to us that opposing counsel wasn't going to work with

14

us on this issue.

15

done in order to get this trial stayed so that we could resolve

16

these matters.

17
18

Why should I say yes?
MR. HARRIS:

In the interest of due process, your

Honor.

21
22

It's clear to us that something needed to be

THE COURT: All right, so the Supreme Court said no.

19
20

it

THE COURT:

Well, why didn't the Supreme Court not see

it that way?

23

MR. HARRIS:

Your Honor, they didn't offer any type of

24

reasoning behind their decision to dismiss it, so I can't tell

25

you—

-3-

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on May 8, 2000)

3

THE COURT:

4

John Snyder.

5

Let's call the Housing Authority against

Ms. Washburn, you get to start.

MS. WASHBURN:

Good afternoon, your Honor, Kimberly

6

Washburn here for the Housing Authority of Salt Lake County,

7

and with me I've got Ms. Sherri Rico and Mr. Roy House of the

8

Housing Authority of Salt Lake County are also present.

9
10

THE COURT:

Do you want to call a witness and start

MR. HARRIS:

Your Honor, I think there were several

off?

11
12

motions pending prior to this trial.

13

matter is ready for trial yet, and I request your Honor to rule

14

on some of those motions prior to starting t o —

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. HARRIS:

17

THE COURT:

18

21

Isn't it set for trial?
It was set for trial, your Honor—
Is there any request for a decision on any

of what you would call pending motions?

19
20

I don't believe this

MR. HARRIS: Your Honor, they have not been fully
briefed.

I've received responses—
THE COURT:

Let me go back to my question, if I could.

22

Is there any request for a decision on any of the motions which

23

you (inaudible)?

24
25

MR. HARRIS:

There has been no request because the

briefings aren't complete yet, your Honor, and the briefing
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THE COURT:

Okay.

2

MS. WASHBURN:

Your Honor, I, of course, would ask the

3

Court deny the defendant's motion for a continuance in this

4

matter, and primarily, your Honor, the basis for that is I,

5

too, am befuddled at the approach that was taken in this case.

6

Things went along fine, the defendant filed a motion to

7

dismiss, but the Court denied that because it had not been

8

properly submitted pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of

9

Judicial Administration.

I kind of perceived that as maybe

10

the clerk had sent the file back to you too soon.

11

response to that.

12

your Honor, and it has not been submitted for a decision as of

13

this date, and it was ready for that almost a month ago, your

14

Honor.

15

We filed a

No reply has been filed by the defendant,

Second, with regard to the papering, the numerous

16

motions that the defendant and defendant's counsel have filed

17

in the past, a week to 10 days, the housing authority has

18

worked diligently to respond in an effort to make sure this

19

proceeding can move forward.

20

circumvent an already established trial date for which, your

21

Honor, until today — well, actually until Friday at 4:30, I'm

22

assuming that Mr. Barnard, the defendant's counsel, filed the

23

motion for continuance with the Court on the eve of trial. I

24

received it via fax.

25

We perceive it as an attempt to

Until that time they had never come to this Court and
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and say, "Here's the problem and here's what we need to do"?

2

MR. HARRIS: Well, your Honor—

3

THE COURT:

I mean I'm a little confused why the

4

Supreme Court wants to look over ray shoulder on a scheduling of

5

an unlawful detainer.

6

great movements of the law as I should be.

7

Maybe I'm just not as sensitive to the

MR. HARRIS: No, I'm not suggesting that, your Honor.

8

Your Honor though, however, dismissed sua sponte a motion to

9

dismiss on behalf ofrayclient.

10

THE COURT: Right.

11

MR. HARRIS: And prior to that being fully briefed and

12

prior to that being submitted to your Honor, and it was — it

13

was clear to us that opposing counsel wasn't going to work with

14

us on this issue.

15

done in order to get this trial stayed so that we could resolve

16

these matters.

17
18

THE COURT: All right, so the Supreme Court said no.
Why should I say yes?

19
20

MR. HARRIS:

In the interest of due process, your

Honor.

21
22

It's clear to us that something needed to be

THE COURT: Well, why didn't the Supreme Court not see
it that way?

23

MR. HARRIS: Your Honor, they didn't offer any type of

24

reasoning behind their decision to dismiss it, so I can't tell

25

you—

-91

Certainly there was no reason for it to not do so in this case,

2

Your Honor, finally with regard to the due process, I

3

guess his argument with that was that all the motions that he

4

had filed.

5

your Honor.

6

be upset that they were received Friday and this morning, but

7

given the time that he —

8

those motions, your Honor, we did our very best to get them to

9

the Court.

Again, we have done our best to respond to those,
He has been provided with our responses.

He may

from the point in time that he filed

Back to the responses, if we were going to stick to

10

the traditional timeline, shouldn't have been due until today,

11

and the response to the motion for summary judgment shouldn't

12

be —

13

Honor.

14

according to the rules, be due until next Monday, your

But this is an expedited process, the matter has been

15

set for trial.

16

circumvent that trial setting.

17

they can to undermine that trial setting.

18

that this case needs to move forward.

19

be any claim counsel is not prepared to proceed.

20

can file all the documents that he has filed, counsel is very

21

resourceful and good at what they do.

22

The defendant and his counsel are trying to
They are doing everything that
Your Honor, I think

I don't think there can
If counsel

Your Honor, I don't think that that be a justification

23

under the circumstances.

They've had adequate time and that's

24

evident by everything that they've done in numerous courts in

25

this jurisdiction.

So the housing authority would ask your
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THE COURT: Okay.

2

MS. WASHBURN:

Your Honor, I, of course, would ask the

3

Court deny the defendant's motion for a continuance in this

4

matter, and primarily, your Honor, the basis for that is I,

5

too, am befuddled at the approach that was taken in this case.

6

Things went along fine, the defendant filed a motion to

7

dismiss, but the Court denied that because it had not been

8

properly submitted pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of

9

Judicial Administration.

I kind of perceived that as maybe

10

the clerk had sent the file back to you too soon. We filed a

11

response to that.

12

your Honor, and it has not been submitted for a decision as of

13

this date, and it was ready for that almost a month ago, your

14

Honor.

15

No reply has been filed by the defendant,

Second, with regard to the papering, the numerous

16

motions that the defendant and defendant's counsel have filed

17

in the past, a week to 10 days, the housing authority has

18

worked diligently to respond in an effort to make sure this

19

proceeding can move forward.

20

circumvent an already established trial date for which, your

21

Honor, until today — well, actually until Friday at 4:30, I'm

22

assuming that Mr. Barnard, the defendant's counsel, filed the

23

motion for continuance with the Court on the eve of trial. I

24

received it via fax.

25

We perceive it as an attempt to

Until that time they had never come to this Court and
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like to have the witnesses removed from the courtroom,

2

THE COURT:

I'm just going to let everybody make their

3

motions and I'll rule on them,

4

anticipate anything.

5

appreciate it.

If you want to call a witness I'd

6

MS. WASHBURN:

7

call Sherri Rico to the stand.

8
9

THE COURT:

I'm not going to try and

Your Honor, the housing authority would

Ms. Rico, if you'll come stand in the

middle here and raise your right hand.

10

COURT CLERK:

You do solemnly swear that the testimony

11

you are about to give in this case now pending before the Court

12

will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,

13

so help you God?

14

THE WITNESS:

I do.

15

SHERRI RICO

16

having been first duly sworn,

17

testifies as follows:

18

DIRECT EXAMINATION

19
20
21

BY MS. WASHBURN:
Q.

Ms. Rico, could you please state your name and spell

your last name for the record?

22

A.

My name is Sherri Rico.

My last name is R-i-c-o.

23

Q«

Ms. Rico, can you please tell us where you are

24

employed?

25

A.

With the Housing Authority of Salt Lake County.

-91

Certainly there was no reason for it to not do so in this case.

2

Your Honor, finally with regard to the due process, I

3

guess his argument with that was that all the motions that he

4

had filed.

5

your Honor.

6

be upset that they were received Friday and this morning, but

7

given the time that he —

8

those motions, your Honor, we did our very best to get them to

9

the Court. Back to the responses, if we were going to stick to

Again, we have done our best to respond to those,
He has been provided with our responses.

He may

from the point in time that he filed

10

the traditional timeline, shouldn't have been due until today,

11

and the response to the motion for summary judgment shouldn't

12

be —

13

Honor.

14

according to the rules, be due until next Monday, your

But this is an expedited process, the matter has been

15

set for trial. The defendant and his counsel are trying to

16

circumvent that trial setting.

17

they can to undermine that trial setting.

18

that this case needs to move forward.

19

be any claim counsel is not prepared to proceed.

20

can file all the documents that he has filed, counsel is very

21

resourceful and good at what they do.

22

They are doing everything that
Your Honor, I think

I don't think there can
If counsel

Your Honor, I don't think that that be a justification

23

under the circumstances.

They've had adequate time and that's

24

evident by everything that they've done in numerous courts in

25

this jurisdiction.

So the housing authority would ask your
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marked?

2

THE COURT: Any time that you're ready.

3

MS. WASHBURN:

May the record reflect that I'm handing

4

you a document captioned, "Lease Agreement," marked as

5

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1.

6

defendant a copy.

9
10

May I approach the witness, your Honor?

THE COURT: Any time.

7
8

I'm also handing counsel for

Q.

BY MS. WASHBURN :

Ms. Rico, if you would, please, take

a look at that document that I have just handed to you, and
does it look familiar to you?

11

A.

Yes, it does.

12

Q.

Can you tell us what that document is?

13

A.

This is the lease with Mr. Snyder that we signed.

14

had him sign on August the 7th, 1998 with the housing

15

authority.

16

Q.

17

I

Can you turn to the last page, that would be page 7 of

that document?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Do you see your signature on that page?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

That is your signature as the authorized signature?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Were you present when the other signature appeared on

24
25

this document?
A.

Yes, I was.

-111

like to have the witnesses removed from the courtroom.

2

THE COURT:

I'm just going to let everybody make their

3

motions and I'll rule on them,

4

anticipate anything.

5

appreciate it.

6
7

If you want to call a witness I'd

MS. WASHBURN:

Your Honor, the housing authority would

call Sherri Rico to the stand.

8
9

I'm not going to try and

THE COURT: Ms. Rico, if you'll come stand in the
middle here and raise your right hand.

10

COURT CLERK:

You do solemnly swear that the testimony

11

you are about to give in this case now pending before the Court

12

will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,

13

so help you God?

14

THE WITNESS:

I do.

15

SHERRI RICO

16

having been first duly sworn,

17

testifies as follows:

18

DIRECT EXAMINATION

19
20
21

BY MS. WASHBURN:
Q.

Ms. Rico, could you please state your name and spell

your last name for the record?

22

My name is Sherri Rico.

23

Ms. Ricor can you please lejj us whe.r<j you are

24

employed?

25

A.

My last name is R-i-c-o.

With the Housing Authority of Salt Lake County.
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hospital for a heart attack, and her family —

she's from Texas

2

and her family came from Texas and felt that it was necessary

3

that she move back home with her family.

4

Q.

Did she leave to go back to Texas?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Do you know the date that she left to go back to

7

Texas?

8

A.

9

Let's see, it was last Tuesday, I'm not sure of that

date.

10

Q.

April 25th; would that be right?

11

A.

Yeah, if that was Tuesday she left.

12

MR. HARRIS:

13

THE COURT:

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Q.

Your Honor—
I'll sustain it (inaudible).

BY MS. WASHBURN:

Tuesday or the Tuesday —

Today is May 8th, so was it last
if you can, Sherri, tell u s —

MR. HARRIS: We'll stipulate that she's left and gone
to Texas.
THE COURT:

Is there any more we need to know?

I mean

is the date important for (inaudible)?
MS. WASHBURN:

Actually, your Honor, the date is kind

of important.

22

THE COURT:

Why is that?

23

MS. WASHBURN:

For a motion (inaudible) by defendant

24

trying to prevent the use of Ms. Keyou's testimony in

25

deposition that was taken because she was leaving.

So it is

-131

marked?

2

THE COURT: Any time that you're ready.

3

MS. WASHBURN:

May the record reflect that I'm handing

4

you a document captioned, "Lease Agreement," marked as

5

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1.

6

defendant a copy.

7
8
9
10

I'm also handing counsel for

May I approach the witness, your Honor?

THE COURT: Any time.
Q.

BY MS. WASHBURN:

Ms. Rico, if you would, please, take

a look at that document that I have just handed to you, and
does it look familiar to you?

11

A.

Yes, it does.

12

Q.

Can you tell us what that document is?

13

A.

This is the lease with M:i :. Snyder that we signed. I

14

had him sign on August the 7th, 1998 with the housing

15

authority.

16

Q.

17

Can you turn to the last page, that would be page 7 of

that document?

18

P.

Yes.

19

Q.

Do you see your signature on that page?

20

A,

Yes.

21

Q.

That is your signature as the authorized signature?

22

,.fi

Yes.

23

Q

Were you present when the other signature appeared on

24
25

this document?
A.

Yes, I was.
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THE WITNESS:

2

THE COURT:

3
4
5
6

It was —

I'm sorry, I'm just going to sustain the

objection and in my mind it's (inaudible).
Q.

BY MS. WASHBURN:

Sherri, how is it that you know Ms.

Keyou called Mr. Snyder?
A.

I was there. As a matter of fact, she put it on the

7

speaker phone when we called, and that's how I heard what he

8

had said.

9
10

Q.

And how is that you know that was Mr. Snyder

responding on the speaker phone?

11

A.

I recognized his voice.

12

Q.

Can you tell me what he said?

13

A.

He said, "You're God-damn right, I'll be down in a

14

minute."

15

Q.

Ms. Rico, did he come down to see you?

16

A.

Uh-huh, right away he came down.

17

Q.

Can you please tell the Court what happened when he

18
19

arrived at your office?
A.

He came into the office and walked in and closed the

20

door, so I asked him to have a seat.

He had his —

and Julie

21

was there in the office and Julie was sitting in the desk

22

chair, and I sat down in the chair by the side of her, and he

23

sat over in the far right-hand corner of the—

24

Q.

He sat across from the desk?

25

A.

Uh-huh, there's two chairs there and he sat over by

-15hospital for a heart attack, and her family —

she's from Texas

and her family came from Texas and felt that it was necessary
that she move back home with her family.
Q.

Did she leave to go back to Texas?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you know the date that she left to go back to

Texas?
A

Let's see, it was last Tuesday, I'm not sure of that

date.
Q.

April 25th; would that be right?

ft

Yeah, if that was Tuesday she left.
MR. HARRIS:
THE COURT:

Q.

Your Honor—
I'll sustain it (inaudible).

BY MS. WASHBURN:

Tuesday or the Tuesday —
MR. HARRIS:

Today is May 8th, so was it last
if you can, Sherri, tell u s —

We'll stipulate that she's left and gone

to Texas.
THE COURT:

Is there any more we need to know?

I mean

is the date important for (inaudible)?
MS. WASHBURN:

Actually, your Honor, lhe date is kind

of important.
THE COURT:
Mi i

Why is that?
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trying to prevent the use of Ms. Keyou's testimony in
deposition that was taken because she was leaving.

So it is
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"You cost me a hundred and twenty dollars you fucking bitch."

2
3

Q.

Ms. Rico, when he came around the desk can you please

describe Mr. Snyder's demeanor?

4

A.

He had his finger right up in my face and he just kept

5

coming right around the corner of the desk, and Julie sighed a

6

couple of times because she was pretty scared to the side of

7

me.

8
9

MR. HARRIS: Objection, calls for (inaudible) state of
mind.

10

THE COURT:

I think she's going to —

I'm going to

11

take it for "she sighed," if I understood right, but beyond

12

that I don't know why.

13
14

THE WITNESS: And I just motioned to her it was okay,
and then that's when my radio went off.

15
16
17

Q.

BY MS. WASHBURN:

What do you mean your radio went

A.

My radio beeped and that meant that somebody was on

off?

18

the line for me, and I stood up and I was getting pretty

19

nervous because he was getting right in my face and just kept

20

calling me a fucking bitch, and so I just pushed in ray radio —

21

it's a two-way radio with maintenance and with anybody in

22

housing authority that has access to radio, and I just pushed

23

it in and held it to the side of me when he was in my face.

24

Q.

Why did you push that button in?

25

A.

Because I was getting pretty nervous, he was getting

-17
1

THE WITNESS:

2

THE COURT:

3
4
5
6

It w a s —
I'm sorry, I'm just going to sustain the

objection and in ray mind it's (inaudible),
Q.

BY MS. WASHBURN:

Sherri, how is it that you know Ms.

Keyou called Mr. Snyder?
A.

I was there.

As a matter of fact, she put it on the

7

speaker phone when we called, and that's how I heard what he

8

had said.

9
10

Q.

And how is that you know that was Mr. Snyder

responding on the speaker phone?

11

A

I recognized his voice.

12

Q.

Can you tell me what he said?

13

A.

He said, "You're God-damn right, I'll be down in a

14

minute."

15

Q.

Ms. Rico, did he come down to see you?

16

A.

Uh-huh r right away he came down.

17

(),»

Can you please tell the Court what happened when he

18
19

arrived at your office?
Pi

-* office and A a] keel i n and closed the

20

door, so I asked him to have a seat.

He had his —

and Julie

21

was there in the office and Julie was sitting in the desk

22

cha 11 , -mid 1 .".nt down in Uie chaii by I he side of her, and he

23

sat over in the far right-hand corner of t h e —

24

He sat across from the desk?

25

! 111 1111 i i, 1 11 f M *"" i. t w in r l i «'i i i " i I I in i j r t" «i id he sat o v e r by
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MR. HARRIS: Objection hearsay.

2

THE COURT:

3
4
5

I'll sustain it on that ground (inaudible)

someone who is not a party.
Q.

BY MS. WASHBURN:

Ms. Rico, you indicated that Ms.

Poulton came into the room.

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

You indicated that she did speak to you.

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Did you see Ms. Poulton at any time prior to her

10

walking in within like five minutes prior to her walking in?

11

A.

No.

12

Q.

Following this incident did you report it to anybody?

13

A.

Well, as a matter of fact right after —

I told Daphne

14

that I was fine and to go on about her business.

15

the office, and then the phone started ringing, my cell phone

16

started ringing and the radio phone started ringing. My

17

director, Roy House, had called me to ask me if I was okay.

18

The dispatcher—

19
20

I stayed in

MR. HARRIS: Objection, your Honor, this is all along
the same lines.

21

THE COURT: Yeah, I think the question that was

22

asked —

23

or no and now we're going through a long discourse, so I think

24

(inaudible).

25

Q.

I can't remember what it was but it seemed like a yes

BY MS. RICO: Ms. Rico, who did you contact regarding

-19"You cost m e a hundred and twenty dollars you fucking bitch."
Q.

M s . Rico, when he came around the desk can you please

describe M r . Snyder's demeanor?
A.

He had his finger right up in my face and he just kept

coming right around the corner of the desk, and Julie sighed a
couple of times because she was pretty scared to the side of
me.
MR. HARRIS:

Objection, calls for (inaudible) state of

mind.
THE COURT:

I think she's going to —

I'm going to

take it for "she sighed," if I understood right, but beyond
that I don't know why.
THE WITNESS:

And I just motioned to her it was okay,

and then that's when ray radio went off.
Qm

BY

A

My radio beeped and that meant that somebody was on

MS#

WASHBURN:

What do you mean your radio went

off?

the line for m e , and I stood up and I was getting pretty
nervous because he was getting right in my iace and just kept
calling m e a fucking bitch, and so I just pushed in my radio

—

it's a two-way radio with maintenance and with anybody in
housing authoj J I y thai iiniii nirHm; to iiadiu, HIT id 1 just pu lied
it in and held it to the side of m e when he was in my face.
y

Why did you push that button in?

A

Bec au s e I wa s get I: ing pi: e11y nei M ous , he wa s gett ing
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Q.

BY MS. WASHBURN:

Ms. Rico, in addition to being the

2

manager over at the Senior Highrise, do you have other job

3

responsibilities at the housing authority?

4

A.

Yes, I do.

5

Q.

Do those responsibilities include doing evictions,

6

preparing paperwork for evictions?

7

A.

8

buildings*

9

Q.

Yes, I do.

I work with the evictions and manage other

Do you also have occasion or have an understanding of

10

the grievance procedure of the Housing Authority of Salt Lake

11

County?

12

A.

Yes, I do.

13

Q.

Can you please tell us how that grievance procedure

14

works?

15

A.

It depends on which eviction that we serve a client.

16

Q.

For example, if you are evicting a tenant for a

17

criminal activity, is that tenant allowed to petition for a

18

grievance?

19

A.

No.

20

Q.

That's the 100 percent policy of the housing

21

authority?

22

A.

Yes, it is.

23

Q.

No exceptions are ever made?

24

A.

No.

25

Q.

If you are evicting somebody for nonpayment of rent—

-211

MR. HARRIS: Objection hearsay.

2

THE COURT:

3

someone who is not a party.

4
5

Q.

I'll sustain it on that ground (inaudible)

BY MS. WASHBURN:

Ms. Rico, you indicated that Ms.

Poulton came into the room.

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

You indicated that she did speak to you.

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Did you see Ms. Poulton at any time prior to her

10

walking in within like five minutes prior to her walking in?

11

A.

No,

12

Q.

Following this incident did you report it to anybody?

13

A

Well, a- => a matter of fac: it right after —

I told Daphne

14

that I was fine and to go on about her business.

15

the office, and then the phone started ringing, my cell phone

16

started ringing and the nadio phone started ringing. My

17

director, Roy House, had called me to ask me if I was okay.

18

The dispatcher—

19
20

I stayed in

HARRIS: Objection, your Honor, this is all along
the same lines.

21

THE COURT:

Yeah, I think the question that was

22

asked —

23

or no and now we're going through a long discourse, so I think

24

(inaudible).

25

Q

I can't remember what it was but it seemed like a yes

BY MS. R I C O :

Ms. Rico, who did you contact regarding

-251

Q.

Who makes the decision whether or not to grant or deny

2

a grievance hearing?

3

MR. HARRIS:

Your Honor, I still don't think that she

4

has found sufficient foundation (inaudible) that she is

5

qualified to testify as to the grievance process and who's

6

entitled (inaudible).

7
8
9

THE COURT: Well, I think there's foundation, so I'll
overrule that.
Q.

BY MS. WASHBURN:

Ms. Rico, can you please tell the

10

Court who it is that makes a decision — who makes the decision

11

regarding whether or not somebody who asks for a grievance

12

hearing gets one?

13

A.

Well, we always give a grievance hearing if it's not a

14

criminal activity.

15

three day eviction, they have a right to an informal hearing

16

and they have a right to a formal, so I don't get to make that

17

decision, but if it's criminal activity it's a three day with

18

no hearing at all.

19

Q.

Eviction that's been served, if it's the

Do you, in your responsibilities at the housing

20

authority, prepare notices to terminate the tenancy of

21

defendants —

pardon me, tenants?

22

A.

Yes, I do all the time.

23

Q.

In your preparation of those notices do you include a

24

provision whether or not the tenant is entitled to a grievance

25

hearing?

-23-

Q.

BY MS. WASHBURN:

Ms. Rico, in addition to being the

manager over at the Senior Highrise, do you have other job
responsibilities at the housing authority?

A.

Yes,

Q.

Do those responsibilities include doing evictions,

I do.

preparing paperwork for evictions?

A.

Yes,

I do.

I work with the evictions and manage other

buildings.

Q.

Do you also have occasion or have an understanding of

the grievance procedure of the Housing Authority of Salt Lake
County?

A.

Yes,

I do.
please 1: e ] ] u s how th a t gr i evance proc edure

works?
It depends on which eviction that we serve a client.
FLU. example, if you are evicting a tenant for a
criminal activity, is that tenant allowed to petition for a
grievance?
No.
That:' s the 100 percent policy of the housing
authority?

A.

Yes,

Q

No exceptions are ever made?

A

No

Q

I f you nurf;" e v i r t i n 1.1 s omeb<) < i y f < "> r n o n pa y m e n I. o J, r e n t —

it is
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Q.

That letter threatened eviction; is that correct?

2

A,

I stated to him that it is at no —

3

it was —

4

future, that yes, he could be evicted.

at any time that

that it was not, but if it kept continuing in the

5

Q.

6

eviction?

7

A.

It's not a threat.

8

Q.

But you told him that you would evict him if he

9
10
11
12

So your answer would be yes, there was a threat of

continued calling people that name, correct?
A.

Yes.
MR. HARRIS:

I have nothing further of this witness,

your Honor.

13

THE COURT:

14

MS. WASHBURN:

15

THE COURT:

16
17
18
19
20

Anything else, Ms. Washburn?
No, thank you, your Honor.

Thank you, Ms. Rico, you can step down and

take your seat.
MS. WASHBURN:

Your Honor, at the present time I'd

like to call Daphne Poulton.
MR. HARRIS:

Can I object to this witness as not

having any relevant information?

21

THE COURT:

22

Poulton, to the stand here.

23

ruling when I've not heard a word from her.

24
25

I can hardly answer that.

COURT CLERK:

Come, Ms.

I don't think I can give you a

You do solemnly swear that the testimony

you are about to give in this case now pending before the Court

-251

Q.

Who makes the decision whether or not to grant or deny

2

a grievance hearing?

3

MR. HARRIS:

Your Honor, I still don't think that she

4

has found sufficient foundation (inaudible) that she is

5

qualified to testify as to the grievance process and who's

6

entitled (inaudible).

7
8
9

THE COURT: Well, I think there's foundation, so I'll
overrule that.
Q.

BY MS. WASHBURN:

Ms. Rico, can you please tell the

10

Court who it is that makes a decision — who makes the decision

11

regarding whether or not somebody who asks for a grievance

12

hearing gets one?

13

A.

Well, we always give a grievance hearing if it's not a

14

criminal activity.

15

three day eviction, they have a right to an informal hearing

16

and they have a right to a formal, so I don't get to make that

17

decision, but if it's criminal activity it's a three day with

18

no hearing at all.

19

Q.

Eviction that's been served, if it's the

Do you, in your responsibilities at the housing

20

authority, prepare notices to terminate the tenancy

21

defendants —

22

pardon me, tenants?

Yes, I do all the time.

23

c • ui: pi e p a i:a t i o n, o £ t h o s e n o t i c e s d o y o u inc 1 i:ide a

24

provision whether or not the tenant is entitled to a grievance

25

hearing?
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2
3
4

Q.

to the best of your recollection?
A.

I got off the elevator and when I was coming — you

could hear him screaming obscenities right from the get-go.

5
6

Can you please tell the Court what happened that day,

MR. HARRIS: Objection, your Honor.

We don't know

whether she can see him—

7

THE COURT:

I think that's something you can cross

8

examine her in the trial, whether or not she knows him, how she

9

knows it's him.

I think the statement she has made in response

10

to the answer is an appropriate response to the question, and

11

so you are open to cross examination on that.

12
13
14

Q.

BY MS. WASHBURN:

that it was Mr. Snyder?
A.

I did not.

Ms. Poulton, how is it that you knew

Did you know at that point in time?

I heard them yelling and "fucking bitch"

15

is what I kept hearing and things like this, and I thought,

16

"Julie is in there alone."

17

there.

18

Q.

How close is the elevator to t h e —

19

A.

Quite a ways.

20

Q.

Pardon me?

21

A.

Quite a ways.

I had no idea that Sherri was

From the front door almost to the front

22

door to the very back door, the elevator is right by the very

23

back door, so I don't know in terms of feet how that would be,

24

but it's quite a ways, and when you can hear, it would be from

25

here to the back.

I would be getting out coming in that way
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Q.

That letter threatened eviction; is that correct?

2

A.

I stated to him that it is at no —

3

it was —

4

future, that yes, he could be evicted.

at any time that

that it was not, but if it kept continuing in the

5

Q.

6

eviction?

7

A.

It's not a threat.

8

Q.

But you told him that you would evict him if he

9
10
11
12

So your answer would be yes, there was a threat of

continued calling people that name, correct?
A.

Yes.
MR. HARRIS:

I have nothing further of this witness,

your Honor.

13

THE COURT:

14

MS. WASHBURN:

15

THE COURT:

16
17

Anything else, Ms. Washburn?
No, thank you, your Honor.

Thank you, Ms. Rico, you can step down and

take your seat.
MS. WASHBURN:

Your Honor, at the present time I'd

18

like to call Daphne Poulton.

19

MR. HARRIS:

20
21

Can I object to this witness as not

having any relevant information?
THE COURT:

I can hardly answer that.

22

Poulton, to the stand here.

23

ruling when I've not heard a word from her.

24
25

COURT CLERK:

Come, Ms.

I don't think I can give you a

You do solemnly swear that the testimony

you are about to give in this case now pending before the Court
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by the door there coming out.

2

desk and he's coming out.

3

exactly remember exactly what he said.

4

bitch," and something about pulling about your socks or

5

stockings or something —

6

said he used.

7

through with you yet," and it sounded very threatening to me.

8
9

He's on the other side of the

He said —

let's see, I'm trying to
He said, "You fucking

pantyhose, I guess, is the word they

I didn't remember exactly except that, "I'm not

I looked over and they both looked very frightened.
He didn't see me there when I was standing there.

He did see

10

me —

11

and I was standing there.

12

Sherri said, "Everything is fine, just do what you have to do."

13

he bumped practically into me when he came out the door,

Q.

I asked them if they were all right.

Now when you—

14

MR. HARRIS: Objection, hearsay, on that, your Honor.

15

THE COURT:

16
17

Q.

On Sherri's statement (inaudible).

BY MS. WASHBURN:

Earlier you indicated, "Tom."

is Tom?

18

A.

Tom is the defendant here.

19

Q.

Mr. Snyder?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Who

I didn't know his last name.

I've never really

paid much attention to last names there.

22

Q.

So you just know him as Tom?

23

A.

Tom, uh-huh.

24

Q.

You indicated that you had looked in and looked around

25

and you saw the two of them, they were both frightened.

Who
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2
3

Q.

Can you please tell the Court what happened that day,

to the best of your recollection?
A.

I got off the elevator and when I was coming — you

4

could hear him screaming obscenities right from the get-go.

5

MR. HARRIS: Objection, your Honor. We don't know

6

whether she can see him—

7

THE COURT:

I think that's something you can cross

8

examine her in the trial, whether or not she knows him, how she

9

knows it's him.

I think the statement she has made in response

10

to the answer is an appropriate response to the question, and

11

so you are open to cross examination on that.

12
13
14

Q.

BY MS. WASHBURN:

that it was Mr. Snyder?
A.

I did not.

Ms. Poulton, how is it that you knew

Did you know at that point in time?

I heard them yelling and "fucking bitch"

15

is what I kept hearing and things like this, and I thought,

16

"Julie is in there alone."

17

there.

18

Q.

How close is the elevator to the—

19

A.

Quite a ways.

20

Q.

Pardon me?

21

A.

Quite a ways.

I had no idea that Sherri was

From the front door almost to the front

22

door to the very back door, the elevator is right by the very

23

back door, so I don't know in terms of feet how that would be,

24

but it's quite a ways, and when you can hear, it would be from

25

here to the back.

I would be getting out coming in that way

-331

was closed.

2

A.

Was there a window that allowed you to see inside?

No, I didn't say that, I said when the door opened I

3

looked inside the room.

4

standing there.

He opened the door while I was

5

Q.

So you never saw him in the room interacting with—

6

A.

Not before —

7

I heard him, but I did not see him until

he opened the door.

8

Q.

So you heard him swearing—

9

A.

Swearing, yes, profusely.

10

Q.

You didn't see him —

11

A.

No, only when he was screaming at them as he opened

12

the door.

you didn't see him interacting.

13

Q.

So he opened the door leaving at that point?

14

A.

He was still standing there, and then he left.

15

He

didn't just walk out the door the minute he opened the door.

16

Q.

But you didn't see him—

17

A.

He had a few things to say.

18

Q.

But you didn't see him doing anything threatening—

19

A.

No, I heard the threatening—

20

Q.

(Inaudible) did you see him moving towards Sherri

21
22

Rico?
A.

He was already right on the edge of the desk. No,

23

there wasn't any further —

he was ready to go, but he was

24

still making his final exit.

25

MR. HARRIS:

Thank you, I have nothing further, your

-311

by the door there coming out.

2

desk and he's coming out.

3

exactly remember exactly what he said.

4

bitch," and something about pulling about your socks or

5

stockings or something —

6

said he used.

7

through with you yet," and it sounded very threatening to me.

8
9

He's on the other side of the

He said —

let's see, I'm trying to
He said, "You fucking

pantyhose, I guess, is the word they

I didn't remember exactly except that, "I'm not

I looked over and they both looked very frightened.
He didn't see me there when I was standing there.

He did see

10

me —

11

and I was standing there.

12

Sherri said, "Everything is fine, just do what you have to do."

13

he bumped practically into me when he came out the door,

Q.

I asked them if they were all right.

Now when you—

14

MR. HARRIS: Objection, hearsay, on that, your Honor.

15

THE COURT: On Sherri's statement (inaudible).

16
17

Q.

BY MS. WASHBURN:

Earlier you indicated, "Tom."

is Tom?

18

A.

Tom is the defendant here.

19

Q.

Mr. Snyder?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Who

I didn't know his last name.

I've never really

paid much attention to last names there.

22

Q.

So you just know him as Tom?

23

A.

Tom, uh-huh.

24

Q.

You indicated that you had looked in and looked around

25

and you saw the two of them, they were both frightened.

Who
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MR- HARRIS:

Thank you.

2

THE COURT:

3

COURT CLERK:

I apologize.

No, no.
You do solemnly swear that the testimony

4

you are about to give in this case now pending before the Court

5

will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,

6

so help you God?

7

THE WITNESS:

I do.

8

CALVIN TROWBRIDGE

9

having been first duly sworn,

10

testifies as follows:

11

DIRECT EXAMINATION

12
13
14

BY MS. WASHBURN:
Q.

Good afternoon, Mr. Trowbridge.

Can you please state

your name and spell your last name for the record?

15

A.

Calvin Trowbridge, T-r-o-w-b-r-i-d-g-e.

16

Q.

Mr. Trowbridge, can you tell the Court where you are

17

employed?

18

A.

I work for Salt Lake County Housing Authority.

19

Q.

What do you do for that authority?

20

A.

I'm facilities specialist.

21

Q.

What does that mean?

22 I

A.

It's a maintenance man.

23

Q.

Do you have occasion to do that kind of work at the

24
25

Senior Highrise?
A.

That's one of my buildings.
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was closed.

2

A.

Was there a window that allowed you to see inside?

No, I didn't say that, I said when the door opened I

3

looked inside the room.

4

standing there.

He opened the door while I was

5

Q.

So you never saw him in the room interacting with—

6

A.

Not before —

7

I heard him, but I did not see him until

he opened the door.

8

Q.

So you heard him swearing—

9

A.

Swearing, yes, profusely.

10

Q.

You didn't see him —

11

A.

No, only when he was screaming at them as he opened

12

the door.

you didn't see him interacting.

13

Q.

So he opened the door leaving at that point?

14

A.

He was still standing there, and then he left. He

15

didn't just walk out the door the minute he opened the door.

16

Q.

But you didn't see him—

17

A.

He had a few things to say.

18

Q.

But you didn't see him doing anything threatening—

19

A.

No, I heard the threatening—

20

Q.

(Inaudible) did you see him moving towards Sherri

21
22

Rico?
A.

He was already right on the edge of the desk. No,

23

there wasn't any further —

he was ready to go, but he was

24

still making his final exit.

25

MR. HARRIS:

Thank you, I have nothing further, your

-371
2

Q.

So you heard two voices coming across the radio; is

that it?

3

A.

Right.

4

Q.

What did you hear?

5

A,

I heard a lot of yelling and a lot of name calling.

6

Tom Snyder was pretty irritated or upset.

7

THE COURT:

Well, I think that's speculative.

8

want to hear is what you heard.

9

I have to conclude whether he was upset or not.

10

What we

Like I heard somebody say, and

THE WITNESS: All right.

I heard him say —

I heard

11

him call her a bitch a few times — well, a fucking bitch. I

12

heard him say that —

13

few times, and when he called her that she asked him to call

14

her Sherri.

15

His voice started getting louder.

16

Sherri so I went to try to find some help to see if I could get

17

somebody over there.

18

Q.

I heard him call her missy and honey a

I heard him say — well, tell her to fuck off.

BY MS. WASHBURN:

I became concerned for

You just indicated that you became

19

concerned for Sherri. Can you tell us what facts led you to

20

the conclusion that you should be concerned for her?

21

A.

This conversation was being over the radio, and I

22

could hear him like he was standing right next to me, and it

23*

w a s loud.

He w a s yelling.

24

Q.

So his voice was loud?

25

A.

Right.
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MR. HARRIS: Thank you.

2

THE COURT: No, no.

3

COURT CLERK:

I apologize.

You do solemnly swear that the testimony

4

you are about to give in this case now pending before the Court

5

will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,

6

so help you God?

7

THE WITNESS:

I do.

8

CALVIN TROWBRIDGE

9

having been first duly sworn,

10

testifies as follows:

11

DIRECT EXAMINATION

12
13
14

BY MS. WASHBURN:
Q.

Good afternoon, Mr. Trowbridge.

Can you please state

your name and spell your last name for the record?

15

A.

Calvin Trowbridge, T-r-o-w-b-r-i-d-g-e.

16

Q.

Mr. Trowbridge, can you tell the Court where you are

17

employed?

18

A.

I work for Salt Lake County Housing Authority.

19

Q.

What do you do for that authority?

20

A.

I'm facilities specialist.

21

Q.

What does that mean?

22 I

A.

It's a maintenance man.

23

Q.

Do you have occasion to do that kind of work at the

24
25

Senior Highrise?
A.

That's one of my buildings.
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form?

2

A.

No, I didn't see anything.

3

Q.

All you heard on the radio was him calling her names;

4
5

is that correct?
A.

Right.

6

MR. HARRIS:

7

THE COURT:

8

MS. WASHBURN:

9

THE COURT:

10

I have nothing further, your Honor.
Anything else, Ms. Washburn?
No, thank you, your Honor.

Thank you, Mr. Trowbridge, you may step

down.

11

MS. WASHBURN:

Your Honor, at this time the housing

12

authority would move to admit the deposition of Julie Keyou as

13

testimony.

14

stipulate that Ms. Keyou is not available at the time of trial.

15

As indicated earlier counsel for defendant did

MR. HARRIS:

Your Honor, I only received this

16

motion —

I'm sorry, I only received this response this

17

morning.

I haven't had a chance to look it over very well.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. HARRIS:

You mean the deposition?
The deposition, that's correct.

The

20

information that I did look at it I think is highly suspect. I

21

think there is —

22

your Honor, is to cross examine to see—

23
24
25

I mean the whole point I'm having (inaudible)

THE COURT:

Sure enough, what do you think about that?

Who was present when the deposition was taking place?
MS. WASHBURN:

Your Honor, I was, Ms. Keyou was
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So you heard two voices coming across the radio; is

that it?
A.

Right.

Q.

What did you hear?

A.

I heard a lot of yelling and a lot of name calling,

Tom Snyder was pretty irritated or upset.
THE COURT: Well, I think that's speculative.
want to hear is what you heard.

What we

Like I heard somebody say, and

I have to conclude whether he was upset or not.
THE WITNESS: All right.

I heard him say —

I heard

him call her a bitch a few times — well, a fucking bitch. I
heard him say that —

I heard him call her missy and honey a

few times, and when he called her that she asked him to call
her Sherri.

I heard him say — well, tell her to fuck off.

His voice started getting louder.

I became concerned for

Sherri so I went to try to find some help to see if I could get
somebody over there.
Q.

BY MS. WASHBURN:

You just indicated that you became

concerned for Sherri. Can you tell us what facts led you to
the conclusion that you should be concerned for her?
A.

This conversation was being over the radio, and I

could hear him like he was standing right next to me, and it
was loud.

He was yelling.

Q.

So his voice was loud?

A.

Right.
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were involved and that we needed to be part of this deposition

2

in order to ensure that the testimony that you would receive

3

would be valid testimony.

4

THE COURT: Well, I think the problem is, clearly, the

5

lack of adversarial context, so I think I'm going to sustain

6

the objection and not allow it in.

7

MR. HARRIS: Thank you, your Honor.

8

THE COURT:

9

MS. WASHBURN:

10

Go ahead, Ms. Washburn, any (inaudible).
Your Honor, I would call Detective Jim

Alcock.

11

COURT CLERK:

You do solemnly swear that the testimony

12

you are about to give in this case now pending before the Court

13

will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,

14

so help you God?

15

THE WITNESS:

I do.

16

JIM ALCOCK

17

having been first duly sworn,

18

testifies as follows:

19

DIRECT EXAMINATION

20

BY MS. WASHBURN:

21

Q.

Good afternoon, Officer.

22

A.

Good afternoon.

23

Q.

Could you please state your name for the record and

24
25

spell your last name?
A.

James Michael Alcock, A-1-c-o-c-k.

-391

form?

2

A.

No, I didn't see anything.

3

Q.

All you heard on the radio was him calling her names;

4
5

is that correct?
A.

Right.

6

MR. HARRIS:

7

THE COURT: Anything else, Ms. Washburn?

8

MS. WASHBURN:

9

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Trowbridge, you may step

10

I have nothing further, your Honor.

No, thank you, your Honor.

down.

11

MS. WASHBURN:

Your Honor, at this time the housing

12

authority would move to admit the deposition of Julie Keyou as

13

testimony.

14

stipulate that Ms. Keyou is not available at the time of trial.

15

MR. HARRIS: Your Honor, I only received this

As indicated earlier counsel for defendant did

16

motion —

I'm sorry, I only received this response this

17

morning.

I haven't had a chance to look it over very well.

18

THE COURT:

You mean the deposition?

19

MR. HARRIS: The deposition, that's correct. The

20

information that I did look at it I think is highly suspect. I

21

think there is —

22

your Honor, is to cross examine to see—

23
24
25

I mean the whole point I'm having (inaudible)

THE COURT:

Sure enough, what do you think about that?

Who was present when the deposition was taking place?
MS. WASHBURN:

Your Honor, I was, Ms. Keyou was
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Q.

You heard Ms. Rico testify that she was basically

—

2

Mr. Snyder said to her quote, "you better pull up your fucking

3

pantyhose, you fucking bitch, we're going to go the rounds,"

4

end quote.

5

constitute an assault under Utah law?

6

A.

7
8

In your mind based on your experience, did that

Yes, ma'am.
MR. HARRIS: Objection, your Honor, I think this is

hearsay and I —

9

THE COURT:

I don't think it's hearsay.

I think if

10

one can be an expert on what a crime is, Detective Alcock

11

probably is such an expert, and so you can offer the opinion.

12

I think you're certainly entitled to pursue how he gets to

13

those opinions on cross examination if you want, but I see no

14

foundational or evidentiary prohibitions (inaudible).

15

Q.

BY MS. WASHBURN:

Also, Mr. Alcock, Ms. Rico testified

16

that Mr. Snyder said to her something along the lines, quote,

17

"I've got to leave now, I'm not through with you, or we're not

18

finished yet," end quote, in addition to some other swearing.

19

Would that also constitute an assault under Utah criminal law?

20

A.

Yes, ma'am.

21

Q.

It's my understanding that the decision whether or not

22

to pursue a case is not left to the police officer or the

23

police department; is that accurate?

24
25

A.

It depends on what type of case you're referring to.

With respect to misdemeanor cases that do not occur in the

-411

were involved and that we needed to be part of this deposition

2

in order to ensure that the testimony that you would receive

3

would be valid testimony.

4

THE COURT:

Well, I think the problem is, clearly, the

5

lack of adversarial context, so I think I'm going to sustain

6

the objection and not allow it in.

7

MR. HARRIS:

8

THE COURT:

9

MS. WASHBURN:

10

Thank you, your Honor.
Go ahead, Ms. Washburn, any (inaudible).
Your Honor, I would call Detective Jim

Alcock.

11

COURT CLERK:

You do solemnly swear that the testimony

12

you are about to give in this case now pending before the Court

13

will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,

14

so help you God?

15

THE WITNESS:

I do,

16

JIM ALCOCK

17

having been first duly sworn,

18

testifies as follows:

19

DIRECT EXAMINATION

20

BY MS. WASHBURN:

21

Q.

Good afternoon, Officer.

22

A.

Good afternoon.

23

Q.

Could you please state your name for the record and

24
25

spell your last name?
A.

James Michael Alcock, A-1-c-o-c-k,
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A.

No, I did not.

2

Q.

Is it your routine practice to interview an alleged

3
4

perpetrator in a crime?
A.

At the stage that we were in with respect to this

5

case, at that stage we try and resolve these issues at the

6

lowest possible level before applying great amounts of

7

resources into investigations.

8

Rico at that time on the 24th, and I faxed her a copy of what

9

we entitled a cease and desist letter wherein it is outlined by

10

Ms. Rico that she wished to have absolutely no contact, verbal,

11

written, physical or any other type of contact with Mr. Snyder.

12

We let it go at that point in time.

This was discussed with Ms.

13

Up until we have what I would call general intent. If

14

there is a violation of a cease and desist order by the victim,

15

then—

16

Q.

You served that cease and desist order o n —

17

A.

That is either served by certified mail, and in this

18

case with Ms. Rico, I would assume it was served by herself or

19

another employee at the facility.

20
21
22

Q.

So you don't know whether or not that gets from the

alleged victim to the alleged perpetrator?
A.

No, at that point with this investigation it was her

23

responsibility to serve that paper or to see that it was

24

served, and then maintain a copy and/or if she was to send it

25

by certified mail, to maintain the receipt in a file with

-431

Q.

You heard Ms. Rico testify that she was basically —
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Mr. Snyder said to her quote, "you better pull up your fucking

3

pantyhose, you fucking bitch, we're going to go the rounds,"

4

end quote.

5

constitute an assault under Utah law?

6

A.

7
8

In your mind based on your experience, did that

Yes, ma'am.
MR. HARRIS: Objection, your Honor, I think this is

hearsay and I —

9

THE COURT:

I don't think it's hearsay.

I think if

10

one can be an expert on what a crime is, Detective Alcock

11

probably is such an expert, and so you can offer the opinion.

12

I think you're certainly entitled to pursue how he gets to

13

those opinions on cross examination if you want, but I see no

14

foundational or evidentiary prohibitions (inaudible).

15

Q.

BY MS. WASHBURN:

Also, Mr. Alcock, Ms. Rico testified

16

that Mr. Snyder said to her something along the lines, quote,

17

"I've got to leave now, I'm not through with you, or we're not

18

finished yet," end quote, in addition to some other swearing.

19

Would that also constitute an assault under Utah criminal law?

20

A.

Yes, ma'am.

21

Q.

It's my understanding that the decision whether or not

22

to pursue a case is not left to the police officer or the

23

police department; is that accurate?

24
25

A.

It depends on what type of case you're referring to.

With respect to misdemeanor cases that do not occur in the

-471

of the police report?

2

A.

I do•

3

Q.

I thought I heard you say that the report was March

4

24th, 2000.

5

A.

No, that's the date that I became aware of the report.

6

I was not in a position at that point in time on February 23rd

7

to be assigning cases

8

this report until Ms, Rico contacted me.

I am now and I wasn't even aware of

MS. WASHBURN :

9

That's all, your Honor.

10

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Harris?

11

MR. HARRIS:

12

THE COURT: 'rhank you, Detective.

13

MS. WASHBURN :

14

No, your Honor.

Your Honor, the plaintiffs would call

Roy House.
COURT CLERK:

15

You do solemnly swear that the testimony

16

you are about to give in this case now pending before the Court

17

will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but, the truth,

18

so help you God?
THE WITNESS:

19
20

///

21

///

22

///

Yes.

23
24

ROY HOUSE

25

having been first duly sworn,
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A.

No, I did not.

2

Q.

Is it your routine practice to interview an alleged

3
4

perpetrator in a crime?
A.

At the stage that we were in with respect to this

5

case, at that stage we try and resolve these issues at the

6

lowest possible level before applying great amounts of

7

resources into investigations.

8

Rico at that time on the 24th, and I faxed her a copy of what

9

we entitled a cease and desist letter wherein it is outlined by

10

Ms. Rico that she wished to have absolutely no contact, verbal,

11

written, physical or any other type of contact with Mr. Snyder.

12

We let it go at that point in time.

This was discussed with Ms.

13

Up until we have what I would call general intent. If

14

there is a violation of a cease and desist order by the victim,

15

then—

16

Q.

You served that cease and desist order o n —

17

A.

That is either served by certified mail, and in this

18

case with Ms. Rico, I would assume it was served by herself or

19

another employee at the facility.

20
21
22

Q.

So you don't know whether or not that gets from the

alleged victim to the alleged perpetrator?
A.

No, at that point with this investigation it was her

23

responsibility to serve that paper or to see that it was

24

served, and then maintain a copy and/or if she was to send it

25

by certified mail, to maintain the receipt in a file with

1

A.

At 1966 South 200 East, yes.

2

Q.

Is the housing authority also the landlord of that

3

building?

4

A.

That's correct.

5

Q.

Who is the manager of that particular building?

6

A.

Ms. Sherri Rico.

7

Q.

Is there still a document in front of you marked as

8

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1?

9

A.

Yes, it is, a lease agreement.

10

Q.

Yes, can you take a look at that?

11

A.

Sure.

12

Q.

Does that document look familiar to you?

13

A.

It really does.

14

Q.

Why is that?

15

A.

Well, just part of the policies of the housing

16

authority.

17

Q.

18

Is this a similar standard lease agreement that the

housing authority uses?

19

A.

That's correct.

20

Q.

And is it the general practice and procedure of the

21

housing authority for the manager to sign on behalf of the

22

housing authority (inaudible)?

23

A.

That's also correct.

24

Q.

Mr. House, is it your understanding that this

25

particular document used as a form document by the housing
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of the police report?

2

A.

I do.

3

Q.

I thought I heard you say that the report was March

4

24th, 2000,

5

A.

No, that's the date that I became aware of the report.

6

I was not in a position at that point in time on February 23rd

7

to be assigning cases

8

this report until Ms. Rico contacted me.

I am now and I wasn't even aware of

MS. WASHBURN :

9

That's all, your Honor.

10

THE COURT: ,Anything else, Mr. Harris?

11

MR. HARRIS:

12

THE COURT: •rhank you, Detective.

13

MS. WASHBURN :

14

No, your Honor.

Your Honor, the plaintiffs would call

Roy House.
COURT CLERK:

15

You do solemnly swear that the testimony

16

you are about to give in this case now pending before the Court

17

will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,

18

so help you God?
THE WITNESS:

19
20

///

21

///

22

///

Yes.

23
24

ROY HOUSE

25

having been first duly sworn,
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Rico, I was contacted later by Ms, Rico, yes.

2

Q.

Did she fill you in on the details of that incident?

3 I

A.

Yes, she did.

4

Q.

In your position over the housing authority, do you

5

make decisions concerning whether or not an eviction procedure

6

should be started?

7

A.

I really don't make those —

I think the lease

8

agreement really speaks for itself, but the staff — we do talk

9

about different crimes and problems.

10

Q.

11

So for example, in this case, it's obvious that a

decision was made to pursue an eviction against Mr. Snyder.

12

A.

That's correct.

13

Q.

How is that that decision was made?

14

A.

Because we felt that the staff was in danger based on

15

what she told me, and we made that decision to maybe do through

16

an eviction procedure with Mr. Snyder.

17

Q.

Mr. House, you said "we," who are we?

18

A.

We are myself and Ms. Rico.

19

Q.

Did anybody else participate in your decision whether

20

or not to pursue this?

21
22

A.

I talked to my director and some other sources within

the housing authority, yes.

23

<}•

Did you contact counsel as well?

24 I

A.

As well, yes, we did.

25

Q.

You made a determination to proceed with the eviction,

1

A.

At 1966 South 200 East, yes.

2

Q.

Is the housing authority also the landlord of that

3

building?

4

A.

That's correct.

5

Q.

Who is the manager of that particular building?

6

A.

Ms. Sherri Rico.

7

Q.

Is there still a document in front of you marked as

8

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1?

9

A.

Yes, it is, a lease agreement.

10

Q.

Yes, can you take a look at that?

11

A.

Sure.

12

Q.

Does that document look familiar to you?

13

A.

It really does.

14

Q.

Why is that?

15

A.

Well, just part of the policies of the housing

16

authority.

17

Q.

18

Is this a similar standard lease agreement that the

housing authority uses?

19

A.

That's correct.

20

Q.

And is it the general practice and procedure of the

21

housing authority for the manager to sign on behalf of the

22

housing authority (inaudible)?

23

A.

That's also correct.

24

Q.

Mr. House, is it your understanding that this

25

particular document used as a form document by the housing
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A.

That's correct.

2

Q.

R. House is for Roy House?

3

A.

Uh-huh.

4

Q.

Prior to signing it did you review the (inaudible)

5

termination of this agreement?

6 I

A.

Yes, I did.

7 J

Q.

Based on your experience, 23 and a half years

8

experience and knowledge of the procedures of the housing

9

authority, does this notice purport what you understand to be

10

required?

11

A.

That's correct.

12

Q.

Will you please turn to the third page attached to

13

that document. What is that—

14

MR. HARRIS: Your Honor, we'll stipulate that this is

15

the three day notice that was served upon Mr. Snyder.

16

know if she wants —

17

foundation.

18
19

THE COURT:

if she's still trying to (inaudible)

You stipulate that that notice got served

on him about when?

20

MR. HARRIS: Yes.

21

THE WITNESS:

22

THE COURT:

23

It w a s —
(Inaudible) if you're going to stipulate

(inaudible).

24
25

I don't

MR. HARRIS:
2/25/00.

The return of service says that it was
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Rico, I was contacted later by Ms. Rico, yes.

2

Q.

Did she fill you in on the details of that incident?

3

A.

Yes, she did.

4

Q.

In your position over the housing authority, do you

5

make decisions concerning whether or not an eviction procedure

6

should be started?

7

A.

I really don't make those —

I think the lease

8

agreement really speaks for itself, but the staff — we do talk

9

about different crimes and problems.

10
11

Q.

So for example, in this case, it's obvious that a

decision was made to pursue an eviction against Mr. Snyder.

12

A.

That's correct.

13

Q.

How is that that decision was made?

14

A.

Because we felt that the staff was in danger based on

15

what she told me, and we made that decision to maybe do through

16

an eviction procedure with Mr. Snyder.

17

Q.

Mr. House, you said "we," who are we?

18

A.

We are myself and Ms. Rico.

19

Q.

Did anybody else participate in your decision whether

20
21
22

or not to pursue this?
A.

I talked to my director and some other sources within

the housing authority, yes.

23

Q.

Did you contact counsel as well?

24 I

A.

As well, yes, we did.

25

Q.

You made a determination to proceed with the eviction,
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federal (inaudible) as well as state?

2

A.

That's for sure.

3

Q.

So as a matter of right, if I understand you

4

correctly, if they get served with a 30 day notice, a tenant

5

does, then they can request a grievance?

6

A.

A grievance, right.

7

Q.

If hypothetically an individual tenant were to be

8

evicted for non-payment of rent, are they also allowed to

9

request a grievance hearing?

10

A.

Yes, they are, but there again, we serve a 14 day

11

notice.

If in the event the rent is not paid by the 5th or 6th

12

day of the month, then we'll serve another notice to a

13

resident.

14

Q.

And that's a 14 day notice?

15

A.

That's a 14 day and that's federal law.

16

Q.

That's federal law.

17

A.

Yes. The state law is three day notice.

18

Q.

Now is it the housing authority's normal procedure on

19

something that's alleged to be criminal, what kind of notice

20

does the housing authority serve?

21

A.

If it's a threat to health, safety of staff and also

22

residents we serve a three day notice, for drug activities and

23

that type of thing, yes.

24
25

Q.

So any kind of criminal activity, significant in your

mind, would (inaudible).
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1

A.

That's correct.

2

Q.

R. House is for Roy House?

3

A.

Uh-huh.

4

Q.

Prior to signing it did you review the (inaudible)

5

termination of this agreement?

6

A.

Yes, I did.

7

Q.

Based on your experience, 23 and a half years

8

experience and knowledge of the procedures of the housing

9

authority, does this notice purport what you understand to be

10

required?

11

A.

That's correct.

12

Q.

Will you please turn to the third page attached to

13

that document.

14

What is that—

MR. HARRIS:

Your Honor, we'll stipulate that this is

15

the three day notice that was served upon Mr. Snyder.

16

know if she wants —

17

foundation.

18
19

THE COURT:

if she's still trying to (inaudible)

You stipulate that that notice got served

on him about when?

20

MR. HARRIS:

21

THE WITNESS:

22

THE COURT:

23

Yes.
It w a s —
(Inaudible) if you're going to stipulate

(inaudible).

24
25

I don't

MR. HARRIS:
2/25/00.

The return of service says that it was
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2
3
4
5

THE WITNESS:

You said the bottom of page 5, and that

says 6, 5 and 6.
Q.

BY MS. WASHBURN:

Correct.

Mr. House, can you please

read paragraph 17?
A.

"The lease termination.

A resident may terminate this

6

lease upon the 30 day notice in compliance with paragraph 16,"

7

is that what you're talking about?

8

Q.

Correct.

9

A.

Okay.

"A resident will leave the premises in a clean

10

and safe condition and return all keys to the housing

11

authority."

12

Q.

Yes.

13

A.

"Housing authority will evict residents from non-

Keep reading?

14

payment of rent, non-payment of other financial obligation due

15

and a (inaudible) of the lease, making any false and misleading

16

statements concerning information required by the housing

17

authority, criminal activities that threaten the health, safety

18

or the rights of people (inaudible) residents, by other

19

residents (inaudible) criminal activities at or near the

20

premises, repeated failure to comply with any resident

21

obligation (inaudible) or for other good cause."

22
23

Q.

Mr. House, is it your understanding —

earlier that (inaudible).

24

A.

Uh-huh.

25

Q.

Right?

you testified

-55federal (inaudible) as well as state?
A.

That's for sure.

Q.

So as a matter of right, if I understand you

correctly, if they get served with a 30 day notice, a tenant
does, then they can request a grievance?
A.

A grievance, right.

Q.

If hypothetically an individual tenant were to be

evicted for non-payment of rent, are they also allowed to
request a grievance hearing?
A.

Yes, they are, but there again, we serve a 14 day

notice.

If in the event the rent is not paid by the 5th or 6th

day of the month, then we'll serve another notice to a
resident.
Q.

And that's a 14 day notice?

A.

That's a 14 day and that's federal law.

Q.

That's federal law.

A.

Yes. The state law is three day notice.

Q.

Now is it the housing authority's normal procedure on

something that's alleged to be criminal, what kind of notice
does the housing authority serve?
A.

If it's a threat to health, safety of staff and also

residents we serve a three day notice, for drug activities and
that type of thing, yes.
Q.

So any kind of criminal activity, significant in your

mind, would (inaudible).
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Q.

Are you familiar with that regulation?

2

A.

Well, I don't (inaudible) federal regulation from me,

3

but if I had to call regulation I could tell you about those.

4

MR. HARRIS:

Your Honor, I again am not prepared to

5

cover a trial.

I have a copy of our motion for summary

6

judgment that sets forth that code and I would like to present

7

that perhaps to refresh his memory and have him read that and

8

not present it as evidence, although it is part of the record.

9

We're dealing with that particular section.

May I do so?

10

MS. WASHBURN:

11

MR. HARRIS: That's correct (inaudible).

12

MS. WASHBURN:

13

MR. HARRIS:

14

witness, your Honor?

15
16

Well, is it 966.41?

Maybe I have a copy.

I'd like to present — may I approach the

THE COURT: Yes.
Q.

BY MR. HARRIS:

I'm presenting you with a copy that

17

your attorney has provided me of the code. We're looking at

18

part 966. Turn on this —

19

you see that page?

at the bottom it says page 453. Do

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q*

There's a subsection (f) that's called "tenant's

22

obligation,"

Do you see that?

It's on the second column about

23

maybe three-quarters of the way down on that page,

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

If you'll turn to the next page, then, No. 11. Could

-57THE WITNESS:

You said the bottom of page 5, and that

says 6, 5 and 6.
Q.

BY MS. WASHBURN:

Correct.

Mr. House, can you please

read paragraph 17?
A.

"The lease termination.

A resident may terminate this

lease upon the 30 day notice in compliance with paragraph 16,"
is that what you're talking about?
Q.

Correct.

A.

Okay.

"A resident will leave the premises in a clean

and safe condition and return all keys to the housing
authority."

Keep reading?

Q.

Yes.

A.

"Housing authority will evict residents from non-

payment of rent, non-payment of other financial obligation due
and a (inaudible) of the lease, making any false and misleading
statements concerning information required by the housing
authority, criminal activities that threaten the health, safety
or the rights of people (inaudible) residents, by other
residents (inaudible) criminal activities at or near the
premises, repeated failure to comply with any resident
obligation (inaudible) or for other good cause."
Q.

Mr. House, is it your understanding —

earlier that (inaudible).
A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

Right?

you testified

-61MR. HARRIS:

We believe that the lease that he was

trying to comply with says in fact that —
more behavior than the —
by HUD regulations.

the lease prohibits

as he's testified it required to do

So I want to establish this is what HUD is

able to do and this is what is not.
THE COURT:
the code right now.

Okay, I mean so we're reading —

this is

What more do you want out of that, that's

what I'm trying to get, what (inaudible) to read?
MR. HARRIS:

Your Honor, I want to read what the

federal regulations require, and then I want to read what the
actual lease states.
THE COURT:

Okay.

So do you want him to read it out

loud?
MR. HARRIS:
THE COURT:

Yes, please.
Okay.

THE WITNESS:

Number 11, "To act and cause household

members or guests to act in a meaning which will not disturb
other residents' personal enjoyment of their accommodation.
(Inaudible) will be conducive to (inaudible) the project will
be so safe and in sanitary condition.H
Q.

BY MR. HARRIS:

And can I get you to read 12.1(a) and

(b)?
A.

"To ensure that the tenants," is that 12.1?

Q.

That's correct.

A.

Okay, "To ensure that the tenants, the tenant, any

-59Q.

Are you familiar with that regulation?

A.

Well, I don't (inaudible) federal regulation from me,

but if I had to call regulation I could tell you about those.
MR. HARRIS: Your Honor, I again am not prepared to
cover a trial.

I have a copy of our motion for summary

judgment that sets forth that code and I would like to present
that perhaps to refresh his memory and have him read that and
not present it as evidence, although it is part of the record.
We're dealing with that particular section. May I do so?
MS. WASHBURN:

Well, is it 966.41?

MR. HARRIS: That's correct (inaudible).
MS. WASHBURN:
MR. HARRIS:

Maybe I have a copy.

I'd like to present — may I approach the

witness, your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
Q.

BY MR. HARRIS:

I'm presenting you with a copy that

your attorney has provided me of the code. We're looking at
part 966. Turn on this —

at the bottom it says page 453. Do

you see that page?
A.

Yes*

Q.

There's a subsection (f) that's called "tenant's

obligation."

Do you see that?

It's on the second column about

maybe three-quarters of the way down on that page.
A.

Yes.

Q.

If you'll turn to the next page, then, No. 11. Could
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will act in a manner so that not to disturb any neighbor's

2

peaceful enjoyment or his or her accommodation and refraining

3

from all illegal and criminal activities on or near the

4

premises.

5

up to the use of sale of drugs by the residence, household

6

members or guests or visitors,"

7

Q.

Such illegal activities includes but is not limited

Is there anywhere in there where it prohibits the

8

right of peaceful enjoyment of accommodations by the employees

9

in that particular section as you read it?

10

A.

It did not state the employees, I guess.

11

Q.

Would you agree that it was the Salt Lake County

12

Housing Authority's right to have included that language in

13

this lease agreement?

14
15
16

A.

Well, (inaudible) is an employee.

She's an employee

plus a resident.
Q.

Okay, I asked the question as to whether or not does

17

the county housing authority have the right to incorporate that

18

language in their lease agreement?

19
20
21
22

A.

Yeah/ I guess we could put it in the lease agreement,

yes.
Q.

But it is not in this lease agreement Mr. Snyder

signed; is that correct?

23

A.

That's correct/ he did sign it.

24

Q.

And is that contained as well in the paragraph you

25

read earlier on page 5?
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MR. HARRIS: We believe that the lease that he was

2

trying to comply with says in fact that —

3

more behavior than the —

4

by HUD regulations.

5

able to do and this is what is not.

the lease prohibits

as he's testified it required to do

So I want to establish this is what HUD is

6

THE COURT:

7

the code right now.

8

what I'm trying to get, what (inaudible) to read?

9

Okay, I mean so we're reading —

this is

What more do you want out of that, that's

MR. HARRIS:

Your Honor, I want to read what the

10

federal regulations require, and then I want to read what the

11

actual lease states.

12
13

THE COURT:

Okay.

So do you want him to read it out

loud?

14

MR. HARRIS:

Yes, please.

15

THE COURT:

16

THE WITNESS:

Okay.
Number 11, "To act and cause household

17

members or guests to act in a meaning which will not disturb

18

other residents' personal enjoyment of their accommodation.

19

(Inaudible) will be conducive to (inaudible) the project will

20

be so safe and in sanitary condition."

21

Q.

BY MR. HARRIS: And can I get you to read 12.1(a) and

23

A.

"To ensure that the tenants," is that 12.1?

24

Q.

That's correct.

25

A.

Okay, "To ensure that the tenants, the tenant, any

22

(b)?
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2

THE COURT: Well, we had him qualified a minute ago,
so I'll overrule that one.

3

Q.

BY MR. HARRIS: Could you answer the question, please?

4

A.

Repeat the question again.

5
6

MR. HARRIS: One moment, your Honor.

I lost ray train

of thought, your Honor.

7

THE COURT:

You were trying to have him compare

8

whether the (inaudible) of the agreement (inaudible) were more

9

expansive than the federal regulations.

10

Q.

BY MR. HARRIS: Yes, thank you, your Honor. Would it

11

be your opinion that the lease agreement that Mr. Snyder signed

12

is more expansive and prohibits more activity, more activity

13

than does the code of federal regulations?

14
15
16
17
18

A.

We use the federal regulation CFR's as a guideline in

coming up with our lease agreement.
Q.

So you're not required to follow the code of federal

regulations?
A.

We're required to follow all of the code of

19

regulations, but we use it as a guideline to put together our

20

lease agreements.

21
22
23

Q.

So if you were to put something in that was prohibited

by the code of federal regulations would that be enforceable?
A.

Well, these regulations are approved by the feds, or

24

by HUD, so I'm quite sure if they had any problem with those

25

they would have contacted us.

-63will act in a manner so that not to disturb any neighbor's
peaceful enjoyment or his or her accommodation and refraining
from all illegal and criminal activities on or near the
premises.

Such illegal activities includes but is not limited

up to the use of sale of drugs by the residence, household
members or guests or visitors."
Q.

Is there anywhere in there where it prohibits the

right of peaceful enjoyment of accommodations by the employees
in that particular section as you read it?
A,

It did not state the employees, I guess.

Q.

Would you agree that it was the Salt Lake County

Housing Authority's right to have included that language in
this lease agreement?
A.

Well, (inaudible) is an employee.

She's an employee

plus a resident.
Q.

Okay, I asked the question as to whether or not does

the county housing authority have the right to incorporate that
language in their lease agreement?
A.

Yeah, I guess we could put it in the lease agreement,

yes.
Q.

But it is not in this lease agreement Mr. Snyder

signed; is that correct?
A.

That's correct, he did sign it.

Q.

And is that contained as well in the paragraph you

read earlier on page 5?
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MS, WASHBURN:

2

THE COURT: Yes.

3

May I approach the witness, your Honor?

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

4

BY MS. WASHBURN:

5

Q.

The record can reflect that I'm also handing a copy of

6

this document to opposing counsel.

Mr. House, did the

7

Department of Housing and Urban Development approve your lease?

8 I

A.

That's correct.

9

Q.

Is it your understanding that the Department of

10

Housing and Urban Development is the entity which (inaudible)

11

the regulations which were developed?

12

A.

That's correct.

13

Q.

Mr. House, if you would, please, turn to page 4 of the

14

lease agreement.

15

A.

Okay.

16

Q.

The very top —

and I don't know if I've stapled on

17

paragraph 11 subparagraph (e). Can you read that?

18

on your copy?

19

A.

Is it (e), is that 11(d)?

20

Q.

It's the one at the very top of the page.

21

A.

I can't.

22

Is it clear

"Residents will comply with all terms," is

that the one you're talking about?

23

Q.

Yes.

24

A.

"Residents will comply with all terms of the lease,

25

all rules and regulations posted by the housing authority in
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2

THE COURT:

Well, we had him qualified a minute ago,

so I'll overrule that one.

3

Q.

BY MR. HARRIS:

4

A.

Repeat the question again.

5
6

MR. HARRIS:

Could you answer the question, please?

One moment, your Honor.

I lost my train

of thought, your Honor.

7

THE COURT:

You were trying to have him compare

8

whether the (inaudible) of the agreement (inaudible) were more

9

expansive than the federal regulations.

10

Q.

BY MR. HARRIS:

Yes, thank you, your Honor.

Would it

11

be your opinion that the lease agreement that Mr. Snyder signed

12

is more expansive and prohibits more activity, more activity

13

than does the code of federal regulations?

14
15
16
17
18

A.

We use the federal regulation CFR's as a guideline in

coming up with our lease agreement.
Q.

So you're not required to follow the code of federal

regulations?
A.

We're required to follow all of the code of

19

regulations, but we use it as a guideline to put together our

20

lease agreements.

21 I
22
23

Q.

So if you were to put something in that was prohibited

by the code of federal regulations would that be enforceable?
A.

Well, these regulations are approved by the feds, or

24

by HUD, so I'm quite sure if they had any problem with those

25

they would have contacted us.
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in general that this part of the lease agreement—

2

A.

This is part of the lease agreement, yes.

3

Q.

Why is it that the housing authority doesn't give a

4

copy of this document with the lease agreement with everybody

5

that signs?

6

A.

Well, we would have to give out some, I don't know,

7

2800 copies of this, and it is —

8

like 35 pages long.

9

Q.

I don't know, maybe —

It's a lot of trees.

Earlier counsel asked you about your interpretation of

10

the lease provisions regarding criminal activity.

11

consider Ms. Rico to be a person?

Would you

12

A.

Sure.

13

Q.

Would you consider an assault against her to be

14

it's

criminal activity?

15

A.

Sure.

16

Q.

If that assault were to take place at the Senior

17

Highrise, do you think that's at or on or near the premises of

18

the housing authority?

19

A.

I think so.

20

Q.

Should it make any difference, in your opinion, when

21

you're (inaudible) to evict that somebody commits a crime and

22

goes to a fellow tenant, a maintenance person or another

23

housing authority employee, do you think there should be some

24

kind of distinction?

25

A.

I don't think I gave up my right to —

civil rights to
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MS. WASHBURN:

2

THE COURT: Yes.

3
4
5

May I approach the witness, your Honor?

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. WASHBURN:
Q.
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6

this document to opposing counsel.

Mr. House, did the

7

Department of Housing and Urban Development approve your lease?

8
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10

Housing and Urban Development is the entity which (inaudible)

11
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12
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That's correct.

13

Q.

Mr. House, if you would, please, turn to page 4 of the

14

lease agreement.

15

A.

Okay.

16

Q.

The very top —

and I don't know if I've stapled on

17

paragraph 11 subparagraph (e). Can you read that?

18

on your copy?

19

A.

Is it (e), is that 11(d)?

20

Q.

It's the one at the very top of the page.

21

A.

I can't.

22

Is it clear

"Residents will comply with all terms," is

that the one you're talking about?

23

Q.

Yes.

24

A.

"Residents will comply with all terms of the lease,

25

all rules and regulations posted by the housing authority in
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2

MR, HARRIS:

One moment, your Honor.

questions.

3
4
5

Just a couple of

RECROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. HARRIS:.
Q.

I want to (inaudible) what type of criminal activity

6

you could evict someone for under the lease agreement.

7

you evict someone for jaywalking, under a strict reading of the

8

lease agreement?

9

A.

I'm not a police officer.

Could

What I normally do, what

10

takes place on the housing authority properties, that's what

11

really I'm concerned about.

12

Q.

And you determined that this altercation with Ms. Rico

13

was criminal assault and decided to evict Tom on that basis?

14

What was your basis for determining that?

15

MS. WASHBURN:

16

THE COURT:

17

THE WITNESS:

18
19

Objection, asked and answered.

I'm not real sure it has been.

Go ahead.

I think that the officer testified

earlier as far as what a —
THE COURT:

He's trying to focus you in on a portion

20

of the agreement on which you relied to make your decision that

21

Mr. Snyder has to go.

22

THE WITNESS:

23
24
25

Okay.

I feel that the —

excuse me,

your Honor.
THE COURT:

I mean what part of the agreement do you

look to to say I've got authority to get him out of here?
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in general that this part of the lease agreement—

2
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4
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5

that signs?
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7

2800 copies of this, and it is —

8

like 35 pages long.
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It's a lot of trees.

Earlier counsel asked you about your interpretation of

10

the lease provisions regarding criminal activity.

11

consider Ms. Rico to be a person?

Would you

12

A.

Sure.

13

Q.

Would you consider an assault against her to be

14

criminal activity?

15

A.

Sure.

16

Q.

If that assault were to take place at the Senior

17

Highrise, do you think that's at or on or near the premises of

18

the housing authority?

19

A.

I think so.

20

Q.

Should it make any difference, in your opinion, when

21

you're (inaudible) to evict that somebody commits a crime and

22

goes to a fellow tenant, a maintenance person or another

23

housing authority employee, do you think there should be some

24

kind of distinction?

25

A.

I don't think I gave up my right to —

civil rights to
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criminal activity.

2

Jaywalking is clearly illegal.

THE COURT:

I'm not sure it is in Salt Lake City.

3

That's ray point.

4

take you to small claims.

5

cities on these things.

6
7

It's some kind of civil matter where they
Salt Lake is unlike a lot of the

They're real (inaudible).

MR. HARRIS: Thank you, your Honor.
Q.

BY MR. HARRIS:

If anybody engages in any type of

8

illegal or criminal activity, no matter the severity, you would

9

have authority to evict them under this provision; is that

10

correct?

11

A.

Anybody.

Now what's anybody?

12

Q.

Any tenant who has signed this lease.

13

A.

I see.

14

Q.

Then you would have the authority to evict them for

15

any illegal or criminal activity no matter the severity under

16

this agreement; is that correct?

17

A.

If they have violated the lease, yes, under this lease

18

agreement.

19

Q.

I'm not asking about the lease, I'm asking about this

20

paragraph here, No. 11(i) where it says all illegal or criminal

21

activity.

22

A.

If they have signed the lease agreement, yes.

23

MR. HARRIS:

24

THE COURT:

25

take a recess.

I have nothing further, your Honor.
Thanks.

You're done, Mr. House. We'll
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2

MR. HARRIS: One moment, your Honor.
questions.

3
4
5

Just a couple of

RECROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. HARRIS:
Q.

I want to (inaudible) what type of criminal activity

6

you could evict someone for under the lease agreement. Could

7

you evict someone for jaywalking, under a strict reading of the

8

lease agreement?

9

A.

I'm not a police officer. What I normally do, what

10

takes place on the housing authority properties, that's what

11

really I'm concerned about.

12

Q.

And you determined that this altercation with Ms. Rico

13

was criminal assault and decided to evict Tom on that basis?

14

What was your basis for determining that?

15

MS. WASHBURN:

16

THE COURT:

17

THE WITNESS:

18
19

Objection, asked and answered.

I'm not real sure it has been. Go ahead.
I think that the officer testified

earlier as far as what a —
THE COURT:

He's trying to focus you in on a portion

20

of the agreement on which you relied to make your decision that

21

Mr. Snyder has to go.

22
23
24
25

THE WITNESS: Okay.

I feel that the —

excuse me,

your Honor.
THE COURT:

I mean what part of the agreement do you

look to to say I've got authority to get him out of here?
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A.

Kimberly Washburn, I received some mail from you.

2

Q.

Okay.

There is a document that's in front of you

3

that's been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit No, 1.

4

there in front of you?

Is it still

5

A.

Oh, hell, yeah.

6

Q.

If you wouldn't mind, sir, could you please turn to

7

I couldn't see it.

the last page of that document—

8

A.

You'll have to speak up, honey, I'm hard of hearing.

9

Q.

I apologize.

10

If you could please turn to the last

page of that document, page 7•

11

A.

Page 7, yes, ma'am.

12

Q.

At the bottom of that page there is a signature, it

13

says, "John D. Snyder."

Is that your signature?

14

A.

Yes, ma'am.

15

Q.

Did you sign that document?

16

A.

Yes, ma'am.

17

Q.

Will you take a look at the document and make sure it

18

is what you recall signing?

19

A.

I didn't understand that.

20

Q.

If you could please, take a look at the document, make

21
22
23
24
25

sure that it is what you recall signing.
A.

I'm not getting that last part, what I would call

what?
Q.

Is that document that's marked as No. 1, is that the

actual lease agreement that you signed with the housing

-731

criminal activity.

2

Jaywalking is clearly illegal.

THE COURT:

I'm not sure it is in Salt Lake City.

3

That's my point.

4

take you to small claims.

5

cities on these things.

6
7

It's some kind of civil matter where they

MR. HARRIS:
Q.

Salt Lake is unlike a lot of the

They're real (inaudible).

Thank you, your Honor.

BY MR. HARRIS:

If anybody engages in any type of

8

illegal or criminal activity, no matter the severity, you would

9

have authority to evict them under this provision; is that

10

correct?

11

A.

Anybody.

Now what's anybody?

12

Q.

Any tenant who has signed this lease.

13

A.

I see.

14

Q.

Then you would have the authority to evict them for

15

any illegal or criminal activity no matter the severity under

16

this agreement; is that correct?

17

A.

If they have violated the lease, yes, under this lease

18

agreement.

19

Q.

I'm not asking about the lease, I'm asking about this

20

paragraph here, No. ll(i) where it says all illegal or criminal

21

activity.

22

A.

If they have signed the lease agreement, yes.

23

MR. HARRIS:

24

THE COURT:

25

take a recess.

I have nothing further, your Honor.
Thanks.

You're done, Mr. House.

We'll
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occurred between you and Ms. Rico. Why don't you explain in

2

your words what happened on that day, starting with the first

3

contact you had with the office then.

4

A.

Well, ray recollection, she called me somewhere after 9

5

o'clock, give or take a little bit, and told me that she had

6

heard I wanted to see her.

7

Q.

What did you want to see her about?

8

A.

Well, I had written a letter to her boss, Scott

9

Lancelot, and —

but I wanted her to have a copy of it, and she

10

leaves early.

She seldom is there, really.

She spends her

11

time over with the big boys and has someone representing her.

12

Q.

So she called and said to come down and meet her.

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

What happened then?

15

A.

She said, "I'm in my office, come down."

I said,

16

"I'll be right there."

So I walked down and I had the letter

17

in my hand.

18

and she acted like it was a weapon or something.

19

off and said, "I've already read it."

20

to see it."

21

Q.

And then what happened?

22

A.

She sounded almost hysterical. She said, "If you

When I walked in I tried to give it to Ms. Rico,
She backed

She said, "I don't want

So I just turned and sat down.

23

don't like it here why don't you move," or "why don't you

24

leave," something to that effect.

25

said, "This is the best deal I've found."

I said, "I love it here." I
But I said, "If you
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Kimberly Washburn, I received some mail from you.

Q.

Okay.

There is a document that's in front of you

that's been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1.

Is it still

there in front of you?
A.

Oh, hell, yeah.

I couldn't see it.

Q.

If you wouldn't mind, sir, could you please turn to

the last page of that document—
A.

You'll have to speak up, honey, I'm hard of hearing.

Q.

I apologize.

If you could please turn to the last

page of that document, page 7.
A.

Page 7, yes, ma'am.

Q.

At the bottom of that page there is a signature, it

says, "John D. Snyder."

Is that your signature?

A.

Yes, ma'am.

Q.

Did you sign that document?

A.

Yes, ma'am.

Q.

Will you take a look at the document and make sure it

is what you recall signing?
A.

I didn't understand that.

Q.

If you could please, take a look at the document, make

sure that it is what you recall signing.
A.

I'm not getting that last part, what I would call

what?
Q.

Is that document that's marked as No. 1, is that the

actual lease agreement that you signed with the housing
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2
3
4
5

left.
Q.

You pointed your finger at her at some point during

this.
A.

I may have, but I was always sitting down.

I read

her—

6

Q.

Go ahead, I'm sorry.

7

A.

I read her story and where she said I was pushing it

8

in her face, she's talking to the wall.

9

Q.

How close do you think you got to her?

10

A.

Oh, I don't think my finger was anywhere within two

11

feet of her.

12

nasty habit of pointing.

13
14
15
16

Q.

I'd say three feet more likely, but I do have a

Do you have a nasty habit of swearing every now and

then?
A.

I worked in the oil fields a little, and I've heard

some choice words.

17

Q.

Did you use some of those this day?

18

A.

I didn't understand it.

19

Q.

Did you use some of those words during this

20

altercation?

21

A.

I probably did.

It's in my vocabulary.

22

Q.

What did you mean when you said to her —

you heard

23

testimony that they said you said, "I'm going to get you, or

24

we're not finished yet."

25

A.

What did you mean by that?

Well, I think that —

I think I said, "You better have
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occurred between you and Ms. Rico.

2

your words what happened on that day, starting with the first

3

contact you had with the office then.

4

A.

Why don't you explain in

Well, my recollection, she called me somewhere after 9

5

o'clock, give or take a little bit, and told me that she had

6

heard I wanted to see her.

7

Q.

What did you want to see her about?

8

A.

Well, I had written a letter to her boss, Scott

9

Lancelot, and —

but I wanted her to have a copy of it, and she

10

leaves early.

She seldom is there, really.

She spends her

11

time over with the big boys and has someone representing her.

12

Q.

So she called and said to come down and meet her.

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

What happened then?

15

A.

She said, "I'm in my office, come down."

16

"I'll be right there."

17

in my hand.

18

and she acted like it was a weapon or something.

19

off and said, "I've already read it."

20

to see it."

21

Q.

And then what happened?

22

A.

She sounded almost hysterical.

I said,

So I walked down and I had the letter

When I walked in I tried to give it to Ms. Rico,
She backed

She said, "I don't want

So I just turned and sat down.

She said, "If you

23

don't like it here why don't you move," or "why don't you

24

leave," something to that effect.

25

said, "This is the best deal I've found."

I said, "I love it here."

I

But I said, "If you
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I made an appointment with Mr. House to talk to him about it,

2

and when I went over there Ms. Rico was all business and she

3

came in and sat down right there.

4

Mr. House explained the ground rules, there couldn't

5

be any name calling or anything, and the next words out of his

6

mouth —

7

man.

8

name calling or anything, and I said, "Fine."

9

know about your drinking problem."

now this is the first time I had ever laid eyes on the

He laid these ground rules down there couldn't be any
He said, "And we

Ms. Rico was sitting within

10

three or four feet of me, and I said, "Where did you get that

11

information," and pointed at her, and she just sat there with

12

her head down, she never said a word, and Roy House didn't

13

mention my drinking problem.

14

I have drank for 50 years, I suppose, but I don't

15

think I have a drinking problem.

16

it.

17

had a conviction in 25 or 30 years of a traffic ticket.

18

I've never been arrested for

I have — my driver's license is clean.

Q.

I haven't even

Regarding the incident, then, with Ms. Rico, did you

19

ever speak with any law enforcement officers regarding that

20

incident?

21

A.

No, sir, I did not.

22

Q.

Was it your —

23

A.

No, I went down to deliver a letter to her.

24

Q.

Do you feel that you threatened her in any way?

25

A.

Did I what?

did you go down there and threaten her?

-81I made an appointment with Mr. House to talk to him about it,
and when I went over there Ms. Rico was all business and she
came in and sat down right there.
Mr. House explained the ground rules, there couldn't
be any name calling or anything, and the next words out of his
mouth —
man.

now this is the first time I had ever laid eyes on the

He laid these ground rules down there couldn't be any

name calling or anything, and I said, "Fine."
know about your drinking problem."

He said, "And we

Ms. Rico was sitting within

three or four feet of me, and I said, "Where did you get that
information," and pointed at her, and she just sat there with
her head down, she never said a word, and Roy House didn't
mention my drinking problem.
I have drank for 50 years, I suppose, but I don't
think I have a drinking problem.
it.

I have —

I've never been arrested for

my driver's license is clean.

I haven't even

had a conviction in 25 or 30 years of a traffic ticket.
Q.

Regarding the incident, then, with Ms. Rico, did you

ever speak with any law enforcement officers regarding that
incident?
A.

No, sir, I did not.

Q.

Was it your —

A.

No, I went down to deliver a letter to her.

Q.

Do you feel that you threatened her in any way?

A.

Did I what?

did you go down there and threaten her?
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whole argument.

2

MR. HARRIS:

Thank you.

3

THE COURT:

4

MS. WASHBURN:

5

THE COURT:

6

MS. WASHBURN:

I rest, your Honor.

Ms. Washburn, anything more?
No rebuttal witnesses, your Honor.

You get to lead out.
Your Honor, we're here today on a

7

proceeding in unlawful detainer for a lease violation by the

8

defendant, Mr. John Thomas Snyder.

9

shown as required under the forcible entry and detainer statute

10

that the housing authority is the owner and the landlord of the

11

premises where Mr- Snyder resides, specifically 1966 South 200

12

East, Apartment A-506. That's located here in Salt Lake City,

13

your Honor.

14

The evidence has clearly

In addition, the evidence has shown, your Honor, that

15

this tenancy of Mr. Snyder at the subject premises was pursuant

16

to a lease agreement entered into by the parties, signed by

17

both parties.

18

reference to the applicability of regulations, policy manuals,

19

et cetera.

They are all incorporated into that lease

20

agreement.

That lease agreement is a valid lease agreement.

That lease agreement, your Honor, makes specific

21

Your Honor, counsel for defendant has tried to

22

persuade this Court to find a ruling that that lease is

23

invalid.

24

front of it to do so, and certainly that is the exact basis for

25

his federal class action lawsuit filed recently.

I don't know that the Court has enough evidence in

So I don't

-83whole argument.
MR. HARRIS: Thank you.

I rest, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Washburn, anything more?
MS. WASHBURN:

No rebuttal witnesses, your Honor.

THE COURT: You get to lead out.
MS. WASHBURN:

Your Honor, we're here today on a

proceeding in unlawful detainer for a lease violation by the
defendant, Mr. John Thomas Snyder. The evidence has clearly
shown as required under the forcible entry and detainer statute
that the housing authority is the owner and the landlord of the
premises where Mr. Snyder resides, specifically 1966 South 200
East, Apartment A-506. That's located here in Salt Lake City,
your Honor.
In addition, the evidence has shown, your Honor, that
this tenancy of Mr. Snyder at the subject premises was pursuant
to a lease agreement entered into by the parties, signed by
both parties. That lease agreement, your Honor, makes specific
reference to the applicability of regulations, policy manuals,
et cetera. They are all incorporated into that lease
agreement. That lease agreement is a valid lease agreement.
Your Honor, counsel for defendant has tried to
persuade this Court to find a ruling that that lease is
invalid.

I don't know that the Court has enough evidence in

front of it to do so, and certainly that is the exact basis for
his federal class action lawsuit filed recently.

So I don't
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THE COURT:

Where does it say that?

2

MS. WASHBURN:

3

THE COURT:

4

MS. WASHBURN:

Paragraph 11 sub (d).

D?
Yes.

In addition, reference is made to

5

those in the policy statement admitted as Exhibit 3, your

6

Honor.

7
8

THE COURT: Well, I appreciate you saying the words.
Where is 11(d)?

9

MS. WASHBURN:

Yes, that would be, your Honor, at the

10

top of page 4 wherein it says, "Resident will comply with all

11

terms of this lease, all rules and regulations posted by

12

housing authority in its main office, and all applicable

13

provisions of building and housing codes affecting health and

14

safety."

15
16
17

THE COURT:

Where exactly does it talk about the code

of federal regulations?
MS, WASHBURN:

Your Honor, there's no specific

18

reference to the CFR's; however, the CFR's are governing law

19

and they —

20

contemplates that inclusion.

21

THE COURT:

I would argue certainly that this lease

I appreciate your contemplation.

Where do

22

we get the language that it contemplates such inclusion?

23

can't pretend to have read it and digest it as you may have.

24

Where does it contemplate this?

25

MS. WASHBURN:

Specifically paragraph 11(d).

I
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THE COURT:

Where does it say that?

2

MS. WASHBURN:

3

THE COURT:

4

MS. WASHBURN:

Paragraph 11 sub (d).

D?
Yes.

In addition, reference is made to

5

those in the policy statement admitted as Exhibit 3, your

6

Honor.

7
8

THE COURT:

Well, I appreciate you saying the words.

Where is 11(d)?

9

MS. WASHBURN:

Yes, that would be, your Honor, at the

10

top of page 4 wherein it says, "Resident will comply with all

11

terras of this lease, all rules and regulations posted by

12

housing authority in its main office, and all applicable

13

provisions of building and housing codes affecting health and

14

safety."

15
16
17

THE COURT:

Where exactly does it talk about the code

of federal regulations?
MS. WASHBURN:

Your Honor, there's no specific

18

reference to the CFR's; however, the CFR's are governing law

19

and they —

20

contemplates that inclusion.

21

THE COURT:

I would argue certainly that this lease

I appreciate your contemplation.

Where do

22

we get the language that it contemplates such inclusion?

23

can't pretend to have read it and digest it as you may have.

24

Where does it contemplate this?

25

MS. WASHBURN:

Specifically paragraph 11(d).

I
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part of the lease agreement admitted as Exhibit No. 3.

2
3

THE COURT:

I haven't seen 3.

somewhere?

4

MS. WASHBURN:

5

THE COURT:

6

It is, your Honor.

Everything else, I guess, was — but maybe

it's in here and I just can't find it.

7
8

Is it available

MS. WASHBURN:

There, your Honor, and here's No. 2 as

well.

9

THE COURT: Where in here does it say—

10

MS. WASHBURN:

11

THE COURT:

And I can't—

I mean do you want to make the CFR part of

12

(inaudible) and/or policy statement?

13

out why anybody talks about a CFR like it means something.

14

might need a basis for what folks do here, and I don't know

15

that —

16

(inaudible) I don't think.

17

I'm just trying to figure
You

it's not like some all encompassing overriding

MS. WASHBURN:

The purpose — we've been talking about

18

the code of regulations is that the housing authority receives

19

federal money—

20

THE COURT: Well, I'm following that, but I don't see

21

how they become part of the agreements under which tenants have

22

to live. Where does it say, "By the way, the CFR is part of

23

your agreement, tooM?

24
25

MS. WASHBURN:

That's what I'm not getting.
I guess in that effect, I mean if

you're going to be that specific there is no particular
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THE COURT:

Well, I don't mean to —

I mean if you

2

want to talk about that, that's fine, what does that have to do

3

with us?

4

so what?

That's what I'm not —

5

MS. WASHBURN:

6

THE COURT:

this is kind of like the CFR,

I agree.

So I'm not getting why it matters.

I mean

7

you want to talk about it, and I just need to understand why I

8

should pay attention to what you're saying.

9
10

MS. WASHBURN:
about it.

11

My position is this is a valid lease, your Honor.

THE COURT:

It strikes me that that's what we're

12

operating under here.

13

don't know why.

14

Well, I don't particularly care to talk

MS. WASHBURN:

Everyone wants me to go to the CFR and I

I think your Honor is perfectly capable

15

of evaluating the law and determining how that works. Our

16

position is we have a valid lease signed by both parties, has

17

been approved by HUD, complies with all the requirements set

18

forth on the housing authority, your Honor, and that Mr.

19

Snyder, the defendant herein, is bound by the terms of that

20

lease agreement.

21

We have testimony, as I (inaudible) forward, your

22

Honor, that Mr. Snyder committed what technically under Utah

23

law is an assault on a housing authority employee, Ms. Sherri

24

Rico.

25

Ms. Rico testified she was fearful, we heard other
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The lease

will be terminated for certain things, including non-payment of
rent.
THE COURT: Right.
MS. WASHBURN:

If you don't provide information as

you're required to in order to meet the funding that is
provided—
THE COURT:

None of that is alleged.

MS. WASHBURN:

Okay, criminal activities that threaten

the health, safety or right to peaceful enjoyment by other
residents in addition or for other good cause.
THE COURT:

So what do you think applies in this case?

MS. WASHBURN:

I think that the criminal activity,

your Honor, does as well as other—
THE COURT:

So Ms. Rico —

I mean we haven't heard

testimony Ms. Rico is a resident.
MS. WASHBURN:
THE COURT:

No, you haven't.

So how could that apply?

I don't like to

argue about it, but I'm just trying to figure out what your
thinking is, because the language says other residents.
meant something else I guess you could have said that.

If it
So you

think this criminal activity (inaudible) applies in paragraph
17?
MS. WASHBURN:

I do, your Honor.

I think that any

criminal activity, I think that that can be broad enough to
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21
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22
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still present in the premises pursuant to the terms of the

2

lease agreement.

3

attorney's fees and costs, your Honor, and under the law we are

4

entitled to treble damages because of his unlawful detainer.

5
6

We are entitled to our damages, including

THE COURT:

Well, I've read your contract law, but

where does it say (inaudible) fees?

7

MS. WASHBURN:

8

THE COURT:

9

MS. WASHBURN:

Paragraph 18.

Pardon me?

10

THE COURT:

11

MS. WASHBURN:

12

THE COURT:

13

MS. WASHBURN:

I'm sorry, what's your question?

What (inaudible) number?
Paragraph 18 of the lease.

Go ahead, thanks.
Okay.

Your Honor, I would proffer in

14

the course of the time final documents would be submitted that

15

the damages in this matter, your Honor, treble damages are

16

presently through today in the amount of $1,128, that's $18.80

17

per day.

We have a total of 68 days that he's been in unlawful

18

detainer.

The total attorney's fees in this case to date with

19

an estimate for today is $7,118.05, and the costs—

20

THE COURT:

Wait, I thought you said $7,000.

21

MS. WASHBURN:

22

THE COURT:

23

MS. WASHBURN:

24

THE COURT:

25

MS. WASHBURN:

I did say that, your Honor.

Seven thousand to prosecute this event?
Yes, your Honor.

I would probably need an affidavit.
Okay, as a result of documentation
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So the first argument, your Honor, is that this is an

2

invalid lease provision, that it prohibits more behavior, it

3

allows them to evict him for even minor infractions, minor

4

behavior that is illegal or criminal, whereas all the cases

5

that have cited and that have dealt with this particular

6

regulation point to serious criminal behavior, drug related

7

activities, selling drugs out of the house, selling drugs to an

8

informant, not something as belligerent as swearing or calling

9

names to other housing authorities.

10

Which thing gets me, your Honor, to the second defense

11

that Mr. Snyder asserts, and that's that his conduct, while

12

clearly offensive, is not criminal in nature.

13

other persons names, being belligerent in hostile, being

14

threatening and intimidating, while clearly offensive, don't

15

rise to the level of being criminal behavior.

16

somebody, telling someone, "We're not done with this yet,M you

17

know, telling someone to, "Pull up your pantyhose," while again

18

offensive, your Honor, is not criminal assault that allows them

19

to terminate the lease and evict him.

20

I think calling

Pointing towards

That is his defense, number one, your Honor, that this

21

lease provision is invalid, and that number two, that the

22

behavior that they assert occurred does not rise to the level

23

of being criminal and is not allowed under the lease to be

24

evictable.

25

Thank you.

THE COURT:

One question.

If it's invalid according
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THE COURT:
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terms of this agreement, and if it's not in there I don't know

2

how I can say it exists. That's where you folks have left me

3

when you go to the CFR.

4

problem, but I don't think it's a landlord/tenant problem.

5

MR. HARRIS: On page 2 of this again, your Honor,

6

I think there may be a claim for some

again—

7

THE COURT: Page 2 where?

8

MR. HARRIS: Page 2 of Exhibit 2, and then we're

9

looking down—

10

THE COURT: Well, this is his notice, right?

11

MR. HARRIS: This is the notice, yes. They are saying

12

here, "You are not entitled to a grievance proceeding

13

contending the issue of the notice."

14

entitled to a grievance procedure is because they're saying

15

that this is —

16

related activity on our given premises, whereas if they're

17

trying to evict him for what they call good cause, then he is

18

clearly entitled to go through the grievance.

19

The reason that he's not

you are being evicted from criminal and/or drug

THE COURT:

You keep saying he's entitled.

Where in

20

the agreement does it say, "You've got a grievance right"?

21

That's —

22
23
24
25

I keep coming back to this question.
MR. HARRIS:

I can find it if you'll give me a moment,

your Honor.
THE COURT:

It seems to me I'm governed by the

agreement that Mr. Snyder signed with these folks.
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2
3

THE COURT:
CFR?

The HUD regulation is another word for

Is there another—
MR. HARRIS:

Well, I assume that those are the

4

policies and procedures that they — that hundred page document

5

that they pointed to.

6

THE COURT:

7

Ms. Washburn, any last comment?

8

MS. WASHBURN:

9

All right, thank you.

I guess, your Honor, I would maintain

that that specific argument with regard to the grievance

10

proceeding was raised in a motion to dismiss which has not been

11

submitted to this Court for decision.

12

there has been considerable briefing done on these issues and

13

were that to have been submitted, I'm confident that the Court

14

would find that the housing authority's actions in this regard

15

were appropriate.

16

has been no evidence indicating or entered today regarding what

17

HUD's determination is with regard to that grievance procedure,

18

so I don't know that it is all at all relevant.

19

So to that end —

The law provides for what they did.

I mean

There

The housing authority made a determination, I think,

20

well (inaudible).

21

discussing the issue with the people involved in making those

22

decisions to reach the conclusion that what happened was

23

inappropriate and constituted grounds for eviction under the

24

lease agreement, your Honor.

25

They started speaking with counsel,

Counsel for defendant maintains that, "Gee, it allows
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by its terms and he began his tenancy 7 August of 1998.

2

I also find that he failed to abide by the terms of

3

this lease in that he engaged in criminal activity.

4

for the purposes of this hearing I think there is other good

5

cause to have him removed.

6

this event, but we have Ms. Rico's testimony that essentially

7

he came into the room, he started pointing his finger and

8

coming around the desk and essentially, I guess, the phrase

9

that we use now days, "getting in her face."

10

I guess

I think that it all revolves around

So I think he

made a clear threat.

11

He was loud, he was upset, he was angry, his choice of

12

words was intimidating, it's clear it did intimidate her

13

because as I noted from the demeanor of both witnesses today,

14

it's pretty clear to me Mr. Snyder could, if he had done what

15

was described, intimidated and threatened in a manner that

16

would make a person believe there is a show of immediate force

17

to carry out some kind of bodily injury.

18

Supporting that, of course, is Ms. Poulton's version.

19

She heard this from 30 or 40 feet away. When she got there she

20

listened some more, heard only the male voice, and when the

21

door opened the only male in the room was Mr. Snyder, and she

22

cooberated essentially everything Ms. Rico said. And then, of

23

course, Mr. Trowbridge heard the same sorts of things over the

24

radio —

25

words.

didn't see any of it. He heard the tone, heard the
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And I guess that, of course, is Mr. Snyder's somewhat

2

ambivalent statement, "Well, I'm not sure I said those things,"

3

or "I do know a little bit of oil field talk."

4

pretty clear that the plaintiff has carried their burden by a

5

preponderance to show that he committed the criminal act of

6

assault or for other good cause.

I think it's

7

So I think pursuant to the agreement, which provisions

8

I think are appropriate, paragraph 11 sub (i), because criminal

9

activity in that subsection applies to anybody who is the

10

recipient of the activity, so any time a resident engages in

11

criminal activity, it needn't be limited just against other

12

residents, as Section 17 for some reason does. Paragraph 11

13

sub (i), he violated that, and paragraph 17, I think there is

14

other good cause here, his conduct towards one of the employees

15

of the plaintiff.

16

So my conclusion is he has violated the terms of the

17

lease, stipulated, then, that after that occurred he was served

18

a three day notice to pay or quit.

19

me, I use that phrase too often.

20

notice to quit because he violated the lease.

21

he's there for —

22

(inaudible) 68 days, which is within the amount that I

23

(inaudible) unlawful detainer, and they are then entitled to

24

their treble damages.

25

He did not pay — excuse

He (inaudible) a three day
He did not quit,

been an unlawful detainer for the plaintiff

I reserve the issue of attorney's fees pending receipt

-1031

of an affidavit to examine what costs were incurred in the

2

defense and/or prosecution of this action, along with the

3

attorney's fees and costs on that issue.

4

conclude, then, that Mr. Snyder has failed to oblige by the

5

agreement, he's breached the agreement, he's not entitled to

6

remain in unit A-506, and he is been in unlawful detainer since

7

25 February.

8
9

I think I have to

Ms. Washburn, anything more specific I need to make in
way of findings?

10

MS. WASHBURN:

11

THE COURT:

No, your Honor.

In response to just a couple of your

12

arguments, Mr. Harris, in that answer —

13

right, if he were simply offensive there wouldn't be a problem,

14

but I think he has committed a crime.

15

assaultive behavior to place his finger in the face of someone

16

in the manner he did, given the context in which it was done,

17

arising, moving around the table, getting closer to, made

18

physical proximity with the tone of voice, and the language

19

that he was using that day.

20

I mean I think you're

I think that's

And then you made another argument, which I think is a

21

fair argument, but it doesn't apply to this case, what would

22

happen if there were minor criminal events. Well, that's an

23

argument, but it's not this case.

24

to be a serious criminal offense, that of assault.

25

This case is what I consider

Then as I've intimated, I don't think these —

the CFR
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record, and therefore the name associated with the
statement may not be the correct name as to the
speaker.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 12th day of
June 2000.
My commission expires:
February 24, 2004
N
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unauthorized changes or additions have been made.
U.

Waterbeds are permitted on ground floor bedrooms only.

V.

Residents shall not install or change
written permission of Management.

W.

Resident is responsible for the repair of all breakage of
window glass, doors and screens on the premises.

X.

Resident shall not drive or park on lawn or sidewalks for any
purpose.

Y.

No major repairs requiring that a vehicle remain in an
inoperable condition for longer than 24 hours shall be
permitted within the complex. The discharge of vehicle fluids
including hydraulic fluids or anti-freeze within the complex
shall be prohibited.

Z.

Maintenance should immediately be notified of inoperable smoke
detectors. Removal of batteries from smoke detectors is
grounds for termination of the lease.

locks without

SECTION XIII
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
^DEFINITIONS

A.

"Grievance" shall mean any dispute which a tenant may
have with respect to the Housing Authority of the County
of Salt Lake (hereinafter referred to as the HA) action
or failure to act in accordance with the individual tenant's
lease of HA regulations which adversely affect the individual
tenant's rights, duties, welfare, or status.

B.

"Complainant" shall mean any tenant whose grievance is
presented to the HA or in accordance with this procedure.

C.

"Hearing Officer" shall mean a person appointed in accordance
with Section C (2) of this Procedure to hear grievances and
render a decision with respect thereto.

the

D.

"Tenant" shall mean any lessee or the remaining head of
the household of any tenant family residing in housing
accommodations covered by this Procedure.

DISCUSSION OF GRIEVANCE
A.

Any grievance shall be personally presented, either
orally or in writing, to the Area Manager or the Director
of Housing so that the grievance may be discussed
informally and settled without an informal hearing.

B.

The grievance must be presented by the complainant or his
representative within a reasonable time, not in excess of
10 days of the HA action or failure to act which is the
basis of the grievance.

C.

The HA shall schedule the informal discussion as promptly
as possible; time and place reasonably convenient to the
complainant, and shall inform the complainant thereof.

D.

A summary of the discussion, dated and signed by the
Director Of Housing shall be prepared within a reasonable
time, not in excess of five working days of the informal
discussion. One copy shall be given to the tenant and one
retained in the HA's tenant file. The summary shall
specify the nature of the complaint and the specific
reasons therefore, and shall specify the right of the
complainant to an informal hearing before the Executive
Director and the procedure by which such a hearing may be
obtained in such case as the complainant is not satisfied
with the disposition of the matter by the HA.

PROCEDURE TO OBTAIN A FORMAL HEARING
Request a Hearing
If the complainant
is dissatisfied with the proposed
disposition of his complaint, as stated in the Director of
Housing or other HA official's statement, he may submit a
written request for a hearing to the HA within a reasonable
time, not in excess of 10 days of the date of the Director of
Housing's summary. The written request shall specify:

1.
2.

The reasons for the grievance; and
The action of relief sought.

Hearing Officer
A hearing officer, as approved by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development shall be appointed to preside over the
formal hearing proceedings.
Failure to Request a Formal Hearing
If the complainant does not request a formal hearing in
writing and within ten days of the Director of Housing1 s
summary, then the HA's disposition of grievance as summarized
by the Director of Housing shall become final. Failure to
request a hearing shall not constitute a waiver by the
complainant of his rights to contest the HA's action in an
appropriate judicial proceeding.
Hearing Prerequisite
All grievances shall be personally presented either orally or
in writing pursuant tot he informal procedure prescribed in
section B as a condition precedent to a formal hearing.

Escrow Deposit
Before a hearing or an informal discussion is scheduled in any
grievance involving the amount of rent which the HA claims is
due, the complainant shall pay to the HA an amount equal to
the amount of the rent due and payable as of the first of the
month preceding the month in which the act or failure to act
took place. The complainant shall thereafter deposit the same
amount of the monthly rent in an escrow account monthly until
the complaint is resolved by decision of the hearing officer.
These requirements may be waived by the HA in extenuating
circumstances. Unless so waived, the failure to make such
payments shall result in a termination of the grievance

procedure.
F.

Scheduling of Hearings
A hearing shall be scheduled by the hearing officer or hearing
panel promptly for a time and place reasonably convenient to
both complainant and the HA. A written notification specifying
the time, place and the procedures governing the hearing shall
be delivered to the complainant and the appropriate HA
official.

4.

PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE FORMAL HEARING

A.

The hearing shall be held before a hearing officer.

B.

The complainant shall be afforded a fair hearing providing the
basic safeguards of due process which shall include:

C.

1.

The opportunity to examine before the hearing and,
at the expense of the complain.ant, to copy all
documents, records and regulations of the HA that
are relevant to the hearing. Any document not so
made available after request therefore by the
complainant may not be relied on the HA at the
hearing.

2.

The right to be represented by counsel or other
person chosen as his or her representative;

3.

The right to a private hearing unless
the
complainant requests a public hearing, but this
shall not be construed to limit the attendance of
persons with a valid interest in the proceedings.

4.

The right to present evidence and arguments in
support of his or her complaint, or controvert
evidence relied on the PHA, and to confront and
cross-examine all witnesses on whose testimony or
information the PHA relies; and

5.

A decision based solely and exclusively upon the
facts presented at the hearing.

If the complainant or the HA fails to appear at scheduled

hearing, the hearing officer may make a determination that the
party has waived his right to a hearing. Both the complainant
and the PHA shall be notified of the determination by the
hearing officer or hearing panel.
The hearing shall be conducted by the hearing officer and oral
or documentary evidence pertinent to the facts and issues
raised by the complaint may be received without regard to
admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable to
judicial proceedings. The hearing officer shall require the
HA, the complainant, counsel and other participants or
spectators to conduct themselves in an orderly fashion.
Failure to comply with the directions of the hearing officer
to obtain order may result in exclusion from the proceedings.
The complainant or the PHA may arrange, in advance and at the
expense of the party making the arrangement, for a transcript
of the hearing. Any interested party may purchase a copy of
such transcript.

DECISION OF THE HEARING OFFICER
A.

The decision of the hearing officer shall be based solely
and exclusively upon evidence presented at the hearing
and upon applicable HA and HUD regulations and State and
Federal Law.

B.

If both parties agree to prepare a proposed decision to
the hearing panel, each party shall submit same to the
hearing panel for its consideration.

C.

The hearing officer shall prepare a written decision,
together with the reasons therefore, within a reasonable
time after the hearing. A copy of the decision shall be
sent to the complainant and the HA. The HA shall retain
a copy of the decision in the tenant's folder. A copy of
such decision, with all names and identifying references
deleted, shall also be maintained on file by the HA and
made
available
for
inspection
by
a
prospective
complainant, his representative, or hearing officer.

D.

The decision of the hearing officer shall be binding on
the Ha and the complainant. The HA shall take all actions
necessary to carry out the decision unless the HA Board
of Commissioners determines within a reasonable time (not

in excess of 3 0 days of the date of the hearing officer's
decision) and promptly notifies the complainant of its
determination that:

6.

1.

The grievance does not concern HA action or
failure to act in accordance with or involving
the complainant's lease on PHA regulations,
which adversely affect
the
complainant's
rights, duties, welfare or status; or

2.

The decision of the hearing officer is
contrary to applicable Federal, State, or
local law, HUD regulations or requirements of
the annual contributions contract between HUD
and the PHA.

PHA EVICTION ACTIONS

If a tenant has requested a formal hearing in accordance with
Section C on a complaint involving HA notice of termination of the
tenancy and the hearing officer upholds the HA's action to
terminate the tenancy, the HA shall not commence an eviction action
in a State or local court until it has served a notice to vacate on
the tenant, and in no event shall the notice to vacate be issued
prior to the decision of the hearing officer having been mailed or
delivered to the complainant. Such notice to vacate must be in
writing and specify that if the tenant fails to quit the premises
within the applicable statutory period, or on the termination date
stated in the notice of termination, whichever is later,
appropriate action will be brought against him and he may be
required to pay court costs and attorney fees.

1.

INAPPLICABILITY OF GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES

The provisions of this grievance procedure are not applicable to
any grievance concerning an eviction or termination of tenancy
based upon a tenantf s creation or maintenance of the threat to the
health or safety of other tenants or HA employees. The H A may
immediately commence an eviction action in accordance with State
Law based on any of the grounds stated in this section.

SECTION XIV

LOCALLY OWNED HOUSING PROGRAM
All preceeding policies, rules and regulations as stated in Section
I - XIV of the Admission and Continued Occupancy Schedule shall be
applicable to applicants and residents of locally owned housing
with the following exceptions:

TENANT RENT

Tenant Rent will be determined
Monthly Adjusted Income as defined
rent which will be established
Housing Authority to ensure the
program.

as the greater of
in Section I or the
from time to time
financial solvency

3 0% of
minimum
by the
of the

